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INTRODUCTION 
This is the City's response in opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration and Objection 
to Proposed Judgment ("Motion for Reconsideration") and in response to the Memorandum in 
Support ofMotionfor Reconsideration ("Memorandum") and Affidavit ofVictor Villegas in 
Support ofMotionfor Reconsideration (''Villegas Affidavit") filed by Plaintiffs on June 29, 
2011. This brief relies on previously defined terms. 
Plaintiffs lost this lawsuit soundly. It is surprising that they continue to stir the pot when 
they have nothing to offer but a rehash of prior arguments and irrelevant new evidence that 
changes nothing. Even if their argument regarding the voluntariness of their actions had merit-
which it does not-it would not change the outcome of this case. 
The City concurs with Plaintiffs that oral argument is unnecessary. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' UTILITY IMPROVEMEl'I'TS CLAIM IS NOTIDNG MORE THAN AN 
ELEMENT OF DAMAGES AND WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED ALONG WITH THE REST 
OF THE LAWSUIT. 
Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum Decision on Defondant 's 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("'Decision") dated June 16, 2011. They also object to the City's 
proposed Judgment submitted on June 27, 2011, which would enter judgment in favor of the City 
on a11 counts. Plaintiffs contend that the Court acted hastily in dismissing the entire lawsuit. 
They recognize, of course, that the Court ruled against their inverse condemnation claim in 
connection with the conveyance of nine lots to be used for community housing. But all is not 
lost, they say, because the Court failed to separately address and discuss their claim for damages 
associated with their utility and other construction improvements on the same nine lots. Thus, 
they insist, the "utility" claim survived unscathed. 




This is a head scratcher. The utility issue is not set out as a separate count in the First 
Amended Complaint. References to both deeds and utility improvements are sprinkled evenly 
throughout each of the three counts. The deed claim and the utility claim both rise and fall on 
the same legal theories. fndeed, they are referred to in the same breath in paragraph 28: 
''PlaintitTs are entitled to be made whole for the value of real property and construction 
improvements which benefitted the City as a result of the City's illegal acts in an amount to be 
proven at trial, but not less than $10,000." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Consistent with the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the City's Afotionfor 
Summary Judgment drew no distinction between the deed claim and the utility claim and plainly 
sought dismissal of all claims: "This motion seeks dismissal with prejudice of all of Plaintiffs' 
claims." Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. Thus, whether it was a separate claim or not, the 
utility claim was put in issue by the City's motion. 
Even if Plaintiffs are aHowed to think up new theories at this stage of the litigation, their 
attempt tore-characterize the utility issue as a separate claim accomplishes nothing. Each of the 
defenses the City presented in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment applies equa1ly to 
the conveyance of the lots and to any improvements made thereon. The "claim" as to the utilities 
is no more than an element of damages, for which Plaintiffs have failed to establish liability. 
They are subject to the same statute oflimitations, the same tort claim notice requirement, the 
same federal ripeness defenses, the same voluntary and exhaustion defenses under IGWST, UC v. 
County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.Jd 56, 62 (2003), and the same equitable defenses. 
(The equitable defenses are the only ones the Court did not reach.) The deed and utility claims 
have the same legal premise-they are unlawful taxes-and arise from the same factual 
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premise--the City forced the Plaintiffs to convey and upgrade the nine lots. The two claims are 
joined at the hip, and there was no need for the Court to discuss them separately in its Decision. 
Curiously, the Plaintiffs saw no need to discuss them separately either-until now. Not 
once in all of their prior briefing or at oral argument did they suggest that there is a separate 
claim (with separate facts and law) with respect to the utility and other construction 
improvements. Not once did they suggest that, in some mysterious way which they have yet to 
explain, they can collect damages for their utility investments when their underlying claim is 
barred by something like six different legal defects (depending on how you count them). 
What this boils down to is that Plaintiffs had an afterthought which they want to preserve 
for appeal. They confess as much at the outset of their Motion: "Plaintiffs move this Court to 
reconsider ... and to preserve the issues addressed here for appeal." Motion at 1-2. 
Plaintiffs' offer of new evidence on the utility issue is not only tardy but pointless. The 
July 26, 2007 email exchange between City staff (Villegas Affidavit, Exh. B) does nothing more 
than explain the City's thinking as to why the developers of Greystone remained bound by their 
earlier commitment to install utilities on the nine lots they had donated to the City. As Mr. 
Millar explained in his email, this was an obligation the developers took on themselves when 
they first platted the property-property that they then intended to develop and sell for a profit. 
Plaintiffs' subsequent decision to convey the lots to the City did nothing to alter this obligation, 
nor did they ask for any such relief. How this changes the Court's evaluation of the various 
defenses raised by the City is a mystery upon which Plaintiffs' Memorandum sheds no light. 




II. THE VOLUNARINESS OF PLAJNTlFFS' ACTION IS FUtllL Y EST ABLlSHED IN THE 
RECORD. 
Plaintiffs contend that reconsideration is appropriate because there is a genuine issue of 
material fact with regard to the voluntariness of their action in donating the nine lots. This is a 
rehash of what they already have argued and lost. 
The City's Findings and Conclusions for both S UB-05-4 and PUD-05-2 issued on April 
27, 2006 each recited the following finding of fact number 16 at page 8: "While the applicant is 
not required to provide a Community Housing Plan, the applicant has agreed to deed nine single 
family residential lots that constitute Phase 3 of the project to the City of McCall to provide 
Community Housing.·· Groenevelt Affidavit, Exhs. P and Q (reproduced here with highlighting 
for the convenience of the Court as Exhibit A). 
Plaintiffs quibble that the Court's Decision appears to attribute this quotation to 
Plaintiffs' application rather than to the City's Findings and Conclusions. If that was an error, it 
is of zero consequence. The fact that this is the City's finding (rather than the Plaintiffs' 
statement) does not make it go away. Plaintiffs never objected to or offered any correction of the 
finding. 
Nor did they offer any correction or retort to the P&Z minutes of April 4, 2006, which 
stated: "Dean Briggs on behalfofSteve Benad [the developer] said they are planning to build 9 
affordable housing lots instead of61ots as originally planned. He advises the houses will be 
deed restricted." Groenevelt Affidavit, Exh. I (reproduced here with highlighting as Exhibit B). 
Nor did they correct or respond to the City Council minutes of April 27, 2006 which 
stated: "Roger Millar, Deputy City Manager, introduced this agenda bill, stating that the 
developer will deed nine lots to the City for community housing. Steve Benad introduced 
himself as the developer for Greystone Village, and explained to Council that he wanted to get 
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some community housing built and available as soon as possible. He urged the Council to 
consider allowing modular homes to be built in this development." Groenevelt Affidavit, Exh. 0 
(reproduced here with highlighting as Exhibit C). 
The Plaintiffs describe these minutes and findings as ''self-serving" statements by the 
City. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 4. But the fact remains that these were contemporary 
statements (not made in response to litigation), and the Plaintiffs never objected to them despite 
the fact that they were part of the official record. Plaintiffs cannot escape the record by saying. 
'"Oh, that that was somebody else talking, not us." 
Plaintiffs complain in their brief that KMST is distinguishable from the present case 
because in KMST"the applicant suggested, in its application, that it dedicate a roadway." 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 4. Plaintiffs appear to forget that their application did too. Plaintiffs' 
application for final plat (dated March 20, 2006) stated: ·'The deed-restricted lots for Phase III 
will be deeded to the City of McCall, please review development agreement for further details." 
Exhibit 1 attached to Motion for Leave to Supplement Summary Judgment Record and to Shorten 
Time (May II, 2011) (reproduced here with highlighting as Exhibit 0). Thus, the Plaintiffs, in 
their own words and in their own application, stated that the lots would be deeded to the City. 
Plaintiffs go on to rehash the affidavits they have previously submitted in a failed effort 
to identify a material fact in dispute. Affidavits by Plaintiffs, their engineers and accountants, 
and a fonner City Council member may create an issue as to their beliefs and attitudes about the 
City's community housing requirements. But so what? This is not relevant to voluntariness 
within the meaning of KloJST. As we have said before, K.\lST is not about voluntariness in the 
sense of a freely offered gift. The developers of KMST were no doubt annoyed and aggravated 
when they were told by ACHD that they needed to dedicate a road. But their actions 
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demonstrated that they agreed to make the dedication nonetheless in order to move their project 
forward expeditiously. That was their choice. That is all that is required to make the action 
voluntary under IG\IST. 
The facts here are at least as compelling as those in KMST, if not more so. Plaintiffs here 
were grandfathered from Ordinance 819. They had no obligation to do anything. They did what 
many developers do; they made a donation to incur good will. If they thought that would speed 
things along. that was no different that the KMST developers who "voluntarily decided to 
dedicate the road to the public in order to speed the approval of its development." KMST, 138 
Idaho at 582, 67 P.3d at 61. As the Idaho Supreme Court said, "Having done so, it cannot now 
claim that its property was 'taken.'" !d. 
The voluntary nature of Plaintiffs· actions is reflected on the face of the final plat 
application (Exhibit D) and the findings and minutes quoted above (Exhibit A, Exhibit B, and 
Exhibit C). If that is not enough, the express words of the Development Agreement signed by 
the Plaintiffs on May 3, 2006 recite and confirm the voluntary nature of the agreement: 
"WHEREAS, the said approvals contain various conditions on which the City and Greystone 
Village have reached agreement and which agreement the City and Greystone Village desire to 
memoriaJize." GroeneveJt Atlidavit, Ex. R (reproduced with highlighting as Exhibit E). These 
are definitive statements. Plaintiffs cannot escape their contemporary words and actions by 
offering self-serving, after-the-fact affidavits describing unspoken things in the heads of various 
players. 
Even these affidavits, however, offer nothing to overcome the voluntariness standard 
established in IGWST. Hehr admitted in his affidavit that the lots were dedicated to the City in 
the interest of furthering the application. ·'[I]t became quite clear to me during the initial stages 
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of the Greystone application process that in order to get all approvals, including building permits 
and sewer connections, Greystone would be required to deal with the City's claimed need for 
community housing in one way or another, or risk being denied somewhere down the line." 
Affidavit of Richard Hehr,, 7. Similarly, Briggs stated in his affidavit: "Mr. Benad made it 
clear to me that for Greystone's application for final plat to be approved and in order to move 
through the application process in an expeditious manner, Greystone would have to address the 
affordable housing issue." Affidavit of Dean W. Briggs, 16. These statements demonstrate 
that Plaintiffs undertook the dedication of the lots and the improvements in order to enhance the 
attractiveness of the project and motivate the City to look favorably on the Greystone 
application, exactly like the plaintiffs in Kl\1ST. 
Next, Plaintiffs contend that the voluntary nature of their actions is drawn into doubt by 
two items in the record. Neither have that effect. 
First, Plaintiffs point to page 7 of the P&Z minutes from May 3, 2005 (Groenevelt 
Affidavit, Exh. B) {reproduced here with highlighting as Exhibit F). These are the minutes that 
paraphrase the P&Z Chainnan's statement as follows: "Chainnan Bailey asked- 'without City 
law behind me'- is that possible to consider between now and the final plat? It's more 
constructive if it's a voluntary project. ... Discussion followed concerning the need for 
affordable housing." Plaintiffs make this point: ·'Had Plaintiffs offered to voluntarily contribute 
to community housing in their application by conveying the nine lots at issue, there would have 
been no need or purpose for this question from the Planning and Zoning Chainnan.·• Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum at 5. That is true. In 2005 Plaintiffs had not yet decided to offer lots to the City. 
At some point in 2006, however, they decided to make this offer, as is shown by all the evidence 
discussed above and as is reflected in their application for final plat (Exhibit D). 
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In any event, the P&Z Chairman's observation made clear that any conveyance to the 
City would be voluntary. Moreover, as the Court has correctly noted, PlaintitTs' offer to deed the 
lots must have been voluntary because Ordinance 819 did not apply to them. 
Second, Plaintiffs point to the letter from their attorney, David Penny, dated April 7, 2006 
which referred to meeting the City's "requirements" for affordable housing: "I need to make 
sure that we have satisfied the city's requirements for providing affordable housing. Greystone 
Village intends to deed to the City of McCall nine (9) affordable housing lots along McCall 
Avenue with the understanding that the value of those lots will be credited against affordable 
housing impact fees/costs." Groenevelt Affidavit, Exh. L. The second sentence of the quotation 
makes evident that the attorney was seeking to confirm that the donated housing would qualifY to 
earn credits under Ordinance 820. There seems little doubt that the Plaintiffs wanted those 
'-Tedits and this was at least a partial motivation for their donation. But the Penny letter does 
nothing to overcome the evident fact that the Plaintiffs chose to make a dedication that was not 
compelled by Ordinance 819. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that their dedication of the nine lots was involuntary because 
the City had a "written, required policy regarding community housing." Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum at 5. For this proposition, they offer for the first time the October 19, 2006 
memorandum by Steven Hasson of the City staff. 1 The City provides a legible copy, attached 
hereto as Exhibit G. 
Aside from being offered late in the process, this document is irrelevant. The Hasson 
memorandum describes a policy that was instituted in late 2006 in response to the Mountain 
1 There is nothing new about this evidence. Plaintiffs' counsel have had access to the October 19, 2006 
email chain for years and apparently relied on it in their earlier litigation, Mountain Central Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. 
City of McCall ("Mountain Central"), Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19, 2008). 
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Central case then pending. After the lawsuit was filed, the City imposed a moratorium on new 
development (Ordinance 827). This was followed by Ordinance 828 that exempted from the 
moratorium applications that proposed voluntary mitigation. The Hasson memorandum 
explained how this would be implemented. Whether mitigation proposed under this policy was 
really voluntary presents an intriguing legal question, but one that has no bearing on this lawsuit. 
The policy described in the Hasson memorandum was developed after the Plaintiffs agreed to 
enter into the Development Agreement on May 3, 2006 and after they conveyed the lots on July 
3 I, 2006-not to mention after the eight earlier events triggering the statute of limitations 
identified as bullet points in the City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 15-16. ln any event, none of this had any applicablity to the Plaintiffs because they 
were subject to neither Ordinance 819, nor the moratorium, nor the mitigation exception. 
CO:SCLUSION 
lf Plaintiffs believed that their utility improvements presented a separate issue with a 
different factual and legal premise, they should have said so. The City's Motion/or Summary 
Judgment put all their claims into play. Plaintiffs cannot now pretend that something less than 
their entire lawsuit was on the block. Their re-argument of the voluntariness issue and offer of 
irrelevant evidence contributes nothing. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is wholly without 
merit and should be denied. The fact that the Court and the City were subjected to this 
unnecessary exercise should be taken into account in weighing the City's forthcoming request 
for attorney fees. 
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DATED this 5th day of JuJy 2011. 
Respectfu1ly submitted, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk 
Valley County Courthouse 
219 Main Street 
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Jed Manwaring, Esq. 
Victor Villegas, Esq. 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
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Exhibit A City Council Findings and Conclusions (Apr.1.7, 1.006) 
The following findings and conclusions for SUB-05-4 and PUD-05-2 were submitted 
previously as Exhibits P and Q to the Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt dated Apr. 4, 2011 ). They 
are reproduced here for the convenience of the Court. 
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McCAU. CITY COUNCIL PLANNING AHD ZONING CoMMISSION 
The Council finds that: 
FINDINGS AND C0NcLtJSK)NS REGARDING 
APPUCATJ()ff FOR 
FINAL PuT APPROVAL 
SUB-05-4 
Greystone VJirag. 
Phase 1, 2, & 3 
1 .. An application for approval of a final plat, pursuant to McCall City Code 3-21 IN&s 
submitted by Briggs Engineering for Steven Benad, the owner of the property 
described below: 
A parcel of land located in PORTIONS OF Gov't lots 1 and 2, Section 9, AND A 
PORTION OF GOV'T LOT 3, SECTION 4, Township 18 North, Range 3 East, 
Boise Meridian, McCall, VAlLEY County, Idaho, more particularly desaibed as 
follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast comer of Section 9, T.18 N .• R 3 E., B.M., McCall, 
VAUEY County, Idaho; thence N 89°52'11" W 1323.64 feet along the north line 
of the NE 1/4 of said Section 9 TO the NE comer of Gov't Lot1, of said Section 
9; thence S o·o7'37" W along THE east line of said Gov't Lot 1 57 4.57 feet to a 
point; thence N 74•59'53• W 39.59 feet to a point on the westerly Right of Way 
for Davis Street, the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING of this subdMsion; 
THENCE S 0°23'10" W ALONG SAID WESTERLY RIGHT OF WAY 51.82 FEET 
TO A POINT; 
THENCE N 75°01'25• W 98.60 FEET TO A POINT OF CURVATURE; 
THENCE ALONG A CURVE TO THE LEFT 62.12 FEET, SAID CURVE HAVING 
A RADIUS OF 435.82 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGLE OF a•10'0Q'<, TANGENTS OF 
31.11 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH SEARS N 79.30'48" W 62.07 FEET TO A 
POINT OF COMPOUND CURVATURE; 
THENCE ALONG A CURVE TO THE LEFT 117.32 FEET. SAID CURVE 
HAVING A RADIUS OF 435.21 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGlE OF 15.26'43", 
TANGENTS OF 59.02 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH BEARSS 88"40'50" W 
116.97 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S a•33'29" W 233.09 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S a•58'20" W 56.60 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 8"29'12" W 20.40 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE N 87" 49'38" W 211.52 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S s•27'31" W 419.82 FEET TO A POINT ON THE NORTH 
BOUNDARY OF McCAU'S FIRST AOOITrON; 
THENCE N 86"45'16" W ALONG SAID NORTH BOUNDARY 162.74 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE CENTERLINE OF ROOSEVELT STREET; 
THENCE S s•42'41" W ALONG SAID CENTERLINE 235.50 FEET TO A POINT 
ON THE NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY OF HEMLOCK STREET; 
THENCE N 81°25'25" W Al.ONG SAID NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY 170.18 
FEET TO THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF MIU RUN CONDO 2A AMENDED; 
McCall City Council 
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THENCE N 8°39'19" E ALONG THE EASTERLY BOUNDARY OF SAID MILL 
RUN CONDO 2AAMENDED 219.41 FEET TOA POINT; 
THENCE S 87°23'11• E CONTINUING ALONG SAID EASTERLY BOUNDARY 
17.40 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE N 14.37'26" E ALONG THE EASTERLY BOUNDARY OF SAID MIU 
RUN CONDO 2A AMENDED AND MIU PARK VILLAGE SUBOIVISlON 1327.83 
FEET TO THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SAID MILL PARK SUBDIVISION, 
SAID POINT BEING ON THE NORTH liNE OF SAID GOV'T LOT 1 AND 
SOUTH LINE OF GOVT LOT 3, SECTION 4; 
THENCE S 89•23'00• E ALONG SAID COMMON GOV7 LOT LJNES 51.55 
FEET TO A POrNT; 
THENCE N 14.41'5r E 593.94 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 75.18'03" E 75.00 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 14.41'57" W 701.16 FEET TO A POINT OF CURVATURE; 
11-IENCE ALONG A CURVE TO THE lEFT 549.27 FEET, SAID CURVE 
HAVING A RADIUS OF 435.16 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 724 19'12", 
TANGENTS OF 318.02 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH BEARSS 37"57'13• E 
513.53 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 74'"59'53• E 164.94 FEET TO THE REAL POINT OF BEGINNING 
OF THIS SUBDIVISION. 
SAID SUBOMSION CONTAINS 11.71 ACRES, MORE OR LESS. 
2. The property in question Is located In the CB Central Business and th8 B Medium 
Density Residentla/ zoning districts. 
3. The applicant is requesting final plat approval to create a subdivision containing 9 
resldenHaJ rots and 24 townhomes on 11.71 acres. 
4. A companion application (PU0-05-2) requests final plan approval of a Planned Urut 
Development for a subdivision containing 9 residential lots and 24 townhomes on 
11.71 aaes, located on the north side ot Hemlock Street, between Mill Road and 
Davis Street 
5. The McCall Planning & Zonmg CommiSSion held a properly posted and noticed 
public hearing on April 5, 2005, at which Ume a Preliminary Plan for the PUD was 
approved by the Commission. The pubRc hearing was continued to May 3, 2005. A 
transcribable record was made of each public hearing. 
6. The Commission received public ttmlmony, reviewed correspondence, and reviewed 
staff reports dated Apri14, 2005 and Aprtl27, 2005 for prefimlnary plan and plat 
approval. 
7. The Commission received public testimony, reviewed correspondence, and reviewed 
a staff report dated March 27, 2006 for final plan and plat approval. 
8. The McCal Area Comprehensive Plan Future land Use Map (Figure 6) identifies the 
subject property as 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential.' It Is 
adjacent to 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential' future land 
uses. 
9. The Commission concluded that the proposed preliminary plat meets the 
requirements of MCC 3-21, subject to certain conditions. 
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10. The preNminary plat for SUB-05-4, Greystone Village, was approved, subject to the 
following conditions: 
1. The applicant shaH realign Mill Poinl Drive to connect directfy to 
Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street The realigned streel shall be 
renamed Roosevelt Avenue and shal be constructed to City standard. 
The right-of-way of Roosevelt Avenue north and south of Hemlock Street 
shall align. 
2. The applicant shal construct sidewalks to City standard on both sides of 
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlock Street to McCall Avenue. 
3. Any parking on Roosevelt Avenue shall be designed to City standard and 
signed to prohibit overnight parking during snow events. 
4. The shared driveway between units 9 through 12 and units 13 through 22 
shall be 40 feet In width and designed to City standard as a private street. 
5. The applicant shall grant an easement between the end of this shared 
driveway and the property to the east to provide pedestrian access and 
emergency vehicle access to this property. The specffies ot this easement 
shaN be addressed in the development agreement. 
6. The applicant shal construct a bicycle path to Oty specifiCations from 
McCall Avenue to Davis Street. 
7. The applicant shaN dedicate a ten foot wide pedestrian easement for the 
portion of the bicycle path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street 
6. The applicant shalt construct a connection to the bicycle path described 
above from the shared driveway adjacent to unit 20. This connection and 
the bicycle path from the connection to Davis Street shall be constructed 
to accommodate emergency vehicles. A vehicle barrier acceptable to the 
City shell be instaKed at DaVis Street to keep traffiC off of the path. 
9. The applicant shall provide pedestrian scale lighting along the bicycle 
path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street 
10. The applicant shaU provide street lighting, street signs and any required 
siop signs at the following Intersections: 
i. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street 
ii. Roosavel1 Avenue and McCall Avenue 
11. All street and pedestrian lighting plans shal be submitted with the final 
plat application. AJI outdoor lighting shall meet the requiremems of the 
proposed Code Title 3, Chapter 14, Outdoor Lighting 
12. Any perimeter fencing shall conform with the following: 
McCall City Council 
f. Perimeter fencing means fencing which, in the opinion of the 
Commission, substantially encloses the property In question. 
Perimeter fencing enclosing residential developments is 
discouraged, except fencing enclosing property with no more than 
two residential units. Perimeter fencing which surrounds, or 
substantially surrounds. a residential sttbdivision shall be primarily 
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constructed of natural materials, such as log paes or split rails. 
Perimeter fencing for residenUal developments shalf have periodic 
openings to allow tor the movement of larger wild animals, such 
as deer and el<, and shall be oonstructed so that the height of the 
top rallls no more than forty two (42) InChes above grade and the 
minimum gap betWeen the bottom rail and grade is fifteen (15) 
inches. Perimeter fencing proposed for a residential development 
is subject to the approval of the Commission either as a part of the 
proposed subdivision or requested via a conditional use permit. 
13. All shared driveways shall meet the following conditions: 
i. Shared driveways shal be constructed to the dimensions of fire 
apparatus access roads per IFC 503.2.1. 
ii. Shared driveways in excess of 150 feet shall have an approved 
turnaround for fire apparatus P« IFC 503.2.5, Appendix D. 
Ill. Additional fire hydrants shan be required at the end of shared 
drtveways per !FC 508.501. 
lv. Hydrant spacing shall be per Table C105.1 of Appendix C of IFC. 
v. The applicant shall prepare a plan detailing hydrant locations to be 
submitted with the final plat application. 
14. The applicant shal prepare construction draWings for the proposed 
landscaping plan for City approval, to Include: 
i. Landscaping along both sides ot Roosevelt Avenue. 
ii. Landscaping along the bicycle path, InclUding benning between 
the bicycle path and the north property line. 
Ill. Landscaping and furnishings {tables, benches, picnic equipment 
and pfayground equipment appropriate to a neighbortlood park 
and acceptable to the CJty} for the open space adjacent to units 17 
through 20. 
iv. Landscaping on the east side of the origlna! railroad embankment. 
15. Maintenance of landscaping {including temporary Irrigation} and 
furnishings In all public lights-ot-way shall be the responsibility of the 
applicant until establishment of plantings, when they will become the 
responsibility of the City of McCall. At the applicant's request, the City 
Atborist shall determine whether the landscaping has beoome established 
and, if established, accept responsibility from the applicant. 
16. The applicant shall submit construction drawings for street, snow storage, 
drainage, water, sewer, and landscaping improvements to the City with 
the final plat application. 
17. The applicant shall submit architectural drawings to the City with the PUO 
final plan application. The Commission will revieW and approve as part of 
a Design Approval Process the design of an multi-family, or two family, 
dweiUng units with the PUO. 
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18. The appllcant shall provfde a permanent emergency access and drainage 
easement as shown on the plat between units 55 and 56 for the benefit of 
property owners to the east. 
19. The applicant shaH negotiate a development agreement with the City prior 
to submittal of the PUO final pfan application. 
20. The applicant shall consider the foHowing in developing the Declaration of 
CCR's to be submitted wtth the PUD final plan application: 
I. The CCR's should Include the six single family rots and not be 
written exclusivety for townhouse development. 
ii. Paragraph 4.2 may be too restrlctlve; the appHcant shoUld 
consider the option to use satellite for television, and it may not be 
practical or possible to make the antennas invisible from the street 
in aff cases. 
iii. Paragraph 4. 16- refers to paragraph 4.17. Is an error. 
iv. Paragraph 5.7.1 -define "fJSCal year". 
v. Paragraph 13.1- revise the date specified. 
vi. Prepare a separate document for a Home OWner's Association 
Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation. 
11. The Commission concluded that the final plat met the following conditions of 
approvat: 
1. The applicant shall realign MIN Point Orlve to connect directly to 
Roosevelt Avenoe at Hemlock Street. The realigned street shall be 
renamed Roosevelt Avenue and shall be constructed to City standard. 
The right-of-way of Roosevelt Avenue north and south of Hemlock Street 
shall align. Mill Point Drives was renamed Roosevelt Avenue and 
connects directly to the existing Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street 
2. The applicant shall construct sidewalks to City standard on both sides of 
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlock Street to McCall Avenue. The applicant 
has agreed to construct the sidewalks on both sides of Roosevelt from 
Hemlocf< to McCal Avenue according McCall City standards. 
3. Any parking on Roosevelt Avenue shaH be designed to City standard and 
signed to prohibit overnight parking during snow events. The applicant 
has agreed to design parking according to the McCall City standards and 
signs wiH be posted to prohibit overnight parking. 
4. The shared driveway between units 9 through 12 and units 13 through 22 
shalf be 40 feet in width and designed to City standard as a private street 
The shared driveways in this condition are not part of Phase 1,11. or Ill. 
This condition will apply to a future phase. 
5. The applicant shall grant an easement between the end of this shared 
driveway and the property to the east to provide pedestrian access and 
emergency vehicle access to this property. The specifics of this easement 
shalf be addressed in lhe development agreement. An easement has 
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been granted between the end of the shared driveway and the property to 
the east. which provides vehlcUar and pedestrian access to the property. 
6. The applicant shaM construct a bicycle path to City speclfic:atlons from 
Meed Avenue to Davis Street The bicycle path Is not part of Phase I, II, 
or Ill but will be completed In a future phase. 
7. The applicant shall dedicate a ten foot wide pedestrian easement for the 
portion of the bicyde path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street The 
easement will be discussed In the development agreement and built as a 
future phase. 
8. The applicant shal construct a connection to the bicycle path described 
above from the shared driveway adjacent to unit 20. This connection and 
the bicycle path from the connection to Davis Street shall be constructed 
to accommodate emergency vehicles. A vehicle barrier acceptable to the 
City shall be installed at Da'oAs Street to keep traffic off of the path. The 
applicant wiH construct an emergency access for vehicles from unit 26 to 
Da'oAB Street In a later phase. This condition was approved by the Mccall 
Fire District. 
9. The applicant shall provide pedestrian scale lighting along the bicycle 
path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street The pedestrian scale 
lighting will be constructed with the bike path during a future phase. 
10. The applicant shalf provide street lighting, street slgos and any required 
stop signs at the following intersections: 
i. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street 
ii. Roosevelt Avenue and McCall Avenue 
The applicant Will provide street lighting for the above referenced 
locations as shown on the PUD final plan. 
11. All street and pedestrian lighting plans shall be submitted with the final 
plat application. All outdoor lighting shalt meet the requirements of the 
proposed Code Title 3, Chapter 14, Outdoor Lighting. 
12. Any perimeter fencing sheU conform with the following: 
McCall City Council 
i. Perimeter fencing means fencing which, in the opinion of the 
Commission, substantially encloses the property in question. 
Perimeter fencing enclosing residential developments is 
discouraged, except fencing enclosing property with no more than 
two residential units. Perimeter fencing which surrounds, or 
substantially surrounds, a residential subdivision shal be primarily 
constructed of natural materials, such as Jog poles ot split raJis. 
Perimeter fencing for residential developments shall have periodic 
openings to allow for the movement of larger wild animals, such 
as deer and elk, and shaU be constructed so that the height of the 
top raR is no more than forty two ( 42) inches above grade and the 
minimum gap between the bottom ran and grade is fifteen { 15) 
inches. Perimeter fencing proposed for a residential development 
is subject to the approval of the Commission either as a part of the 
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proposed subdM$fon or requested via a conditionaJ use permit 
The applicant has agreed to obtain the Commission's approval for 
rendng or obtain a conditional use permlt. 
13. All shared driveways shall meet the folowfng conditions; 
1. Shared drivewa~ shall be constructed to the dimensions of fire 
apparatus access roads per IFC 503.2.1. 
il. Shared drfvewa~ in excess of 150 feet stuUI have an approved 
turnaround for fire apparatus per IFC 503.2.5, Appendix 0. 
Iii. Additional flre hydrants shall be required at the end of shared 
driveways per IFC 508.501. 
iv. Hydrant spacing shal be per Table C105.1 of Appendix C of IFC. 
v. The applicant shaU prepare a plan detaBing hydrant locations to be 
submitted with the final plat application. 
14. All driveways will be constructed to the requirements Rsted above and are 
shown on the final plat/plan. 
15. The applicant shall prepare construction drawings for ttMJ proposed 
landscaping plan for City approval, to Include: 
i. Landscaping along both sides of Roosevelt Avenue. 
ii. Landscaping along the bicycle path, including berming between 
the bicycle path and the north property line. 
iii. Landscaping and furnishings (tables, benches, picnic equJpment 
and playground equipment appropriate to a neighborhood parl< 
and acceptable to the City} for the open space adjacent to units 17 
through 20. 
iv. landscaping on the east side of the orlgJnal railroad embankment 
16. Maintenance of landscaping (including temporary irrigation) and 
furnishings in aU pubic rights-of-way shalf be the responsibility of the 
applicant until estabRshment of plantings, when lhey will become the 
responsibility of the City of McCall. At the applicant's request, the City 
Arborlst shall determine whether the landscaping has become established 
and, if established, accept responslbiNty from the applicant. The appNcant 
has submitted sutftcient landscaping plans. 
17. The applicant shall submit construction drawings for street, snow storage, 
drainage, water, sewer. and landscaping Improvements to the City with 
the final plat application. The City Engineer approved construction plans 
and final platlplan for Phase I and If. 
18. The appficant shall submit architectural drawings to the City with the PUO 
final plan appUcatlon. The Commission will review and approve as part of 
a Design Approval Process for the design of all multi-famUy, or two family, 
dwelling units with the PUO. The appticant submitted elevations of the 
townhouses. 
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19. The applicant shall proVide a pennanent emergency access and drainage 
easement as shown on the plat between units 55 and 56 for the benefit of 
property owners to the east. The easement Is shown on the ftnaJ plan 
and will be discussed in the development agreement 
20. The applicant shall negotiate a development agreement with the City prior 
to submittal of the PUD tlnal plan application. 
21. The applicant shaH consider the following In developing the Declaration of 
CCR's to be submitted with the PUD final plan application: 
I. The CCR's should Include the nine single family lots and not be 
written exclusively for townhouse development. 
il. Paragraph 42 may be too restrictive: the applicant shoutd 
consider the option to use sa1ellite for television, and it may not be 
practical or possible to make the antennas invisible from the street 
in aff cases. 
iii. Paragraph 4. 16- refers to paragraph 4. 17, is an error. 
iv. Paragraph 5. 7.1 - define "fisca\ year". 
v. Paragraph 13.1- revise the date specified. 
vi. Prepare a separate document for a Home Owner's Association 
Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation. 
12. The flnaf plat for SUB-05-4, Greystone VlDage, was recommended for approval by 
the Planning and Zoning Commission. subject to the following conditions that shall 
be met before the City staff places the application on the City Council agenda tor 
consideration: 
a. The applicant shal sign a development agreement with the City pursuant 
to MCC 9-6-06. 
b. The appii<;;ant shalt submit electronic files of the final plat in a form 
specified by the aty. 
13. The applicant has met conditions a and b set by the Planning and Zoning 
Commission. 
14. On February 23, 2006, the McCall City Counal adopted an Amended Wastewater 
Poficy (Re501ution-06-8). 
15. The Wastewater Polley restricts the Issuance of building permits. 
18. While the applicant is not required to provide a ComiTICJrlity Housing Plan, the 
applicant has agrwd to deed the nine single famly resldentiat lots that constitl.lte 
Phase 3 of the project to the City of McCal to provide Community Housing. 
1. The proposed final plat meets the requirements of McCaN City Code, Title 9. 
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2. The City of McCall Wastewater Policy (Resolution 06-08} provides a mechanism 
whereby adequate wastewater capacity can be provided to support the subdivision 
while protecting the public health, safety and welfare. Building permits tor lots in the 
subdMsion will be issued In conformance with the Wastewater Polley, as now enacted, 
and as may be modWled by Council In the future. 
3. The City of McCall accepts the nine single family residential deeded Iota from the 
applicant and the applk:ant will receive the associated benefits of the community 
housing contribution In the building permit allo<;ation process. 
4. The final plat for SUB-05-4, Greystone Village, Is hereby approved with the 
following conditions: 
1 . The applicant shall submit electronic fHes of the final plan in a form specified by 
the City before recording the final plat 
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MCCALL CRY COUNCIL PLANNJNG ANO ZONING COMMISSklN 
The Council finds that: 
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1. All application fot' approval of a final plan, pursuant to McCall City Code 3-21 was 
submitted by Briggs Engineering for Staven Benad, the owrter of the property 
described below: 
A parcel of land located i'l PORTIONS OF Gov't Lots 1 and 2, Section 9, AND A 
PORTION OF GOVT LOT 3, SECTION 4, TO'M"IShlp 18 North, Range 3 East. 
Boise Meridian, McCaM, VALLEY County, Idaho, more particularly described as 
follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast comer of Section 9, T.18 N .• R 3 E., B.M., McCall, 
VAUEY County, Idaho; thence N 89.52'11. W 1323.64 feet along the north fine 
of the NE 1/4 of said Section 9 TO the NE comer of Gov't Lot 1, of said Section 
9; thence s O"OT3r W along THE east lfne of said Gov't Lot 1 574.57 feet to a 
point; thence N 74"59'53" W 39.59 feet to a point on the westerly Right of Way 
for Da'tlis Street, the REAL POINT OF BEGINNING of this subdi\lision; 
THENCE S o•23'10" W ALONG SAID WESTERLY RIGHT OF WAY 51.82 FEET 
TO A POINT; 
ntENCE N 75.01'25"W98.60 FEET TO A POINT OF CURVATURE; 
THENCE ALONG A CURVE TO THE lEFT 62.12 FEET, SAID CURVE HAVING 
A RADIUS OF 435.82 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 8°10'00", TANGENTS OF 
31.11 FEET. AND A CHORD WHICH BEARS N 79.30'48• W 62.07 FEET TO A 
POINT OF COMPOUND CURVATURE; 
THENCE AlONG A CURVE TO THE LEFT 117.32 FEET. SAID CURVE 
HAVING A RADIUS OF 435.21 FEET. A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 15.26'43•, 
TANGENTS OF 59.02 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH BEARSS 88"40'50" W 
116.97 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 8"33'29" W 233.09 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 6"58'20" W 56.60 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 8"29'12" W 20.40 FEET TO A POINT; 
ntENCE N a7•49'38• W 211.52 FEETTOAPOtNT; 
THENCE S 8~7'31• W 419.82 FEET TO A POINT ON THE NORTH 
BOUNDARY OF McCALL'S FIRST ADDITION; 
THENCE N 86•45'16" W ALONG SAID NORTH BOUNDARY 162.74 FEET TO A 
POINT ON THE CENTERUNE OF ROOSEVa T STREET; 
THENCE S 8"42'41" W ALONG SAID CENTERLINE 235.50 FEET TO A POINT 
ON THE NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY OF HEMLOCK STREET; 
THENCE N 81"25'2s- W ALONG SAID NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY 170.18 
FEET TO THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF MILL RUN CONDO 2A AMENDED; 
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THENCE N 8"39't9• E ALONG THE EASTERLY BOUNDARY OF SAID MILL 
RUN CONOO 2A AMENDED 219.41 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 87"23'11" E CONT1NUING ALONG SAID EASTERLY BOUNDARY 
17.40 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE N 14"37'26• E ALONG THE EASTERlY BOUNDARY OF SAID MIU 
RUN CONDO 2A AMENDED AND MIU PARK VILLAGE SUBDIVISION 1327.83 
FEET TO THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SAID MILL PARK SUBOMSION, 
SAID POINT BEING ON THE NORTH LINE OF SAID GOV'T LOT 1 AND 
SOUTH LINE OF OOV'T LOT 3, SECTION 4; 
THENCE S 89°23'00" E AlONG SAID COMMON GOV'T LOT LINES 51.55 
FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE N 14*41'57" E 593.94 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 75" 18'03" E 75.00 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 14"41'57" W 701.16 FEET TOA POINT OF CURVATURE; 
THENCE AlONG A CURVE TO THE LEFT 549.27 FEET, SAID CURVE 
HAVING A ~US OF 435.16 FEET, A CENTRAL ANGLE OF 72.19'12", 
TANGENTS OF 318.02 FEET, AND A CHORD WHICH BEARS S 37"57'13" E 
513.53 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE S 74"59'53" E 164.94 FEET TO THE REAl POINT OF BEGINNING 
OF THIS SUBDIVISION. 
SAID SUBDIVISION CONTAINS 11.71 ACRES. MORE OR LESS. 
2. The property in question is located in the CB Central Business and the B Medium 
Density Residential zoning districts. 
3. The applicant is requesting final plan approval to create a planned unit development 
containing 9 residential lots and 24 townhomes on 11.71 acres. 
4. A companion application (SUB-Q5-4} requests final plat approval of a subdivision 
containing 9 residential lots and 24 townhomes on 11.71 acres, located on the north 
side of Hemlock street, between MiU Road and Davis Street 
5. The Mccall Planning & Zoning CommisSion held a property posted and noticed 
public hearing on April 5, 2005. at which time a Preliminary Plan for the PUD was 
approved by the Commission. The pub~c hearing was continued to May 3, 2005. A 
transcribable record was made of each pubic hearing. 
6. The CommiSsion received public testimony, reviewed correspondence, and reviewed 
staff reports dated Apri14, 2006 and Aprll27, 2005 for preliminary plan and plat 
approval. 
7. The Commission received public testimony, reviewed correspondence, and reviewed 
a staff report dated March 27, 2006 for final plan and plat approval. 
8. The McCall Area Comprehensive Plan Future land Use Map {Figt.lre 6) identffles the 
subject property as 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential.' It is 
adjacent to 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential' future land 
uses. 
9. The Commission concluded that the proposed preliminary plan meets the 
requirements of MCC 3-21, subject to certain conditions. 
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10. The preliminary plan for PUO-o5-2, Greystone VHiage, was approved, subject to the 
following conditions: 
1. The appQcant shall realign Mill Point Drive to connect directly to 
Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street The realigned street shall be 
renamed Roosevelt Avenue and shall be constructed to City standard. 
The right-of-way of Roosevelt Avenue north and south of Hemlock Street 
shall align. 
2. The applicant shall construct sidewalks to City standard on both sides of 
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlock Straet to McCall Avenue. 
3. My parking on Roosevelt Avenue shall be designed to City standard and 
signed to prohibit overnight parking during snow events. 
4. The shared driveway between units 9 through 12 and units 13 through 22 
shall be 40 feet in widfh and designed to City standard as a private street. 
5. The applicant shaN grant an easement between the end of this shared 
driveway and the property to the east to provide pedestrian access and 
emergency vehicle access to this property. The specifics of this easement 
shaM be addressed in the development agreement. 
6. The applicant shall construct a bicycle path to Clty specifications from 
McCall Avenue to Davis Street. 
7. The applicant shall dedicate a ten foot wide pedestrian easement for the 
portion of the bicycle path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street. 
8. The applicant shal construct a connection to the bicycle path described 
above from the shared driveway adjacent to unit 20. This connection and 
the bicycle path from the COMec1lon to Davis Street shalt be constructed 
to accommodate emergency vehicles. A vehicle barriet acceptable to the 
City shall be Installed at Davis Street to keep tratffc off of the path. 
9. The applicant shal provide pedestrian scale Hghting along the bicycle 
path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street 
10. The applicant shall provide street lighting, street signs and any required 
stop signs at the following intersections: 
i. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street 
ii. Roosevelt Avenue and McCall Avenue 
11. AI street and pedestrian lighting plans shall be submitted with the final 
plat application. All outdoor lighting shall meet the requirements of the 
proposed Code Title 3, Chapter 14, Outdoor Lighting 
12. Any perimeter fencing shall coofonn with the foNowing: 
McCall City Council 
i. Perimeter fencing means fencing which, in the opinkJn of the 
Commisston, substantially encloses the property In question. 
Perimeter fencing enclosing residential developments is 
discouraged, except fencing enclosing property with no more than 
two residential units. Perimeter fencing which surrounds, or 
substantially surrounds, a residential subdivision shad be prlmanty 
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constructed of natural materials, such as tog poles or split rails. 
Perimeter fencing for resldenlfaJ developments shal have periodic 
openings to alloW for the movement of larger witd animals, such 
as deer and elk. and shalt be constructed so that the height of the 
top rall is no more than forty 1wo ( 42) Inches above grade and the 
minimum gap between the bottom ralJ and grade Is fifteen (15) 
Inches. Penmeter fencing proposed for a res\dential development 
is subJect to the approval ot the CommissiM eiltler as a part of the 
proposed subdivision or requested vie a conditional Ll88 permit. 
13. AJI shared driveways shaft meet the following conditions: 
i. Shared driveways shall be constructed to the dimensions of fire 
apparatus access roads per IFC 503.2.1. 
ii. Shared driveways in excess of 150 feet shall have an approved 
turnaround for flre apparab.JS per IFC 503.2.5, Appendix D. 
iii. Additional fie hydrants shall be required at the end ot shared 
driveWays per IFC 508.501. 
lv. Hydrant spacing shall be per Table C1 05.1 of Appendix C of IFC. 
v. The applicant shal prepare a plan detailing hydrant locations to be 
submitted with the final plat application. 
14. The applicant shal prepare construction drawings for the proposed 
landscaping plan for City approval, to include: 
i. Landscaping along both sides of Roosevelt Avenue. 
II. Landscaping along the bicycle path. including bermlng between 
the bicycle path and the north property Una. 
iii. LandScaping and furnishings (tables, benches, picnic equipment 
and playground eqUipment apPropriate to a neighborllood park 
and acceptable to the City) for the open space adjacent to units 17 
through 20. 
iv. Landscaping on the east side of the original railroad embankment 
15. Maintenance of landscaping (Including temporary irrigation) and 
furnishings In all public rights-of-way shall be the responslbNity of the 
applicant until establishment of plantings, when they wll become the 
responsibility of the City of McCaN. At the applicant's request, the City 
Arborlst shall determine whether the landscaping has become established 
and, if established, accept responsibility from the applcant. 
16. The applicant shal submit construdfon drawings for street. snow storage. 
drainage, water, sewer, and landscaPing Improvements to the City with 
the tfn~ plat application. 
17. The applicant shall submit architectural drawings to the City with the PUD 
final plan application. The Commisseon wilf review and approve as part of 
a Design Approval Process the design of all mulfi..family, or t'NO family, 
dwellng units with the PUD. 
McCall Clty Counolt 
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18. The applcant shal provide a permanent emergency access and drainage 
easement aa shown on the plat between units 55 and 56 for the benefit of 
property owners to the east. 
19. The appkant shall negotiate a development agreement with the City prior 
to submjttai Qf the PUD final plan apPJicatlon. 
20. The applicant shall consider the folaowing In developing the Declaration of 
CCR's to be submitted With the PUO final plan application: 
I. The CCR's should include the six single family lots and not be 
written exclusively for townhouse development 
il. Paragraph 4.2 may be too restrictive; the applicant should 
consider the option to use satefflte for television, and It may not be 
practical or possble to make the antennas lnWJible from the street 
in all cases. 
iii. Paragraph 4. t 6 - refers to paragraph 4.17. is an error. 
iv. Paragraph 5.7.1- define "fiscal yea(. 
v. Paragraph 13. 1 - revise the date specified. 
vl. Prepare a separate document for a Home Owner's AsSOCiation 
Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation. 
11. The Commission concluded that the final ·ptan met the following conditions of 
approval: 
1. The applicant shall realign Mil Point Drive to connect directly to 
Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street. The realigned street shall be 
renamed Roosevelt Avenue and shaH be constructed to City standard. 
The right-of-way of Rooseveft Avenue north and south of Hemlock Street 
shall align. MRI Point Drives was renamed Roosevelt Avenue and 
connects directly to the existing Roosevelt Avenue at Hemlock Street 
2. The applk;ant shaft construct sidewalks to City standard on both sides of 
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlo<>k Street to Mcealf Avenue. The applicant 
has agreed to construct the sidewalks on both side$ of Roosevelt from 
Hemlock to McCall Awnue according McCall City standards. 
3. Any parking on Roosevelt Avenue shaU be designed to City standard and 
signed to prohibit overnight parSdng during snow events. The applcant 
has agreed to design parking according to the McCall City standards and 
signs ~ be posted to prohibit overnigtlt parking. 
4. The shared driveway between units 91tlroogh 12 and units 13 through 22 
shall be 40 feet In width and designed to City standard as a private street 
The shared driveways in this condition are not part of Phase I, II, or Ill. 
This condition wiH apply to a future phase. 
5. The applicant shall grant an easement between the end of this shared 
driveway and the property to the eest to provide pedeslrian access and 
emergency vehicle access to this property. The specifics ot this easement 
shall be addressed In dle devetopment agreement. An easement has 
McCal City Counel 
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been granted between the end of the shared driveway and the property to 
the east, which provides vehicular and pedestrian access to the property. 
6. The applicant shall construct a bicyde path to aty specifications from 
McCall A\18008 to Davis Street The bicycle path is not part of Phase I, II, 
or Ill but will be completed in a future phase. 
7. The appBcant shall dedicate a ten foot wide pedestrian easement for the 
portion af the bicycle path from Rooseveft Avenue to Davis Slreel The 
easement will be discussed In the development agreement and buitt as a 
future phase. 
8. The applicant shaM construct a connection to !he bicycle path described 
abo'Je tmm the shared driveway adjacent to unit 20. This connectiOn and 
the bicycle path from the connection to Davis Street shall be constructed 
to accommodate emergency vehkles. A IJehicJe barrier acceptable to the 
City shall be Installed at Davis Street to keep trafflc off of the path. The 
applicant wiN construct an emergency access tor vehides from unit 26 to 
Davis Street in a later phase. This condition was approved by the MccaU 
Fire DistriCt. 
9. The applicant shaU provide pedestrian scale lighting along the bicycle 
path from Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street. The pedesfiian scale 
lighting will be constructed with the bike path during a future phase. 
10. The applicant shall provide street lighting, street signs and any required 
stop signs at the following Intersections: 
1. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street 
u. Roosevelt Avenue and McCall Avenue 
The applicant wll provide street lighting for the above referenced 
tocattons as shown on the PUD final plan. 
11. All street and pedestrian lighting plans shall be submitted with the final 
plat application. AU outdoor lighting shaU meet the requirements of the 
proposed COde TIHe 3, Chapter 14, OUtdoor lighting. 
12. Any perimeter fencing shalf confonn with lt1e following: 
McCalt City Cooncil 
i. Perimeter fencing means fendng which, in the opinion ot the 
Commission, substantially encloses the property in question. 
Perimeter fencing enctosing residential developments Is 
discouraged, except fencing enclosing property with no more than 
two residential units. Perimeter fencing which surrounds, or 
substantially surrounds. a residential subdivision shall be primarily 
constructed of natural materials, such as log poles or split rails. 
Perimeter fencing for residential developments shaM have periodic 
openklgs to allow for the movement of larger wild animals, StiCh 
as deer and el<, and shall be constructed so that the height ot the 
top rail is no more than forty two ( 42) inches above grade and the 
minimum gap between the bottom rail and grade is fifteen (15) 
inches. Perimeter fencing proposed for a residential development 
Is subject to the approval of the Commission either as a part of the 
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proposed subdMslon or requested via a conditional use permit. 
The applicant has agreed to obtain the Commission's approval for 
fencing or obtain a conditional use pennit. 
13. Ail shared driveways shaN meet the following conditions: 
i. Shared driveways shal be constructed to the dimensions of tire 
apparatus access roads per IFC 503.2.1. 
ii. Shared driveways In excess of 150 feet shall have an approved 
tumarnund for fire apparatus per IFC 503.2.5, Appendix D. 
iii. Additional fir& hydrants shall be required at the end of shared 
driveways per IFC 508.501. 
lv. Hydrant spacing shalt be per Table C105.1 of Appendix C of IFC. 
v. 1lle applicant shaU prepare a plan detaiUng hydrant tocatlons to be 
submitted with the final plat applicatiOn. 
14. All driveways will be constructed to the requirements listed above and are 
shown on the final plat/plan. 
15. The applicant shall prep81'8 construction drawings for the proposed 
landscaping plan tor City approval, to indude: 
1. Landscaping along both sides of Roosevelt Avenue. 
II. Landscaping along the bicycle path, including benning between 
the bicycle path and the north property line. 
ill. Landscaping and furnishings (tables, benches, picnic equipment 
and playground equipment appropriate to a neighborhood park 
and acceptable to the City) for the open space adjacent to units 17 
through 20. 
lv. landscaping on the east side of the original railroad embankment. 
16. Maintenance of landscaping (lnduding temporary irrigation) and 
furnishings in all pubfic rights-of-way shal be the responsibility of the 
applicant until establishment of plantings, when they will become the 
responsibility of lhe City of McCall. At the applicant's request the City 
Arborlst shall determine whether the landscaping has become established 
and, if established, accept responsibility from the applicant. The applicant 
has submitted sufficient landscaping plane. 
17. The applicant shall submit construction drawings for street, snow storage, 
drainage, water, sewer, and landscaping improvements to the City With 
the final plat application. The City Engineer approved construction plans 
and final plat/plan for Phase I and 11. 
18. The applicant shal submit architectural drawings to the City with the PUO 
ffnaf plan application. The Commission wiff review and approve as part of 
a Design Approval Process ror the design of aB multi-family, or t\W family, 
dwelling units with the PUO. The applicant submitted elevations of the 
townhouses. 
M<:Call City Council 
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19. The applcant shaY pro'iide a permanent emergency access and drainage 
easement as shown on the plat between units 55 and 56 for the benefit of 
property Ownef'1 to the easl The easement Is shown on the final plan 
and will be discussed in the development agreement 
20. The applicant shall negoUate a development agreement with the City prior 
to submittal of the PUD final plan application. 
21. The applicant Shall consider the following in developilg the Declaration of 
CCR's to be submitted with the PUD final plan application: 
i. The CCR's should Include the rnne single family lots and not be 
written exclusively for townhouse developmenl 
ii. Paragraph 4.2 may be too restrictive; the applicant shot.rid 
consider the option to use satellite for television, and it may not be 
practfcal or possible to make the antennas invisible from the street 
in all cases. 
ill. Paragraph 4. 16- refers to paragraph 4.17, is an error. 
iv. Paragraph 5. 7.1 -define ·nscal year". 
v. Paragraph 13. 1 -revise the date specified. 
vi. Prepare a separate document for a Home Owner's Association 
Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation. 
12. The final plan for PUD-05-2, Greystone Village, was recommended for approval by 
the Planning and Zoning Commission, subject to the following conditions that shalt 
be met before the City staff places the appftcatlon on the City Council agenda for 
consideration: 
a. The applicant shall sign a development agreement with the City pursuant 
to MCC 9-8-06. 
b. The applicant shall submit e~tronic files of the final plat in a form 
spec:ifled by the City. 
13. The applicant has met conditions a and b set by the Planning and Zoning 
Commission. 
14. On February 23, 2006. the McCall City Council adopted an Amended Wastewater 
PoUcy (Resolution-06-8}. 
15. The Wastewater Policy restricts the issuance of building pet1l'Uts. 
16. While the applicant Is not required to provide a Comnunty Housing Plan, the 
applicant has agreed to deed the nine single fanjy residential lots that constitute 
Phase 3 ot the proiect to the City of McCall to provide Community Housing. 
The Council concludes that: 
f. The proposed finat plan meets the requirements of McCan City Code, Title 9. 
McCall City Council 
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2. The City of McCaN Wastewater PoHcy {Resolution 06-08) provides a mechanism 
whereby adequate wastewater capacity can be provided to support the subdivision 
while protecting the poblfc health, safety and welfare. BuRdlng pemtlts for lots In the 
subdivision will be issued in confoonance with the Wastewater Policy, as now enacted, 
and as may be modlfled by Council in the future. 
3. The aty of McCall accepts the nine single family residential deeded lots from the 
applicant and the applicant will receive the associated benefits of the community 
housing contribution In the building permit aDocation process. 
4. The final plan for PUC-05-2. Greystone Vlftage, is hereby approved with the 
following conditions; 
1. The applicant shall submH electronic files of the final plan in a form specified by 
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McCall Area 
Planning and Zoning Commission 
Meeting Minutes 
April 4, 2001 
CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL 
Chainnan Bob Youde called the McCall Planning and Zoning Commission meeting to 
order at 6:00 pm. Commissioners Jeff Schaedler, Phil Feinberg and Sarah Jessup were 
present 
REVIEW & APPROVAL QF MINUTES 
The March 7, 2006 minutes were approved as read. 
OLD BUSINESS 
No old business items. 
NEW BUSINESS 
PRE·APPLJCA TfON 
1103 McCall Avenue 
Heather Fried ricks from McCall Design: A request for a pre-application meeting for 1103 
McCall Avenue to (a) rezone from CBD to R4 or (b) add live work space to the project to 
conform to the requirements of the underlying zone. NOT A PUBLIC HEARING. 
Ms. Friedricks said the property at 1103 McCall Avenue is currently zoned in the Central 
Business District but it is a residential project Since the residential house is located in 
the CBO, an addition is not allowed because it is a non-conforming use. Therefore, they 
could either incorporate commercial use into the project which is not the first choice or 
apply for a rezone which appears that R4 would be the most suitable for the project. She 
showed the Commission the site plan. She explained her client was considering a bed 
and breakfast however on-site parking is an issue. She said she they are looking for 
guidance from the Commission as to which direction they should go considering the 
challenges they are facing. The parcel is mostly surrounded by single-family residences. 
The Commission directed staff to look into the issue of spot zoning. Staff will get back to 
the applicant as soon as possible. 
SUB-05-4 
Greystone Village 
The applicant is requesting final plan approval of a Planned Unit Development and final 
plat approval for a subdivision containing 9 residential lots and 24 town-homes on 11.71 
acres, located on the north side of Hemlock Street, between McCall Avenue and Davis 
Street. The remaining 28 town-homes. bike path, and the emergency access from 
Roosevelt Avenue to Davis Street will be developed in a future phase. Phase 1 & 2 
encompass the townhouse and Phase 3 includes the 9 single family lots. NOT A 
PUBLIC HEARING. 
The McCall Area Comprehensive Plan Future land Use Map identifies the subject 
property as 'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential.' It is adjacent to 
'Central Business District' and 'Medium Density Residential' future land uses. 
The project is proposed to be served by City water and sewer. 
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The interior road is proposed to be public. Access to individual town-homes will be from 
shared driveways off of the interior road. Access to the subdivision will be from public 
roads (i.e. Mill Road and Roosevelt Avenue). The shared driveways specifics will be 
covered in the development agreement. 
Staff recommends that the Planning & Zoning Commission approve the final plat for 
SUB-05-4 and recommend approval of the final plan for PU0-05-2, subject to the 
following conditions: 
1. The applicant shall sign a development agreement with the City pursuant 
to MCC 9.6.06. 
2. The applicant shall submit electronic files of the final plat in a form 
specified by the City. 
The City Council must also approve the Final Plat and Plan. 
Dean Briggs on behalf of Steve Benad said they are planning to build 9 affordable 
housing lots instead of 6 lots as originally planned. He advised the houses will be deed 
restricted. The question was brought forth to Mr. Millar if this could be possible since the 
preliminary plat was approved with 6. Mr. Millar looked this up in the City Code and 
advised that since the amendment is less than a 10% increase the conditions of 
approval is acceptable. 
Commissioner Schaedler made a motion to approve SUB 05-04 with the conditions as 
submitted, Commissioner Jessup seconded, and the motion carried. 
PUD-05-2 
Greystone Viflage 
Briggs Engineering, representing Steve Benad: A request for final plan approval for a 
Planned Unit Development Phase 1, 2, and 3 containing 24 townhouses and 9 single 
family lots, north of Hemlock Street. east of McCall Avenue and west of Davis Street. 
NOT A PUBLIC HEARING. 
The final plan for PUD-05-2, Greystone Village, is hereby recommended for approval, 
subject to the following conditions that shall be met before the City staff places the 
application on the City Council agenda for consideration: 
1. The applicant shall sign a development agreement with the City pursuant to MCC 
9-6-06. 
2. The applicant shall submit electronic files of the final plan in a form specified by 
the City 
Commissioner Schaedler made a motion to approve PUD 05-02 with the conditions as 
submitted, Commissioner Jessup seconded, and the motion carried. 
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SUB-05-1 
Whitetail, Phase II 
The applicant is requesting both final plat and final plan approval for the second phase of 
a Planned Unit Development containing 130 single family residential lots on 
approximately 335 acres. NOT A PUBLIC HEARING. 
The Future Land Use Map in the McCall Area Comprehensive Plan identifies the 
property as ·'Low Density Residential.· It is bordered by other properties identified as 
"Low Density Residential." 
Staff recommends that the Planning & Zoning Commission recommend approval of the 
final plat for SUB-05-1 and the final plan for PUD-05-1 with conditions. Draft Findings 
and Condusions for each application are attached. 
Steve Millemann addressed the Commission and advised them they are working with 
ITO on improvements to Gun Hill Rd. Club Hill Blvd and Hwy 55. ITO will be conducting 
a speed study to look at the feasibility of decreasing the speed limit. Chairman Youde 
asked Mr. Millemann if he could foresee any problems with the conditions of approval to 
which he replied that they did not. 
Commissioner Schaedler recused himself. Chairman Youde made a motion to approve 
SUB-05-1 with conditions # 1-10 listed in the Findings and Conclusions, Commissioner 
Feinberg seconded, and the motion carried. 
PUD-05-1 
Whitetail, Phase II 
Steve Millemann for Whitetail, A Club for All Seasons LLC and Summit Resources, Ltd.: 
A request for final plan approval for a Planned Unit Development containing 130 single 
family lots on approximately 335 acres located at Part of Sections 12 and 13, Township 
18 North, Range 2 East, B.M., Valley County, Idaho. NOT A PUBLIC HEARING. 
Chairman Youde asked Mr. Millemann and John Sabala if they had any problems with 
the 5 conditions of approval to which they replied they did not. 
Chairman Youde made a motion to approve PUD-05-1 with the five conditions, 
Commissioner Jessup seconded and the motion carried. 
SUB-04-15 
Timbercrest, Phase II 
The applicant is requesting final plat approval for Phase 2 of a subdivision containing 20 
residential lots on 7.24 acres, located on Verita Road (west side of Boydstun Road 
between Pinedale and Rio Vista). 
The Future Land Use Map in the McCall Area Comprehensive Plan identifies the 
property as "Low Density Residential.· It is bordered by other properties identified as 
"Low Density Residential" and "Rural Residential.· 
The Planning and Zoning Commission approved the preliminary plat for the subdivision, 
subject to conditions. The applicant has met all the conditions relevant to Phase 2. 
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The applicant will need a letter from CH2MHill recommending engineering approval of 
the final plat and construction drawings before staff places the application on the City 
Council agenda. 
Staff recommends that the Planning & Zoning Commission approve SUB-04-15. Draft 
Findings and Conclusions are attached. 
The City Council must approve the Final Ptat 
Neither the applicant. nor a representative was present. 
Commissioner Feinberg recused himself from voting. Chairman Youde made a motion 
to approve SUB-04-15. Commissioner Schaedler seconded, and the motion carried. 
SUB-05-14 
Broken Ridge Commons 
The subdivision application, Broken Ridge Commons, is a modification of Broken Ridge 
Subdivision Phase 3. The applicant is proposing the final plat approval to create four 
lots on the parcel. The applicant is proposing to construct Phase 1 (lot 1) which includes 
72 condominium units in 9 multi-family structures on a nine acre lot. 
The Future Land Use Map in the McCall Area Comprehensive Plan identifies the 
property as "High Density Residential." It is bordered by other properties identified as 
''Medium Density Residential" and "Industrial." 
The applicant shall submit an application to rezone lots 2, 3, and 4 to Community 
Commercial prior to submitting applications for building permits on lot 1. 
The project is proposed to be served by City water and Payette Lakes Recreational 
Water and Sewer District (PLRWSD) sewer. The applicant must verify with PLRWSD 
that the district has adequate capacity to serve the proposed development and provide 
documentation of same with the final plat application. 
Commissioner Schaedler made a motion to approve SUB-05-14. Commissioner 
Feinberg seconded, and the motion carried. 
ADJOURNMENT 
As there was no further discussion, Chairman Youde adjourned the meeting at 7:30 p.m. 
ATTEST: 
Robert Youde 
Planning and Zoning Commission 
Chairman 
McCall Area Planning and Zoning Commission 
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CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL 
Mayor Robertson called the regular meeting of the McCall City Council to 
order at 6:03 p.m. Council Member Kraemer, Mayor Robertson, and Council 
Member Scott (by telephone) answered roll call. A quorum was present. 
Council Member Bailey and Council Member Bertram were absent. 
Bill Nichols, City Attorney, was present. 
City staff members present were City Manager Lindley Kirkpatrick, City 
Manager; Roger Millar, Deputy City Manager; and Joanne York, City Clerk. 
Michelle Groenevelt, Community Development Planner, joined the meeting in 
session. 
Mayor Robertson led the audience in the Pledge of Allegiance. 
PUBLIC COMMENTS 
ROBERTSON opened the meeting to Public Comments at 6:04 p.m. Hearing 
no comments, he closed the Public Comments at 6:05 p.m. 
CONS EN f AGENDA 
There was a brief discussion concerning the Consent Agenda. 
City Council Minutes - Regular IIAeellng 
Page 1 of 5 
April 27' 2006 
426 
MCCALL CITY COUNCIL- REGULAR MEETING 
APRIL 27, 2006 
ROBERTSON moved to adopt the Consent Agenda as presented. KRAEMER 
seconded the motion, and the motion carried. 
BUSINESS /\GENOA 
AB 06-94 Reoort from the Library Advisorv Board 
Robyn Armstrong presented a report from the Library Advisory Board, including 
the history of the board, their Strategic Plan Mission Statement, current 
activities, and future goals. 
The Council expressed their appreciation to the library Advisory Board for their 
commitment to improving and expanding the library. 
AB 06-96 Vallev Adams Regional Housing Authority Joint Powers 
Agreement Resolution 06-11 
Roger Millar, Deputy City Manager, introduced this agenda bill, and recounted 
the process that culminated in forming the Housing Authority. Greg Lovell, 
McCall's representative to the Housing Authority, was elected chairman at their 
first meeting. 
ROBERTSON noted a clerical error in Resolution 06-13, paragraph 5. 
Mr. Millar informed the Council that a Request for Proposal had gone out for an 
entity needed to oversee community housing on city properties, to begin in 
July. 
ROBERTSON moved to adopt Resolution 06-13, with the correction as noted, 
and authorize the Mayor to sign the necessary documents. KRAEMER 
seconded the motion, and the motion carried. 
AB 06-81 MIC 2006 Gem Action Plan 
Curt Spalding, Chairman of the McCall Improvement Committee (MIC), 
introduced himself and said he was available for any question from Council 
concerning this plan. The Council expressed satisfaction with the plan as 
presented. 
ROBERTSON moved to approve the MIC's recommended list of priority 
projects and adopt the 2006 Gem Action Plan. KRAEMER seconded the 
motion, and the motion carried. 
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Page2 of5 
April 27. 2006 
427 
MCCALL CITY COUNCIL- REGULAR MEETING 
APRIL 2 7, 2006 
AB 06-90 SUB-QS--4 and PUD-QS-2 Greystone Village Final Plat. Final Plan and 
related Development Agreement 
Roger Millar, Deputy City Manager, introduced this agenda bill, stating that the 
developer will deed nine lots to the City for community housing. 
Steve Benad introduced himself as the developer for Greystone Village, and 
explained to Council that he wanted to get some community housing built and 
available as soon as possible. He urged the Council to consider allowing 
modular homes to be built in this development. 
KRAEMER moved to adopt the draft Findings and Conclusions and approve 
the Final Plat for SUB-05--4 and the Final Plan for PUD-05-2, Greystone 
Village. SCOTT seconded the motion. In a roll call vote, KRAEMER, SCOTT, 
and ROBERTSON voted aye, and the motion carried. 
ROBERTSON moved to approve the related Development Agreement and 
authorize the Mayor to sign. KRAEMER seconded the motion. In a roll call 
vote, ROBERTSON, KRAEMER, and SCOTT voted aye, and the motion carried. 
AB 06-95 SUB-05-02 Spring Mountain Meadows Final Plat and related 
Development Agreement 
Michelle Groenevelt, Community Development Planner, introduced this item. 
KRAEMER moved to adopt the draft Findings and Conclusions and approve 
the Final Plat for SUB-05-2, Spring Mountain Meadows, and approve the 
related Development Agreement and authorize the Mayor to sign. 
ROBERTSON seconded the motion. In a roll call vote, KRAEMER, 
ROBERTSON, and SCOTT voted aye, and the motion carried. 
AB 06-9] McCall-Donnelly School District Bond Proposal 
lindley Kirkpatrick, City Manager, reminded the Council that this was a follow-
up to the discussion from last week's meeting since Council had wanted to have 
a week to decide whether or not to give public support to the School District. 
ROBERTSON stated that he believed that supporting the bond issue was the 
right thing to do. KRAEMER also voiced his support. SCOTT expressed her 
support, stating there was also a safety factor in the need to separate the grade 
school students from the high school students. 
SCOTT moved to support the passage of the bond proposed by the School 
District. ROBERTSON seconded the motion, and the motion carried. 
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ROBERTSON requested that Tom Grote, Editor of The Star-News, publish a 
statement of support from Council. 
REPORTS 
Bill Nichols, City Attorney, distributed copies of his Clients Services Survey to 
the Council and discussed the results with them. 
Mr. Nichols also reported to the Council that the Fish Pen Dock judicial review 
was scheduled for argument on May 31, 1 0 a.m., in Cascade. He said 
members of the Council were welcome to attend if they were interested, but 
their attendance was neither necessary nor required. 
Lindley Kirkpatrick, City Manager, stated he had submitted his written report to 
Council and asked if there were any questions. 
There was a brief discussion concerning Chad Olsen's agreement for the 
Boydstun Street water line improvements. Mr. Millar, Deputy City Manager, said 
the deadline for Mr. Olsen to begin work was May 8. 
At 6:55 p.m., ROBERTSON moved to go into Executive Session. KRAEMER 
seconded the motion. In a roll call vote, ROBERTSON, KRAEMER. and SCOTI 
voted aye, and the motion carried. 
EXECUTIVE SESSION 
Executive Session was held pursuant to Idaho Code §67-2345(1 )(f), to 
discuss litigation issues. 
At 8:05 p.m., ROBERTSON moved to return to open session. KRAEMER 
seconded the motion. In a roll call vote, ROBERTSON, KRAEMER, and SCOTI 
voted aye, and the motion carried. 
ROBERTSON moved to authorize Bill Nichols, City Attorney, to proceed with 
condemnation of properties on Boydstun Street. KRAEMER seconded the 
motion, and the motion carried. 
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ADJOURNMENT 
Without further business, ROBERTSON adjourned the meeting at 8:06p.m. 
William A. Robertson, Mayor 
ATTEST: 
Joanne E. York, City Clerk 
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The following document was provided to the Court earlier as Exhibit l to Motion for 
Leave to Supplement Summary Judgment Record and to Shorten Time (May 11, 20 ll ). At oral 
argument, Plaintiffs offered no objection to the exhibit. It is reproduced here for the convenience 
of the Court. 
CITY'S REsPONSE BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 





Honorable Mayor and McCall City Council 
216 Bast Part Street 
McCa11, Idabo 83638 
RE: Pbuuaed Uait Develop.._t Fblal P1aa!Fblal Plat 
On behalf of my client Steve Benad and Greysmno ViUagc. p.leeae accept t.hi& application 
for Planned Unit Development Final Plan and Final Plat. The subject property ia in 
Government Lot I &2, Section 9, Government Lot 3, Section 4. Township 18 North, Range 
3 Bast, B.M. City ofMcCaU, VaUey County, Idaho. 
I Addreued Coltditias ol Approval I 
1. Tho applicant shall ..Usn Mill Point Drive to connect directly to Roosevelt 
Avenue at Hemloclc: Street. Tho realigned street shall be renamed Roosevelt 
Avenue and shall be constructed to City standard. 
MfD Poiat Drive wu reaamed Roosevelt Ave, all4l ha dJt"ect 
couectiOII to Roosevelt Ave. at Hemlock Street. Pleue review Phase 
l t1aa1 plat for Greyatoae VUiap tor dlaapa. 
2. The applicant 8llaiJ con~truct sidewalk.s to City standard on both sides of 
Roosevelt Avenue from Hemlock Street to McCall Avenue. 
AD aidewaJb wUI be eoastncted to City or McCall'• staadard 011 bGtJa 
Hies of Roosevelt Ave. frorrt Heraledc Strut Co McCaU Ave. 
3. Any parking on Roosevelt Avenue shall be desip.ed to City standard and signed 
to prohibit overnight parking. 
AU partiq oa RoMeVelt Ave. •••• be deslpeci Co City standards and 
sipa wtll be posted to prolllbk ovel'BiPt parklq. 
4. 1"hc shared driveway between units 15 through 18 and units 19 through 22 shall 
be 60 feet in width and designed to City standard as a private street 
This shared driveway between Wlitll~ tlaroap 18 aad uaits 19 
throup n, are aot put of tlae CUI'ftllt appHadoas for pllues l, 1 
aad3. 
S. 1"hc applicant shall grant an easement between the end ofthia shared driveway 
and tbe property to the east to provide ~ar and pedestrian access to this 
property. 
All eaaemeat has beea grated betweell the end or the s•ared 
driveways ad tlte property to die east, whlell provides veldallar aad 






6. The applicant shall constntct a bicycle path to City specifteatioos from McCall 
A venue to Davis Street. 
A blcyde Pldl to the Clty'ta{*l1kadou ftola McCIII Ave. to Davll 
Street are llOt carreatly part oll'base t, 1, or 3, dais will be addreued 
Ia a later pllue for Greystoae VWap. 
7. Tho applicant sbaU dedicate a ten-tOot wide pedestrian e&aC!IIlOftt for tho portion of 
the bicycle padl from Roosevelt Avenue to Davia Street. 
A tela-foot pedeltriaa easemeat of the bicycle padt trmn Roosevelt 
Ave. to Da'Yft Street II not ca.rrently part ol Pllue l, 1, or 3; tllil will 
be addreued Ia a later phase for Greystae VBiqe. 
8. The applicant shall constnlct a connection to dtc bicycle path described above 
from the shared driveway adjacent to unit 26. Thia connection and tbe bicycle 
path ttom the connection to Davis Street shall be constructed to accommodate 
emergency vehieles. A vehicle barrier acceptable to the City shall be installed at 
Davis Street to keep traffic off' of tho path. 
All emerpaey aeeea wiU be eoa!Uneted to .eeomm.odate emeraeuey 
vetddet from aalt l' to Davia Street, llowever, tbft II aot carreatly 
part or Pilate l,l, or 3; dtil wiD be addretsed ill a later plaue for 
Greyatoae vmaae. 
9. The applicant sbaU provide pedestrian scale Jigbting along the bicycle path from 
Roosevelt A venue to Davis Street. 
Pecleetriaa seale lfptilla aloq tile bicycle IH'tla ti'OIII Ro01evelt Ave. to 
Davia Street wll be eoastnc:tecl, laowever, tllil II aot eurreat17 part ot 
Pll ... t, l, or 3; thil wil be addreaed Ia a later plaue for Greystoae 
vm-... 
1 0. The applicant .shaJl provide street Iigbting at tbc following intmections: 
a. Roosevelt Avenue and Hemlock Street 
b. Roosevelt Avenue and McCall Avecue 
Tile applcut wDI pnvtde atreet IJcladaafor tbe above refereaeed street 
loeadoal. pleue view PJaaaed. Uait Developmeot plat for l1Ptlo1 
~a tiona. 
11. All streot and pedestrian lighting plana sbaJl be submitted with tho final plat 
application. 
Street and pedatrfaa Uptlag piau have beeJa desipated per tbe 
Planaed Uait Dewlopmeat plat, please review piau. 
12. Any perimeter fencing shall conform with' the fullowing; 
Perimeter fencing means :tencina wbic.b, in the opinion of the 
Commission, subetantially eoclosea tho property in question. Perimeter 
tcmcing enclosing residential developments is discouraged. except fencing 
enclosing property with no more than two residential units. Perimeter 
f'encing. wbich surrounds. or substantially SliiTOUl1ds. a residential 
subdivision shall be primarily oonstructed of natural ma&eriala, such as log 
polea or split rail& Perimeter fencing for residential developments sbal1 
have p«iodic openings to allow Cor the movement of larger wild animals, 
such as deer and elk. and shall be constructed so that the height of tho top 
rail is no more than forty two ( 42) irl(ihea above grade and the minimum 
COM000317 
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pp b«weea the boaom rail - glde ia fttte. (1 S) incJJe& Perimeta' 
r~ propoeed for a reaidential development Is subject to the appron1 
of the Commillioll either 11 a pet of the ~ aubdiviaioo or 
roqUCitecl via a coadittooal1110 permit. 
Perlmetw faellla wtl be caaatldld te tile opiUoa of~. 
c ....... ad wm be Abject t. •• approorll of tile CCI•mlato. 
eitller a a part of tile,...,......~ or • a req.....a .ta a 
eoadfdnallllepermlt. 
13. All slwed drivewa)'ll aba1l meet tbo fO!lowiq coaditiana: 
a. Shln:d drivewayslball be COD8trtlcted to tho dimanlioaa of fire appuatua 
accea roada per IFC 503.2.1. 
b. Shared driveways in acea of l SO feet abal1 haw an approved tuma'oUDd 
fer fire llppll'ltul per IFC 503.2.5, Appeadix D. 
c. AdditiOMifire h~ abal1 be required It the ODd of sblred driveways 
per IFC .508.501. 
d. Hydrud spiCing shall beperTIIJioC105.1 ot Appeodix C ofiFC. 
e. Tho applica abiJJ preparo a plaD detaiq hydrant locationa to bo 
submiued witb the thud plat~· 
A.ldaml drlvewaJII w• be '*lltnleW to .eet d tile above 
req....._tl, pleale rntew ......_. Ualt Dwelop .. c piM for JocadoJis 
tor nn llyclruts. 
14. The applicant sbaU prepare COIIItruction drawinp Cot the proposed landacapina 
plan for City IPPfOval. to include: 
a. LaDdlcapiaa alona both aide8 ofR.ooeevelt Avenuo. 
b. I .aodiC8ping a1ona tho bicycle path. 
c. Laodscapiq and f\mlishinaa (bcncbaa. tralh receptacles acceptable to the 
City) for the open space adjacent to units 23 throuah 26. 
Pleae ..mew au.dled ladsape,..... ,._lppi'Oftd eoutruetioa 
dnwillp r ... tile abon ........... ...... ,. l'eqllinnaeabl. 
IS. Maintt.olnco of landsciiPius and .t'bmilbinp in all public rights-of-way shaD bo 
the 1'elp0nlibility of the applicaat UDtil establishmant of pl•tinp, when they will 
become the RlllpO!Wibility of the City ofMcCall. At the applicua'a requeat, the 
City Albori.at ab8U cleCcmUne wbetber tho laodacapins hill become established 
and. if established, accept l'tllpODiibility &om tbc appliclnL 
Malaleaaace ollacllapiDa lllCI r. ...... w.p • al JMIItJk ript!HI-ways 
daU be die~ oltM appltcut. 
All conditions for Grcystono Village phaaea 1, 2, and 3, wiD either bo COJl"'ll.stnwJdwcdlilol..LoriL..W.WJw'11 ____ _. 
be bonded. per City of McCaJJ.'s boudins requiremenl8, prior to bavina the final plata 
===•.:·~~ ~..:..d becleededtDtheCityofMclCIIJ, pleue 
COM000318 
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If )'011 should have any questions, ple~ae feel free to contact me at 208-344-9100 or 
§lbrinaw@briaJHPsineeriq.com. 
Thdyou. 
~2-~~~;.:'_ .. -~ 
Sabrina Whitehead 




Exhibit E Development Agreement (May J, 2006) 
The following Development Agreement was submitted previously as Exhibit R to the 
Affidavit of Michelle Groeneve/1 dated Apr. 4, 2011 ). The original is 45 pages. Page 1 is 
reproduced here for the convenience of the Court. 
CITY'S RI:SPONSI: 8RJI:F OPPOSING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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City Oat 
City of McCall 
216 But .hrk san.t 
McC.U. lcWio 13638 
DtVELOPM.INT AGRI.DUNT 
Far l.ec:CIIdiJic Pmpoeee Do 
Not Write Abow Tbia LiDe 
'Thit o.veiopma A~ btniatftc refcmd to as '"Aare--t", i.s Cilda'ed 
into by aed b«weea tbe City of McCall, a muaicipal corporatioll of tM s .... of ldllbo, 
hereiDak ma1ed to 11 the '"City", mel "'reystone Viltaae, LLC", blniaafter maTed 
to u '"<lnr)stoDe Villqe", whole addawl ia 1909 PiJpim Cove .Roed, ~aU, ldllbo, 
83638, IDd who il the owner of the OreystoDe Villap, which il 1110re palticul..ty 
delcribed ia the lttacbld-
WHEJU!AS, Approval of the Final Plat for Greystooe Villap bu been Jl'8llted by 
the Mce.JJ City Council u of April 21', 2006. 
WHI!It.!AS, till llicllfiiiOYIII..,w Yllioul ccati.,_ a. wticta e. City _. 
ar., ..... ViDIIt haw r..w ............ whidl ....... City ... OnY*M 
ViDIIt ..... ....wiz& 
WHEREFO~ the City of McCall mel Oreystooe Vill ... do •*- into this 
Aareement IDd ror aad ill considention of tho mutaal covtnlllts, duties lftd oeliptiollt 
btninMt b1b. do aarw u follows: 
Aln'ICL&I 
LI!GAL .AtrniORlTY 
1.1 Thil D~vt~opmtDt Aaroema iiiMde punuiDt to IDd m KCOrdaDce with 
the p:oYi.1ioa1 ofldlho Code f67-6,11A IDd McCall City Code, Tide 9, Chlrptcr 6. 
AAnCLI.B 
ROADWAY AND STORM OJlAINAG.& 
2.1 EitiMr pll'ty sha1J pve the odw at least thirty (30) days prior writtea 
notice bdlrc proccedina with an or •Y part of the Road and Stona Dninap 
~mprov ...... 
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Exhibit F P&Z Commission Minutes (May 3, 2005) 
The following P&Z Commission minutes were submitted previously as Exhibit B to the 
Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt dated Apr. 4, 2011 ). The original minutes are 26 pages. Pages 
1 and 7 are reproduced here for the convenience of the Court. 
CITY'S RESPONSE BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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City of McCall 
Planning and Zoning Commission 
Meeting Minutes 
May 3, 2005 
Call to Order 
Chairman Bailey called the McCall Planning and Zoning Commission Meeting to order at 7:00 
PM. Commissioner Don Bailey, Commissioner Bob Youde, Commissioner Phil Feinberg and 
Commissioner Jeff Schaedler were present. 
City staff member present was Roger Millar, Community Development Director and Joanne 
York, Administrative Assistant. 
Review and Aoproval of Minutes 
Chairman Bailey stated that there were no minutes prepared for approval. 
Mr. Millar spent a few minutes explaining the pre-session concept. Pre-sessions are for the 
purpose of general information sharing only; and remarks by the Commission or City staff 
cannot and should not be relied upon as decisions, pre-decisional approval, or disapproval, or 
any other binding official action. Pre-sessions are not part of the decision making process or 
decision record. This informal discussion will be held from 6 PM to 7 PM before the formal 
Planning and Zoning Commission meeting convenes. This opportunity is open to anyone. The 
first session was held tonight with the owners of the Hotel McCall. 
Chairman Ba1ley stated there is still one vacancy on the Planning & Zoning CommissiOn. 
Old Business 
SUB05-S Uck Creek Meadows 
Mr. Millar introduced the application which was being continued from a previous meeting. The 
applicant is Scott Findlay, for J. B. Scott The application is for preliminary plat approval for a 
subdivision containing 146 residential lots on 57.22 acres, located on the south side of Lick 
Creek Road, near the intersection with Pilgrim Cove Road. This is a Public Hearing. 
Printed 51191200!1 1_,..WI 
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Commissioner Youde asked about a final landscape plan. Mr. Millar replied that it will be 
submitted along with the final plat. 
Chatrman Bailey asked if there ~re 52 planned units. Mr. Millar stated yes, in the latest 
version. 
Chairman Bailey asked the developer if he recatled a discussion from their first or second 
meeting regarding providing affordable community housing at Greystone on Payette and at that 
time you said no. What are your findings now? The developer replied that we all need to come 
together to plan for affordable housing, but this project won't lend itself to that. Chairman Bailey 
asked - "without City law behind me• - is that possible to consider between now and the final 
plat? It's more constructive if it's a voluntary project. Because of where this housing is located 
and the need for affordable housing, this would be a good place for it. Chairman Bailey asked 
the developer to look at costs and see if it's feasible. It might be doable with this many units 
since you have control of the entire multi-family units. 
Discussion followed concerning the need for affordable housing. 
Chairman Bailey asked if there were any further questions. He stated that our preference would 
be for the design where Roosevelt Street continues. 
Chairman Bailey stated that the Public Hearing was open for anyone wanting to speak in favor 
of the development There was no response. He asked if anyone wanted to speak in 
opposition of the development. 
President of the Aspen Homeowners Association stated that he appreciated the changes made 
in the project. He stated that the Roosevelt Avenue/McCall Avenue option would allow more 
space between the condo property and Roosevelt if Units 21 and 22 of the project were 
eliminated, or he would like to see very heavy landscaping along the property line and berms. 
Discussion followed. 
Chairman Bailey stated there seems to be plenty of land - 65' - between the street and the 
property line. 
Printed 511912005 Page 1 ot26 
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• 
ExbibitG Memorandum from Steven Hasson (Oct. 19, 2006) 
A legible copy of the memorandum from Steven Hasson dated October 19, 2006 is 
attached hereto as Exhibit G. A partially illegible version of this document was provided to the 
Court as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Victor Villegas in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
dated June 29, 2011. The City contends that evidence is tardy and immaterial. However, if the 
Court wishes to consider it, it should have a legible copy. 
CITY'S REsPONSE BRIEF OPPOSING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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CITY OF MCCALL 
October 19, 2006 
To: McCaU City Staff 
From: Steven Hasson, AICP 
Subject: Advising applicants about vojuntary affordable housing mitigation payment 
Dear staff: Here Is a format that you should rely upon for addressing voluntary affordable housing 
mitigation proposals. 
· Advise the applicant that they have the option to move forward on their buUding permit application 
during the moratorium - provided they offer a form of affordable housing mitigation that is In 
keeping with the sprit and intent of the housing policy and ordinances that has been adopted by 
the City. 
Because this Is a voluntary effort on their part - applicants are free to propose what they believe 
is in keeping with the spirit and Intent of the City's affordable housing program. 1f the applicant 
asks for assistance in fee determination we should provide them a copy of the fee structure 
without offering comment that they must follow this payment plan. 
If they ask to rely upon that compensation formula we should accommodate them without making 
comments to the effect that they made the right or wrong choice. If they propose to pay fees they 
should be given a copy of the waiver/release form they will be asked to sign. 
If the applicant inquires as to what others have done, it would be acceptable to state they have 
paid the fees and signed a waiver. In that circumstance, staff should qualify that even though 
others have ~ to pay the fees and sign. the waiver, the applicant can propose something 
different if they choose and aU proposals will be fairly evaluated. 
If they propose a means of compensation as mitigation lhat Is cfearty Insufficient we should just 
return the permit to them with a comment that in our judgment the form of consideration does not 
resolve the effect the construction of the r&Sidence will have on the City's affordable housing 
needs. The ordinance fee structure should be considered a guide you can use to detennine If the 
offered compensation is adequate. 
Staff should make no effort to tell them how to cure the offer of insufficient compensation. Staff 
can and should ask any application why they believe the offered compensation Is adequate. 
If they offer a fonn of compensation or mitigation that is original (such as 12 buffalo) then the 
determination of whether that is sufficient mitigation to resolve the City's affordable housing 
needs created or Increased by the construction of the residence should be forwarded to Roger 
Millar for his assessment. If you feel uncomfortable returning the permit because it is likely 
insufficient in its means of compensation - then feel free to forward that to Roger for his review. 
Tell the applicant that the offered mitigation will be reviewed and a decision made. They wiN be 
informed of the decision. 
Advise the applicant that any staff determination is appealable to a higher authority. 
We should try and be as neutral as possible and not encourage or discourage the mitigation 
offered. 
116 Eut PJrt Strut • McCall, ldah• IHJI • (laiJ 634-7141 • FAX {lGI) 634-JtJI 
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB #4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 





FBed A.M. ~. l) P.M. 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant City ofJkCa/1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Case No: CV 2010-276C 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM F. NICHOLS 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Counter-defendant. 
:HFIDAVIT OF WILliAM F. NICIIOLS 
1207704_1 docx I 4432-4 
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State ofldaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Canyon ) 
WILLIAM F. NICHOLS, being tirst duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
l. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I make this 
Aftidavit based upon personal knowledge and to the best of my information and belief. 
2. Since August 2005, I have been the City Attorney for the City of McCall, Idaho, 
which is the DefendanUCounterclaimant in this action. 
3. The stakes involved in this litigation are substantial, particularly given the City's 
current tinancial situation. 
4. This case called for the assistance of outside counsel qualified to address a broad 
range of state and federal constitutional issues as well as associated procedural and jurisdictional 
issues. In my experience, it is necessary to look outside of Valley County to obtain counsel 
qualitied to handle litigation of this sort. This is particularly true given the conflicts of interest 
that often occur with local attorneys. I was aware that Givens Pursley LLP, and specifically 
Christopher H. Meyer, had dealt with affordable housing and inclusionary zoning related cases in 
Blaine County and had considerable expertise in these types of cases. Upon contacting him I 
discovered that he was also retained by Valley County for litigation that involved issues of 
impact fees which, though different from the issues in this case, presented similar constitutional 
issues. For these reasons, and upon my urging, the City retained the firm of Givens Pursley LLP 
to serve as lead counsel in this matter. 
5. In addition to being the City Attorney for the City of McCall, I am also a 
shareholder in the Jaw firm of White, Peterson, Gigray, Rossman, Nye & Nichols, PA, located in 
Nampa, Idaho. I have practiced law in Idaho since 1986. During that time, I have handled 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILH\~1 F. NICHOLS 
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numerous cases in state courts throughout Idaho. I am a past chair of the Real Property Section 
of the Idaho State Bar, and also a past president of the Idaho Municipal Attorneys Association. 
6. In my capacity as City Attorney for the City of McCall, I was involved 
throughout the course of this litigation on a consultation and review basis, and I am familiar with 
the issues and pleadings in this action. However, in order to avoid potential redundancy in 
billing, the City is not seeking recovery of attorney fees associated with my role in this litigation. 
7. Although the state statute of limitations and lack of notice issues were relatively 
straightforward, the litigation also presented a variety of other issues, particularly those involving 
federal and state constitutional claims and associated procedural and jurisdictional issues, as well 
as discovery. These issues demanded experienced litigation counsel familiar with this 
specialized area. Likewise, the merits of the case called for assistance of counsel familiar with 
the specialized area of affordable housing and inclusionary zoning, as well as impact fees and 
their constitutionality under state and federal law. Mr. Meyer is a highly regarded expert in 
these areas. From my review of the court's decision, the underlying briefing, and the time sheets 
of the City's counsel submitted in support ofthe attorney fee motion, the work performed by Mr. 
Meyer and his co-counsel and legal assistant was reasonable and necessary. In my experience 
there are only a small number of law firms in the state, and few in Valley County (especially 
ones that would not be contlicted out of representing the City), that are available to handle this 
type of action. 
8. I am familiar with the current hourly rates generally charged by attorneys 
litigating matters such as this one in Idaho. For these types of proceedings in 2010 and 20 ll, 
lawyers in the Boise, Idaho market generally charge hourly rates ranges between $200 and $400. 
9. I am familiar with the qualifications, experience, and abilities of Christopher H. 
Meyer and his law tirm, Givens Pursley LLP. I know of Mr. Meyer's work and reputation from 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM F. NICHOLS 
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his presentations at Continuing Legal Education conferences, his written materials for those 
presentations, his publication of articles, his work managing the Idaho Environmental Forum, 
and my involvement in matters where his tirm was opposing counsel. I believe that the hourly 
rate charged by Mr. Meyer in this matter ($31 0/hour) is reasonable in light of the nature of this 
litigation, the stakes involved, and his abilities, skills, and experience in these matters, and his 
total years of practice and experience. 
I 0. I have reviewed the rates charged by other counsel at Givens Pursley LLP who 
performed work in this matter. I believe, based on my experience and knowledge and what I 
personally charge similarly situated clients in similar matters, that those rates are reasonable and 
are at or below current hourly rates charged in the market for litigated matters involving land use 
~xactions with administrative and constitutional law dimensions. 
I l. I have reviewed the total amounts of the attorney fees requested to be awarded in 
this matter by the City. In my opinion, the total requested attorney fees represent a reasonable 
charge for the work performed given the nature of the matter, the etTort required, the stakes 
involved, and the issues required to be addressed. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this g~ day of July, 2011. 
~/~~ 
William F. Nichols 
.\HII>.\\IT OF WIJ.U.\\Ufiinl ... ~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J/1!_ day of July, 2011, the foregoing was filed, 
served, and copied as follows: 
DOCUMENT FILED: 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk 
Valley County Courthouse 
219 Main Street 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Facsimile: 208-382-7107 
Jed Manwaring, Esq. 
Victor Villegas, Esq. 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 













COURTESY COPIES TO: 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
District Judge 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Jason Gray 
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
;ase No. __ --..~n~ N~u----­
Filed A.M . 'I ?J P.M. 





Attorneys for Defendant and Counterc/aimant City of McCa/1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Counter-defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT Of MARTIN C. HE:'IIDRICKSON 
1206268_3.DOC /4432-4 
Case No: CV 201 0-276C 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON 
Page I 448 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
I. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I make this 
Affidavit based upon personal knowledge and to the best of my information and belief. 
2. I am a partner in the firm of Givens Pursley LLP which represents 
Defendant/Counterclaimant City of McCall (the '"City") in the above-captioned civil action. 
3. I am admitted to practice in Idaho, the United States District Court for the District 
of Idaho, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
4. I hold a J.D. degree, magna cum laude, from Texas Tech University School of 
Law ( 1998) and a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Idaho ( 1994). 
5. In 2009, 2010, and 2011 I was listed as a "Rising Star" by 1\-fountain States Super 
Lawyers®. I am "peer review rated" by Martindale-Hubbell. 
6. Prior to joining Givens Pursley LLP in 2006, I was an associate at the Boise law 
firm of Moore, Baskin & Parker, where I practiced in the areas of civil litigation defense and 
civil rights defense. 
7. During my practice at Givens Pursley LLP, I have handled numerous cases in state 
and federal courts throughout Idaho in a variety of commercial and real estate related matters. 
My areas of practice include civil litigation, administrative law, civil rights, land use, and 
constitutional law. 
8. I billed the time I spent on this matter at a rate of $200.00 per hour in 20 I 0 and 
$210.00 per hour in 20 II. This is my regular billing rate, as retlected in the itemized billing 
sheets for this matter that are Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Christopher H :Heyer. 
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9. The time entries on the itemized billing sheets for this matter set out in Exhibit B 
to the Affidavit of Christopher H. Jfeyer accurately reflect the work that I completed on this 
matter. 
l 0. The rates charged for the time spent by Givens Pursley LLP attorneys and staff on 
this action are at or below the prevailing charges for like work in McCall, Idaho, and throughout 
the State when undertaken on a hourly fee agreement. 
ll. I undertook to make my interactions with co-counsel as efficient and productive 
as possible while avoiding duplication of effort. 
12. During the course of this proceeding, I and others representing the City made 
every effort to communicate forthrightly with counsel for the Plaintiffs in order to avoid surprise 
and unnecessary litigation costs. 
13. Because of the importance of the questions involved in this case, including the 
potential for further litigation by those similarly situated, and the complexity of the federal law 
issues pressed by the Plaintiffs, this case required a considerable amount of time as well as 
specialized expertise in the areas of land use, administrative law, constitutional law, and civil 
procedure. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this~ day of July, 2011. 
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t!l. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this _J _1 _day July, 2011. 
Notary Public or 
Residing at: __,o..=-..;:;....a.-~r---o~-r--'-'....,...__-
My Commission Expires: ll..o 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ll 1h day of July, 2011, the foregoing was tiled, served, 
and copied as follows: 
DOCUMENT FILED: 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk 
Valley County Courthouse 
219 Main Street 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Facsimile: 208-382-7107 
Jed Manwaring, Esq. 
Victor Villegas, Esq. 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
SERVICE COPIES TO: 























COURTESY COPIES TO: 
Honorable Michael R. Mclaughlin 
District Judge 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jason Gray 
rgj U. S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 U.S. Mail 
Law Clerk to Judge Michael Mclaughlin 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net 
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
60 I West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
;ase No·----._lnst Ni 
Fl/ecJ .... AM.Ii. ~ ~;zr--_-P.M-. 





Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant City o/AfcCall 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
V. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Counter-defendant. 
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State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
CHRISTOPHER H. MEYER, being tint duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
I. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I make this 
Atlidavit based upon personal knowledge and to the best of my infonnation and belief. 
2. I am a partner in the finn of Givens Pun ley LLP which represents 
DefendanUCounterclairnant City of McCall (the ·'City") in the above-captioned ci vii action. 
3. I am admitted to practice in Idaho, Colorado (inactive), and the District of 
Columbia (inactive), as well as numerous federal courts. 
4. I hold a J.D. degree, cum laude, from the University of Michigan Law School 
( 1981) and an A.B. degree in economics, magna cum laude, from the University of Michigan 
School of Literature, Science and the Art ( 1977). During my undergraduate yean, I was named 
a James B. Angell Scholar and was awarded the Osterweil Prize in Economics. 
5. For the year 2011, I was selected by Best Lawyers in America® as the top natural 
resources lawyer in Idaho. I have been listed in the Best Lawyers in America® since 2006 (listed 
in each four practice areas), in Chambers USA's listing of America's leading lawyers for 
business since 2008 (highest ranking, "Band 1 "), in ,\;fountain States Super Lawyers® since 
2007, in Who's Who Legal, the International Who's Who for Environmental Lawyers since 20 I 0 
(one of only seven lawyers named in Idaho for the 2012 edition), and as a fellow in the honorary 
society, Litigation Counsel of America, since 2010. Martindale-Hubbell has awarded me its 
highest ranking ("AV") in each year since 1994. 
6. I have authored numerous articles and am a regular speaker at legal forums 
throughout the nation. 
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7. The Idaho Yearbook Directory (2001) named me as "a key figure in Idaho water 
law" and .. centrally located in the world of Idaho public affairs." 
8. I began my practice of law with the National Wildlife Federation in Washington, 
D.C. in 1981. From 1984 through 1991, I was an Associate Professor Adjoint with the 
University of Colorado School of Law in Boulder where I taught seminars in advanced water 
law, environmental law, and negotiation. During that time, I also litigated environmental cases 
for the National Wildlife Federation's legal clinic at the law school where I was employed. 
9. I have practiced law with Givens Pursley LLP in Idaho for twenty years. During 
that time, I have handled numerous cases in state and federal courts throughout Idaho and 
elsewhere. I have also represented a variety of clients at the administrative level before planning 
and zoning commissions, cities, and counties. I have also played a significant role in shaping 
legislation in Idaho, including the 1992 amendments to the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act 
and the Municipal Water Rights Act of 1996 and the 2003 amendments thereto. 
10. My practice emphasizes land use (including zoning, permitting, and impact fees). 
I also practice in the areas of water law, road and public access law, and environmental and 
natural resources law. My practice includes extensive experience in constitutional and 
administrative law. 
11. Further information about my professional background, including litigation 
experience and publications, is included in my resume, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
12. I billed the time I spent on this matter at a rate of $305 per hour in 20 I 0 and $310 
per hour in 20 I 1. This reflects a discount on my regular billing rate. This discount was provided 
as an accommodation to the City. 
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13. lam the lead attorney working on this matter. I am assisted by Martin C. 
Hendrickson and, on occasion, by other attorneys and staff as reflected in the itemized billing 
sheets for this matter that are attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
14. In addition to me, the other attorneys and paralegals from Givens Pursley LLP who 
assisted on this matter are identified on the billing sheets as follows: 
Martin C. Hendrickson. Mr. Hendrickson's credentials are described in his separate 
Affidavit. Mr. Hendrickson's billing rate was $200 per hour in 2010 and $210 in 2011. 
Justin M. Fredin. Mr. Fredin is an associate at Givens Pursley LLP whose practice 
concentrates in land use and litigation. Mr. Fredin's billing rate was $195 per hour. 
Alison S. Berriochoa. Ms. Berriochoa is a paralegal who assisted with compiling and 
organizing documents in connection with discovery and motion practice. Her work made 
case management more etlicient and thereby reduced attorney fees. Ms. Berriochoa's 
billing rate was $100 per hour. 
15. While serving as lead counsel, I consulted with other members of this tirm and 
delegated where appropriate to other partners and associates in order to minimize litigation 
expense and take advantage of specialization. 
16. The rates charged for the time spent by Givens Pursley LLP attorneys and staff on 
this action are at or below the prevailing charges for like work in McCall, Idaho, and throughout 
the State when undertaken on a hourly fee agreement. 
17. I undertook to make my interactions with co-counsel as etlicient and productive 
as possible while avoiding duplication of effort. 
18. During the course of this proceeding, I and others representing the City made 
every etfort to communicate forthrightly with counsel for the Plaintiffs in order to avoid surprise 
and unnecessary litigation costs. 
19. Because of the importance of the questions involved in this case, including the 
potential for further litigation by those similarly situated, and the complexity of the federal law 
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issues pressed by the Plaintiffs, this case required a considerable amount of time as well as 
specialized expertise in the areas of land use, administrative law, constitutional law, and civil 
procedure. 
20. The costs and attorney fees displayed in Exhibit B reflect a summary of the 
monthly billing statements provided by Givens Pursley lLP to the City in connection with this 
matter. 
21. I exercised my professional judgment in reviewing all monthly billings to ensure 
that charges were reasonable, necessary, and appropriate. Where appropriate, I reduced or wrote 
off attorney time spent on the matter where I felt that the time could not be justified on the basis 
of the work produced. 
22. With the assistance of staff, I prepared the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees submitted on behalf of the City herewith. The Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees is 
based on the detailed billing summary set out in Exhibit B. The Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge. 
23. Total attorney fees charged in this matter (through June 30, 20 II) were $82,023. 
24. I served as lead counsel in the cases of Schaefer v. City of Sun Valley, Case No. 
CV-06-882 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist. July 3, 2007), and Cove Springs Development, Inc. v. 
Blaine County, Case No. CV2008-22 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., June 3, 2008). My partner, 
Martin C. Hendrickson, assisted in both cases. The description of those cases (including the 
attorney fees awarded in the Schaefer matter) is set out in City's Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees with Supporting Statement is accurate. A true and correct copy of the Judgment 
entered in the Schaefer case is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this ll tb day of July, 2011. 
~~~ 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this llth day July, 2011. 
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Notary Public for I 
Residing at:--.......,.-=-'--...---=;;-='--,..---
My Commission Expires: _ ___,""+.....,....L...f-'-"~~ J ~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the II th day of July, 20 II, the foregoing was filed, served, 
and copied as follows: 
DOCUMENT FILED: 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk 
Valley County Courthouse 
219 Main Street 
Cascade, ID 83611 
Facsimile: 208-382-7107 
Jed Manwaring, Esq. 
Victor Villegas, Esq. 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
SERVICE COPIES TO: 
Boise, ID 83701-0959 
jmanwaring@evanskeane.com 
vvillegas@evanskeane.com 
COURTESY COPIES TO: 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
District Judge 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jason Gray 
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
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CHRISTOPHER H. MEYER 
In 2011, Best Lawyers in America named Chris Meyer "lawyer of the Year" in Idaho 
for natural resources. This capped three decades of work in water law, land use and 
zoning law, natural resources law, road and public access law, and constitutional law. 
His clients include Fortune Ten companies, major league energy companies, food 
producers, mining companies, municipal water providers, land developers, and local 
governments. He is described in the Idaho Yearbook Directory as .. centrally located in 
the world of Idaho public atTairs" and .. a key figure in Idaho water law." He has 
served for over a decade as President of the Idaho Environmental Forum. Before 
joining Givens Pursley in 1991, Chris taught water law and negotiation at the 
University of Colorado law School. Prior to that, he practiced environmental law in 
Washington, D.C. Chris has written extensively on natural resource law subjects and 
lectures on a variety of legal topics. Chris has broad experience in transactions 
involving land use and water rights. He also has extensive litigation experience and 
has played a significant role in shaping legislation. 
LEGAL EMPLOYMENT 
Givens Punley LLP, Boise, Idaho. 
Partner. August 1991 to present. 
University of Colorado Law School, Boulder, Colorado. 
Associate Professor Adjoint. August 1984 to July 1991. Held this teaching position while serving as counsel to 
NWF Natural Resources Clinic. Taught seminars in advanced water law, environmental law, and negotiation. 
National Wildlife Federation, Washington, D.C. 
Counsel. May 1981 to July 1984. 
PROFESSIONAL R£CQGNIIION 
Best lawyers in America (since 2006) 
Named "lawyer of the Year" (top lawyer in Idaho) for natural resources in2011 
Recognized in water law, land use & zoning law, natural resources, and environmental law 
Mountain States Super lawyers (since 2007) 
Recognized in energy and natural resources law 
Chambers USA (since 2008) 
Band l (highest ranking) for natural resources and environment 
Who's Who Legal: The International Who's Who of Environment Lawyers (since 2010) 
One of only seven environmental lawyers recognized in Idaho 
Litigation Counsel of America (since 2010) 
Fellow in honorary society composed of less than one-half of one percent of American lawyers 
Marquis' Who's Who in the World, Who's Who in America, and Who's Who in American Law 
Martindale-Hubbell 
Highest ranking: "'AV" (since 1996) 
Idaho Yearbook Directory (200 1) 
Described as a "key figure in Idaho water law" and .. centrally located in the world of Idaho public affairs" 4 6/ 
Listed among top 100 most influential Idahoans 
Christopher H. Meyer 
University of Mic:higan, School of Law 
Juris Doctor, 1981 
• cum laude 
University of Michigaa 
Degree in economics, 1977 
• high distinction (magna cum laude) 
• Phi Beta Kappa 
• James B. Angell Scholar 
EDUCATION 
• honors program in economics, class honors 
• Osterweil Prize in Economics 
SELECTED LITIGATION 
American Independence Mines and lt.linerals Co. v. USDA, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Idaho 2010) (NEPA, 
standing, and road law issues). 
Pagel 
In Re SRBA. Case No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 29-00271 et al. (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., Nov. 9, 2009 and April 12, 
201 0) (upholding position of clients regarding alternative points of diversion in City of Pocatello municipal 
water rights litigation) (now on appeal to Idaho Supreme Court). 
Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, Case No. CV-07-402 (Idaho, Seventh Judicial Dist., Oct. 22, 2009) (upholding County's 
validation of Anderson Creek Road) (now on appeal to Idaho Supreme Court). 
In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 63-02779 et al. (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., June 3, 2009), Subcase Nos. 
63-02449 et al. (Fifth Judicial Dist., May 20, 2009) (secured partial decrees for each of the City of Nampa's 
water rights). 
Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 191 PJd 233 (2008) (amicus brief in public access case). 
Cove Springs Development, Inc. v. Blaine County, Case No. CV2008-22 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist., June 3, 2008) 
(declaring unlawful and unconstitutional various exaction and comprehensive plan ordinance provisions). 
Schaefor v. City ofSun Valley, Case No. CV-06-882 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist. July 3, 2007) (declaring 
unconstitutional Sun VaHey's affordable housing fee). 
American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 154 P.3d 433 (2007) 
(conjunctive management of ground and surface water). 
Chisholm v. Idaho Department of Water Resources, 142 Idaho 159, 125 PJd 515 (2005) (water rights-local 
public interest). 
Davisco Foods lnt'l, Inc. v. Gooding Cotmty, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P.3d 116 (2005) (land use). 
Farrell v. Board of County Comm 'rs oflemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002) (public road access-the 
Indian Creek Road case). 
Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134 Idaho 916, 12 P.3d 1260 (2000) (wilderness water rights). 
State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 947 P.2d 400 (1997) (partial forfeiture water rights 
case). 
Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc., 129 Idaho 454, 926 P.2d 1301 
(1996) (interpretation of water right amnesty statute). 
State, ex rei. Higginson v. United States, 128 Idaho 246,912 P.2d 614 (1995) (constitutionality ofSRBA 462 
amendments- water law). 
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Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration, 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994), afrg, 1993 WL 662353 (D. Neb 
1993) (scope of environmental trust's authority to litigate). 
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 991 F.2d 1405 (lOth Cir. 1990) (federal reserved water rights- amicus brief). 
State v. Morros, 766 P.2d 263 (Nev. 1988) (instream flows recognized under state law). 
Catherland Reclamation Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist., 433 N.W.2d 161 (Neb. 1988) (water 
rights and state endangered species act). 
Hitchcock and Red Willow Irrigation Dist. v. Lower Platte North Natural Resources Dist., 410 N.W.2d 101 (Neb. 
1987) {right to build water project). 
Tu/alip Tribes of Washington v. FERC, 732 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1985) (hydropower licensing). 
Escondido it,lutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 ( 1984) (mitigation for 
hydroelectric developments on public lands). 
National Wildlifo Fed 'n v. Marsh, 568 F. Supp. 985 (D.D.C. 1983) (administrative law under NEPA). 
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rei. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (ban on water export in violation of commerce clause) 
(brief available at 1982 WL 608572). 
LEGISLATION 
Local Public Interest Amendments (water rights), 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 298, codified at Idaho Code§ 42-
2028(3), 42-203A(5), 42-222( 1 ), 42-240(5), 42-1763. 
Idaho Municipal Water Rights Act, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 297, codified at Idaho Code§ 42-202(2), 42-2028, 
42-217("4."), 42-219( 1) & (2), 42-222(1 ), 42-223(2), 43-335, 43-338)). 
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, logical outgrowth rule, Idaho Code§ 67-5227. 
PUBLICATIONS 
Allen, Meyer, Nelson & Lee, Idaho Land Use Planning Handbook, Givens Pursley (20 11 ). 
Fereday, Meyer & Creamer, Water Law Handbook: The Acquisition, Use, Transfor, Administration, and 
Management of Water Rights in Idaho, Givens Pursley (2011). 
Meyer, Road Law Handbook: Road Creation and Abandonment Law in Idaho, Givens Pursley (2011 ). 
Meyer, Ethics Handbook: Ethical Considerations for the Client and Lawyer in Idaho, Givens Pursley (20 11 ). 
Meyer, Planning for Future Needs Under the Municipal Water Rights Act of 1996, Association of Idaho Cities 
Conference on Municipal Issues (2011). 
Meyer, Municipal Water Rights and the Growing Communities Doctrine, The Water Report at 1 (Mar. 15, 2010). 
Meyer, ''Development, Codification, and Application of the Growing Communities Doctrine in Idaho," presented at 
American Bar Association, Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources, 28th Annual Water Law 
Conference: Whose Spigot Is It? (Feb. 18-19, 201 0). 
Meyer, An Introduction to the Law of Interstate Water Allocation: From Compacts to Common Sense, Law 
Seminars International (2009). 
Meyer, Interstate Water Allocation. The Water Report (Aug. 15, 2007). 
Meyer, Idaho Chapter Author for Brownfields Law and Practice, Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. (2004) (named Best 
Law Book of the Year by the American Association of Publishers). 463 
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Meyer, A Comprehensive Guide to Redeveloping Contaminated Property (Idaho Chapter), American Bar 
Association (2002). 
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Meyer, 'Die Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine in a Skeptical Age, 39 American Law Institute- American 
Bar Assn. 219 (200 l ). 
Meyer, All I Really Need To Know About Legal Ethics I Learned in Law School, 43 The Advocate (Idaho Bar 
Assn.) 15 (2000). 
Allen, Him berger, Honhorst & Meyer, Land Use Law in Idaho, National Business Institute ( 1999). 
Meyer, Aquifer Storage and Recovery in Idaho, University of Idaho ( 1999). 
Meyer, Complying with Environmental and Special Use Regulations, in LAND USE LAW IN IDAHO, National 
Business Institute ( 1999). 
Meyer, Municipal Water Rights in Idaho: 'Die Growing Communities Doctrine and Its Recent Codification, 
Northwest Water Law & Policy Project ( 1996). 
Meyer, Small Handles on Big Projects: 'Die Federalization ofPrivate Undertakings, 41 Rocky Mountain Mineral 
Law Institute 5-l (1995). 
Meyer, lnstream Flows: Integrating New Uses and New Players into the Prior Appropriation System, in INSTREAM 
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, Natural Resource Law Center ( 1993). 
Meyer, Water Conservation: Looks Can Deceive, in RIVER VOICES (1993). 
Meyer, Instream Flows: Coming ofAge in America, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WESTERN REGIONAL INSTREAM 
FLOW CONFERENCE ( 1989). 
Meyer, Western Water Law: 'Die New Frontier, in AUDUBON WILDLIFE REPORT (1989). 
Meyer, New Developments in Water Rights on Public Lands: Federal Rights and State Interests, paper presented at 
conference sponsored by the Natural Resource Law Center, University ofColorado School of Law, Water as a 
Public Resource: Emerging Rights and Obligations ( 1987). 
Meyer, Navigating the Wetlands Jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers, 9 Resource L. Notes 3, Natural 
Resources Law Center ( 1986). 
Meyer, Two papers published in Winning Strategies/or Rivers: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual National 
Conference on Rivers, American Rivers Conservation Council { 1985). 
Osann, Campbell, Meyer, & Allemang, Shortchanging the Treasury: 'Die Failure of the Department of the Interior 
to Comply with the Inspector General's Audit Recommendations to Recover the Costs ofFederal Water 
Projects, National Wildlife Federation (1984). 
Anderson, Campbell & Meyer, Solving the Water Crisis, V-7 Policy Report 9, the Cato Institute ( 1983). 
Meyer, Sporhase v. Nebraska: A Spur to Better Water Resource Management, l Envtl. Forum 28, Environmental 
Law Institute ( 1983). 
Burwell & Meyer, A Citizen's Guide to Clean Air and Transportation: Implications for Urban Revitalization, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency ( 1980). 
Meyer, The Effects of Labor Organization on the Functional Distribution of Income in Manufacturing Industries in 
the United States for the Years J 948 through J 972, Senior Honors Thesis, University of Michigan ( 1978). 
BAR ~IEMBERSHIPS 
Member of the bars of Idaho, Colorado, and the District of Columbia. 
Admitted to practice in federal courts in the District of Columbia, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 464 
Christopher H. Meyer 
PERSONAL 
Born September 29, 1952, in Springfield, Missouri. 
Married to Karen A. Meyer. One child, C. Andrew Meyer. 
I have made my home in Boise, Idaho since 1991. 
I have lived in tifteen cities in thirteen states: Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, 
Michigan, Missouri, New York. Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Florence, Italy. 
Christopher H. Meyer 
GIVENS PuRSLEY lLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
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Rep0t1 Run; i11Fi.011 i 2.44 SOPM 
Givens Punley llP 
Fees Listing 
Feu Workecllhrv Jua JO 2011 
Page I ol8 
ProV antage WlP 14 
Entered 
Timekeeper Date Worked Fee Type Status Hours Rate Amount Date By Tran. II 
Martin Hendlictson 812512010 No Fee Type HisiOI'( 1.50 20000 300.00 8127/2010 MCH 1343929 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/4) 
won. on Answer to First Amended Complant 
Martin Hendrickson 812612010 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 2.10 200.00 420.00 812712010 MCH 1343926 
City of McCaa I Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
ContlntJt worll on Answer: analyZe polentlal afflrmatl'le defenses. 
Christopher H. Meyer 6126/2010 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 030 30500 9150 91112010 ch1 1344687 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Stra1egy discussion with Manln Hendrickson re answer, motion to diSmiss, and motion for summary judgment; quick email to client 
Martin Hendrickson 8/2712010 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 2.80 20000 56000 812712010 MCH 1344037 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/4 ) 
Continue worll on Answer and AfftnnaUve Defenses; review P&Z and City Council minutes re: approval of appllcaUona; review comespondenoe from City re·. timellnt and approvals. 
Chnstopher H. Meyer 8127/2010 No Fee Type HisiOIY 140 305.00 427.00 9/1/2010 chi 1344697 
City of McCaU 1 Greystone Village ( 4432/4) 
Review and edit answer, coordination wttl'l City staff re tJmeHne and ordinance ISsues. 
Martin Hendrickson 812812010 No Fee Type HisiOf'/ 2.50 20000 500.00 8/28/2010 MCH 1344049 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 1 4 ) 
Conference wltn C. Meyer re: anomey tee prov1s10111n Development Agreement. poten«al counlerclalm, motion to diSmiSs; review documents from client; work on Answer and 
Counterclaim. 
Christopher H. Meyer 8/2612010 No Fee Type HisiOI'f 600 305.00 I .830.00 911/2010 chi 1344702 
City of McCall/ Greys tone Village ( 4432 /4 ) 
Research and drafting of Ans-; compile and review adminiStrative record; prepare detailed timellne wttl'l quotations and comments; coordinatiOn and stralegy discussions with Manln 
Hendrickson·. emalis to client. 
Martin Hendrickson 8/29/2010 No Fee Type HiS I Of'/ 1.20 20000 240.00 8/30/2010 MCH 1344077 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 1 4 ) 
Continue review of city documents re: approval of applications; wonc on Answer and Counterclaim; conference with C. Meyer re: same. 
Christopher H. Meyer 812912010 No Fee Type HiStOf'/ 850 30500 2.592.50 9/1/2010 chi 1344705 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
F urtner research and drafting of Answer, coonlination and strategy discussions with Martin Hendrickson. 
Alison S. Bemochoa 8/3012010 No Fee Type History 2.70 10000 270.00 8/3012010 ASB 1344078 
City of McCan I Greystone Village ( 4432 1 4 ) 
Assemble client documents In chronology binder; research bankruptcy ot Greystone Village, LLC, Steven Benad and Richard Hehr. 
Martin Hendrickson 8130/2010 No Fee Type HistOI'( 150 20000 30000 813012010 MCH 1344093 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Rev- and rev1se updated draft of Ans- and Counterclaim: review addHional documents trom City; conference wltn C. Meyer re. Rllng Answer and Counterclaim 
Chnstopher H. Meyer 8130/2010 No Fee Type History 7 10 305.00 2.165 50 91112010 chi 1344707 
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Final round of edits 10 Answer. extensive coordlnalion with C1ty stall re documents; review additional documents: coordillalion with BIU NichOlS re substitution of counsel and oilier 
matters. 
Alison S Berriochoa 9/1312010 No Fee Type HiSIOf'/ 0 20 10000 2000 9/13/2010 ASB 1346898 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Begon revtew and organ<zati0<1 of documents produced by client. 
Alison S. Bernochoa 9114/2010 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 100 10000 100.00 911412010 ASB 1346978 
C1ty of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 1 4 ) 
Complete initial review of addilional records produced by client 
Martin Hendrickson 9116/2010 No Fee Type History 340 20000 680.00 101612010 MCH 1351042 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Vt~age ( 4432/ 4) 
Re..- documents from clienl re: develOpment application and hearings. 
Alison S. Berriochoa 911712010 No Fee Type HiS I Of'/ 020 10000 20 00 9117/2010 ASB 1347668 
City of McCan I Greystone Village ( 4432/4 ) 467 
Repon RUII ?1712011 !244 51 Plot 
ay Nakya HibDeler 
Tlmekeel!!r Date Worked Fee T~j!! 
Begin review of addi11onat documems produced by client 
Alison S BeniochOa 912012010 No Fee Type 
City of McCaa I Greystone ViRage ( 4432 I 4 } 
Assemllle email recoros of Greystone. 
Alison S. Beniochoa 9/21/2010 No Fee Type 
City of McCall/ Greystone Vinage ( 4432 I 4 } 
Finish O!Vat1iZ>ng email from Valley Coonty. 
Martln Hendrickson 912812010 No Fee Type 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 /4} 
Wort. on discovery requests to pli!lnllffs. 
Martln Hendrickson t0/512010 No Fee Type 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4} 
Givens Punley LLP 
Fees Listing 






Continue revieW of records and worll on discovery requests including requests for admissions. 
Alison s. Berriochoa 101812010 No Fee Type HistOtY 2.70 







Organize and review all addijional documents received from client for duplicates in preparation of assembling C. Meyer worlling binder. 
Alison S Berriochoa 1011012010 No Fee Type History 350 100.00 








Assemble all additional documents received from client In chronologie order: draft Index of same in preparation of assembling C Meyer worl<lng binder 
Martln Hendrickson 10/12/2010 No Fee Type History 350 200.00 700.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 } 
Page 2 Of 8 
ProVantage WIP 14 
Entered 
Date By Tran. t 
912012010 ASS 1347800 
912112010 ASS 1347971 
10/612010 MCH 1351028 
10/812010 MCH 1351047 
10/812010 ASS 1351857 
10/10/2010 ASS 1351897 
10/1312010 MCH 1352490 
RevieW reply to counterclaim: review pleadings for starus conference: stallls conference re: scheduling order and deadlines; conference with C. Meyer re: document management 
continue wor1< on dlscowry requests to plainlltfs. 
Christopher H Meyer 10/12/2010 No Fee Type HistOtY 0.80 30500 244.00 10/15/2010 ch1 1352840 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 } 
RevieW illOd prepare for starus conference: pantcipalll In stallls conference. 
Alison s. Berriochoa 10/1812010 No Fee Type HiStOtY 1.10 10000 110.00 t0/18/2010 ASB 1353048 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 } 
R evleW all Outlook files received from C !lent regarding F akway Condos pro~t. 
Martln Hendrickson 11/1112010 NoFeeType HistOtY 380 20000 760.00 11/12/2010 MCH 1357632 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 } 
Draft email to client re sc~aduling order and starus: worl< on discovery requests to plaintiffs. 
Martln Hendrickson t1117/2010 No Fee Type History 5 30 20000 1.060.00 t1123/2010 MCH 1359302 
City of McCall/ Greys tone Village ( 4432 14 ) 
Continue revieW of admmlstratlve recoro and drattlng diSCOvery requests to plainlltfs. 
Christopher H Meyer 117/2011 No Fee Type HiSIOfY 050 310.00 t55.00 t/1012011 ch1 t367302 
City of McCaU 1 Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Ema~ to client: evaluate impact of Buckskin case on Greystone litlglltfon. 
'Aartin Hendrickson 1114/2011 No Fee Type HiStOtY 3.30 21000 69300 1/1412011 MCH 1368170 
City ol McCaN I Greystone Village ( 4432 /4 } 
RevieW discovery responses and documents produced by Plamtlffs: wor1< on conespondence to Plaintiffs' counsel re deficient responses. 
Alison S Berriochoa 1/14/2011 No Fee Type HiSIOfY 0.20 100.00 2000 111412011 ASB 1368222 
C1ty of McCan I Greystone Village 1 4432 /4 } 
Bum copy of Pli!lntifl's Discovery Responses !or C. Meyer review. 
Alison S. Berriochoa 1/17/2011 No Fee Type His!OtY 0 40 100.00 40.00 111712011 ASS 1368345 
City of McCan I Greys tone Village ( 4432/4) 
Beyln .mllal reVIeW of documents produced by Plalnllfl 111 response to dlscowry rnquests. 
Christopher H. Meyer 1118/2011 No Fee Type HistOtY 130 31000 40300 1121/2011 ch1 t368921 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 } 
468 
r~epon Run 117.'7011 12 44 StPM 
By Nakya Hibbeier 
Tlmeketl?;!r Date Worked Fet T~l?;! 
Ret~>ew diScovel'f. prepare ootllne le< tunhet diSCOvefY. etc. 
Christopher H. Meyer 1!1912011 No Fee Type 
City of McCaH I Greystone Village ( 4432 /4) 
Givens Pursley LlP 
Fees Listing 




310 00 21700 
Revtew pleadings and a11alySis of statute of llm•tallons 1ssues: tefepl\011t confel1l\C8 Wlth Martin Hendnckson re nmtno and scopt of mollon ror >ummafY tudgmenl 
Alison S Beniochoa 1122/2011 No Fee Type History 190 100.00 t9000 
City of McCall 1 Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Orgaruze client documents and documents produced by Plalnllft, update timellne. 
Chnstopher H. Meyer 1122/2011 No Fee Type History 350 31000 1,085.00 
City of McCall 1 Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Prepare motion tor summ3fY judgment telephone conference witn Martin Hendnckson re strategy fe< same. 
Alison S. Berriochoa 1/24/2011 No Fee Type History 0.60 100.00 60.00 







Page j 018 
P!1lVantage WIP t4 





Conference with C. Meyer regardlnglimellne and additional documents to be addad; obtain a11d review docket for filing and service of original ce<nplalnt; telephone conference with 
Valley County Cler1< regattlmg discrepancy on filing date of Amended Complaint; draft email to C. Meyer regarding same. 
Chrislopher H. Meyer 1124/2011 No Fee Type History 400 310 00 I ,240.00 1/2512011 en I 1369392 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4) 
Research and dran brief in suppor1 of motion for sumffi31'f judgment coordination with City staff re various plats and documents. 
Alison S. Berriochoa 1/2512011 No Fee Type History 4.80 100.00 480.00 1/25/2011 ASS 1369204 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Update tlmellne and C Meyer notebOok With additional client doCuments and City ordinances. 
Christopher H. Meyer t/25/2011 No Fee Type History 4 40 310.00 I ,364 00 1/2612011 en I 1369698 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
Researcn and draft motion ror summary judgment. 
Alison S Berriochoa 1/2612011 No Fee Type History 0.30 tOO.OO 30.00 1/26/2011 ASB 1369691 
City of McCall/ Greys tone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
T eiephone conference with Valley Co Cier1< requesting copy of original complaint: review records requested !rom Valley Co.: elect!1lnlc document management of same. 
Martin Hendrickson 112612011 No Fee Type His lory 4.50 21000 945.00 2/7/2011 MCH 1372154 
City of McCall/ Greys lone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
Wort< on letter to opposing coursei re· discovefY responses: wor1< on additional discovery requests to plalntil!s; review and edit bnef in support of summafY judgment 
Christopher H Meyer 112612011 No Fee Type History 2.30 31000 713.00 2/1/2011 en I 137(}706 
City of McCall/ Greys lone Viffage ( 4432/4 ) 
Drafting and research on motion tor partial summary judgment 
Chnstopher H. Meyer 1/2912011 No Fee Type History 2.80 310.00 868.00 2/1/2011 en I 137fr7t2 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Research and draft motion tor partial summary ;udgment. 
Martin Hendnckson 21112011 No Fee Type History 4 60 210.00 968.00 316/2011 MCH 1376781 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/4 ) 
RevieW and reVIse opening brief in supper! of mellon fe< summil'f judgment. 
Chnstopher H Meyer 212312011 No Fee Type History 080 310.00 248.00 212812011 chi 1375579 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 1 4 ) 
RevieW and edit draft motion IO< summil'f judgment. 
Christopher H Meyer 3/t512011 No Fee Type History 1.10 310.00 34100 3/1612011 en I 1378533 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 1 4 ) 
Work on motion to diSIT\ISS blieflng. 
Chnstopher H. Meyer 3/21/2011 No Fee Type Histoly 080 310.00 248.00 3/22/2011 en I 1380141 
City of McCan 1 Greyslone Village ( 4432/4 ) 
'!eseanch re Mction tor Summil'f Judgme.1t 
Chnstopher H Meyer 3/2212011 No Fee Type History 8 20 310 00 2,542 00 3/23/2011 chi t380376 
C1ty of McCan I Greyslone Village ( 4432/4 ) 469 
'• 
Repol1 Run 71712011 12.44 51 PM 
By Nakya Hibbeler 
Tlmekee~r Date Worked FeeT~~ 
Research and draft bl* 1n support of rootion lOt summary ~l 
Martin Hendrictcson 312312011 No Fee Type 
City of McCaN I Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Review and revise bnef '"support of roo110n lOt summary Judgment 
Christopher H Meyer 312312011 No Fee Type 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Givens Puniey LLP 
Fees Listing 





210.00 126 00 
31000 2,263 00 
Review the record and mal:e deta~led notes; edits to brief in support of motion for summary Judgment correspond wM City Stall and ~nsel re record issues. 
AlisOft S Berriochoa 3/24/2011 No Fee Type History 0.30 100.00 30.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 ) 
Update llmetine and C Meyer worl:ing notebOOk. 
Christopher H. Meyer 3/24/2011 No Fee Type History 3 10 31000 961.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
Research and draft brlef In support of motion lor summary judgment 
Christopher H. Meyer 3/2912011 No Fee Type History 070 31000 217.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
Research and draft brief In support of moiiOn lor summary judgment 
Christopher H. Meyer 3/3012011 No Fee Type History 700 31000 2,170.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
Research and drafting lor brlelln support of rootlon lor summary judgment. 
Martin Hendriclcson 3/3012011 No Fee Type History 0.30 210.00 63.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
Revise stipulation and order 10 modify expen disclOsure deadlines; W!ite to opposing counsel re: same. 
Christopher H. Meyer 3/31/2011 No Fee Type History 680 310.00 2,108 00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 14 ) 
Research and drattlng on motion lor summary judgment 
Christopher H. Meyer 4/1/2011 No Fee Type History 130 310.00 403.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 ) 
Edit brief in support of motiOn for summary judgment 
Martin Hendrickson 4/112011 No Fee Type History 030 210 00 63.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 ) 
Review email trom opposing counsel re: expen deadlines: revise stipulation and order; W!ite to opposing counsel wl1h reviSed stipulatiOn and order. 
Christopher H. Meyer 41?12011 No Fee Type History 2.40 310 00 744.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 1 4 ) 
Edits to bner '"support of motiOn for summary Judgment 
Martin Hendriclcson 41412011 No Fee Type History 650 210.00 1.365.00 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
~>age 4 or a 
ProVantage WIP 14 
Entered 
Date By Tran. t1 
3/2412011 MCH 1380455 
3124/2011 ch1 1380539 
312412011 ASB t380430 
312812011 ch1 1380814 
3130/2011 ch1 1381143 
4/1/2011 ch1 1381476 
4/6/2011 MCH 1382538 
4/1/2011 ch1 1381477 
4/4/2011 ch1 1381982 
4/6/2011 MCH 1382540 
4/7/2011 ch1 t383167 
416/2011 MCH 1382542 
WOO< on memorandum In support of rootlon tor summary judgment; 'AOf!t on affldM in support; wrt1e to Michelle Groenevett wl1h revised affidavit draft affidavit of counsel: dratt roollon 
and order tor leave to exceed page limit 
Christopher H. Meyer 4/4/2011 No Fee Type History 460 310.00 1.426 00 417/2011 ch1 1383168 
City of McCaa I Greystone Viffage ( 4432/ 4) 
Edits to brlef In support of roo110n tor summary i'Jd9ment 
AliSOft S. Berriochoa 4/512011 No Fee Type History 040 100.00 40.00 4/512011 ASB t382055 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 1 4 ) 
Assemble final exhibits to Affldavij of M Groenevelt In preparation of flRng. 
Martin Hendridtson 41512011 No Fee Type History 030 210.00 63 00 41512011 MCH 1382499 
City of McCall/ Greystone Vinage ( 4432 I 4) 
Rev- atftdavH or Groeneven tor !!ling wl!ll Court: check on staiUS ot healing on mollon lor summary ;udgment 
Chnstopner H. Meyer 4/512011 No Fee Type History 100 310.00 310.00 4/7/2011 ch1 1383170 
Ctty of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4) 470 
B)l: Nakya Hlbbeler 
Gl\'tnl Punlty U.P 
Fees Listing 
~·ea Worktcllhrv Jun lO 10 II 
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ProVantage WIP 14 
Entered 
Timekeeper Date Worked Fee Type Statui Hou11 Rate Amount Date 
Precaration and filing of affidavit >n support ol >rotlon fOt summaty Judgment pr1)Cn summary chart 
Christopher H. Meyer 4J1212011 No Fee Type Histofy 3.00 31000 93000 411312011 
C rty of McCaY I Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 } 
COOidlnalion re hearing for motion lor summary judgment otftce cooterance wrtl'l Ma111n Hendnckson re same; email exchanges Witt! clients/stall re upcoming meeting and preparalion 
ot iellel1; research and prepn draft senlement offer letter. 
Martin Hendridlson 4/1212011 No Fee Type HiStOIY 0.40 21000 8400 411312011 
City of McCall/ Greys tone Village ( 4432 I 4 } 
Rll'iiew and revise letter 10 opposing counsel demanding dismissal ot suit write to C Meyer re: same. 
Christopher H. Meyer 4/13/2011 No Fee Type HiStOI'f 0.50 310.00 155.00 4/1812011 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 14 ) 
Telephone conference With BiH NiChols; edits to draft settlement letter lor Greystone 
Christopher H. Meyer 4/14/2011 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 4.50 310.00 1,395 00 4/1812011 
City of McCall I Greyslone Village ( 4432 14 ) 
Edits 10 settlement offer kltte~ prepare summary notes and update spreadsheet review and P'llCate for meeting with City Council; drive to McCall; artend executi'le comm1ttee meeting. 
Christopher H. Meyer 4/15/2011 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 400 31000 1,240 00 4118/2011 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 /4) 
Drli'le 10 Boise; edits to settlement offer kltter, review file and update notes. 
Martin Hendridlson 4120/2011 No Fee Type HiSIOIY 0.40 21000 8400 515/2011 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Review emalls re: service of affidavrt and exhibits supporting motion for summary judgment on opposing oounse; reply to C. Meyer re: same. 
Christopher H. Meyer 4122/2011 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 100 310 00 310.00 4/27/2011 
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
Telephone conferences with Ma111n HendriCkson, opposing counsel (ViCtor Villegas), Bill Nichols, and lindley Klr11patr1ck re follow up on settlement offer, upcoming hearing on motion, 
and discovery deadlines; notes to file. 
Martin Hendrie~~ son 4/2212011 No Fee Type HistOI'f 080 210.00 16800 5/512011 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 44321 4 } 
Conference with C. Meyer re: serttement kltter. pending discovery; confe'llnCe Witt! C. Meyer and V Villegas re: pending discovery, opllon to save costs by postponing unUI after motion 
heartng; conference wrt!1 C. Meyer re discovery. 
Christopher H. Meyer 4123/2011 No Fee Type HisiOI'f 1.50 310.00 465.00 4/2712011 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 44321 4) 
Pnepare letter 10 Victor Villegas; telephone conference wlt!1 Marlin Herienckson re edits to letter, review discovery requests. 
Martin Hendrickson 4/23/2011 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 0.40 210.00 84.00 SiS/2011 
City of McCaN 1 Greyslone Village ( 4432/ 4) 
Review emaillrom C Meyer and draft klnlliiO V. Villegas re: discovery; reply to C. Meyer re: same. 
Alison S Berriochoa 412512011 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 3 70 100.00 370.00 4/25/2011 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 4432/ 4) 
Conduct pnvilege review in preparation of responding 10 diSCovery requests; dra!l emau to M. HendriCkson regarding same. 
Martin Hendridlson 4125/2011 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 750 210.00 1.575 00 5/5/2011 
City of McCall/ Greyslone ViHage ( 4432/ 4) 
Wrrte to M. Groenevett re discovery responses and additlonal documents; wor11 on objections and responses 10 discovery requests. 
Alison S. Bemochoa 4126/2011 No Fee Type History 0.70 100.00 70.00 4/2612011 
City of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 443214) 
Complete pMVilege log in preparallon of M Hendnckson review. 
Martin Hendridlson 4/2612011 No Fee Type HiStOI'f 770 21000 1,617 00 515i2011 
City of McCall Greyslone Vinage ( 443214 ) 
Work on diSCovery objectiOns and responses; review necords and emalts from C•ty and remove prlvifeOed and unrelated materials; draft prMiege IOQ. 
Alison S. Berriochoa 4/2712011 No Fee Type HiStofy 460 100.00 46000 4/27/2011 
C1ty of McCall/ Greyslone Village ( 443214 } 
ReviSe Pr1\>1lege Log, complete assembly of documents In pr1)Carallon of production. 
Martin Hendridlson 4127/2011 No Fee Type HiSIOI'f 6.50 21000 1.365 00 5i5/2011 
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Fees Listln1 
Fees Worked thnt Jua JO lOll 
Pagt6018 
ProVIII\tage WIP 14 
Timekeeper Date Worked Fee TyJ?! Stltut Hours Rate Amount 
Entered 
Date By Tran. I 
City of McCall I Greystone ViAage ( 443214) 
Review documents and compu~et ~les from City for privlleged and untelated aocumeniS 10 PIVPft for production 10 opposlnQ counsel: pntpare privilege lOg and table of document 
ctescnp!IOnt. 
Martin Hendmson 4128/2011 No Fee Type Histoly 5.20 21000 1 092.00 515/2011 
City of McCaA 1 Greystone ViHage ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Cononue review of City recolds lOr production 10 opposlng counsel. preparation of pmllege lOg and tallle 01 doclirneniS; write 10 opposing counsel re: same. 
Justin Fredin 412912011 No Fee Type History 470 19500 91650 51212011 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4) 
Researcn regarding application of quasi-estoppel; research regarding extension or revwal of flHng deadHne under Idaho Tort Claims Act 
Christopher H. Meyer 4/2912011 No Fee Type Histoly 2.10 310.00 651.00 51212011 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Review response brief and other submissions by plaintiffs; telephone conferences with '-4artin Hendrtci<Son re strategy for response. 
Martin Hendrickson 412912011 No Fee Type History 4.50 21000 94500 51512011 
City of McCan 1 Greystone ViRage ( 4432/4) 
Study PlaintiffS' ma!etlals In opposition to motion for summary judgment conference with C. Meyer re: lssuas and dwlslon of tasl<s; researcn cases cited lOr quasi esiOppel: conference 
wtth J. Fredin re same; review stlll\dards lOr motion to continue summary judgment hearing; worlt on response to motion for continuance. 
Justin Fredin 51212011 No Fee Type Billed 6.40 195.00 1,248 00 51912011 
City ot McCafl/ Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Researcn regarding application of quasl-esiOppel; resean:h regarding extension or revwal of flllng deadHne under Idaho Tort Claims Act, discuss findings witll M. Hendrickson. 
Martin Hendrickson 51212011 No Fee Type Billed 750 210.00 1.575 00 61212011 
City ot McCaU I Greystone Village ( 4432 /4 ) 
Analyze PlaintiffS' brief In opposition to motlon lor summary judgment supponing materials 111\d cases; outline issues lor reply brief; research application of estoppel to extend statute of 
Hmhattons or revive claim. 
Christopher H. Meyer 51312011 No Fee Type Billed 3.90 310.00 1.209 00 51512011 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432 /4 ) 
Resean:n and dran brief 1n suppon of motion for summary judgment 
Martin Hendrickson 51312011 No Fee Type Billed 750 21000 1,575 00 6/312011 
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
Researcn and wor1t on reply brief In support of motion for summary judgment 
Martin Hendrickson 514/2011 No Fee Type Billed 8.10 21000 1.70100 51512011 
City of McCall/ Greystone Vinage ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Continue work on reply bnef In support of motion for summary judgment; review memoflll\dum In opposition to motiOn to vacate; drat! motiOn to exceed page limit conference witll M. 
Wilfiams re: ability to file via fax thrOugh his offlce; conference Nitll M Groeneveit re: reoordS ooncemlng credtt IOward community housing fees; review emaH from City re additional 
reSOlutions 111\d ordinances on community hOusing Issue. 
Christopher H. Meyer 5/412011 No Fee Type Billed 10 30 310.00 3.193.00 5/512011 
City of MeCaB I Greystone Village ( 4432/4 ) 
Researcn and drat! ceply bnef on motiOn lOr summary Judgment edits 10 brief In cesponse 10 Rule 56(1) motion. 
Christopher H. Meyer 51512011 No Fee Type Billed 5.00 31000 1.550 00 519/2011 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 4432/4 ) 
Coordination Nitll clients. coordination re today's diSCovery responses; preparation for oral argument next Wednesday. 
Martin Hendrickson 515/2011 No Fee Type Billed 6.70 210.00 1.40700 61112011 
City ot McCall! Greystone Village ( 44321 4 ) 
Draft supplemental reply brief, motion for ieave.lllld motion 10 shorten tlrne; continue wor1< on Objections 111\d responses 10 dtscovary requests: write to MicneHe Groeneveit re: re<:ordS 
concerning refunds 01 hOusing fees; review email from M!cheHe Groeneven with spreadSNiel 01 refunds; conference with Micneite Groeneven re: ether objectiOns or requested refunds. 
Chnstopher H Meyer 5110/2011 No Fee Type Silted 9.50 310.00 2.945 00 511312011 
City ot McCall! Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Prepare for oral argument (reviSe spreadsheet. master notes. ouHine of argument. new exhibits. etc.): oooldinatlon with Mar!ln Hendrickson. 
Chnstopller H. Meyer 511112011 No Fee Type Billed 1080 31000 3.348 00 511312011 
City of McCaA 1 Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Rev- 111\d file motion 10 supplefnent record: pntpare fOr oral argument: participate in oral argument drwe 10 111\d from Cascade. 
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ProVaotage WIP 14 
Timekeeper Oatt Worked Fee Type Status Hours Rate Amount 
Entered 
Oatt By Tran. 1 
City of McCaB I Greystone Village ( 443214) 
Prepare tor oral 319umen1 on motion to postpone hearing; draft motion to supplement recotU and 10 shorten nme: conference .villi C. Meyer rt: oral iiii!Ument tssues tor motion tor 
summary judgment '1!vlew and '1lvlse C. Meyer outilne tor oral iiii!UITWiflt tl'l'ttl to Cascade; attend r.taring on pending motions; return travtl. 
Christopher H Meyer 511212011 No Fee Type Billed 090 310.00 279.00 511312011 
City of McCaH I Greystone Village ( 4432 /4 ) 
Follow up ne dlscovety, etc. ioiiOwing yesterday's heanng. 
Martin Hendrickson 61312011 No Fee Type Billed 160 210.00 336.00 61612011 
City of McCaU I Greystone Village ( 4432 14 ) 
Review letter fnom opposmg counsel '1!: prlvilege log and additiOnal records. review withheld recOrds referenced in lener. 
Martin Hendrickson 61812011 No Fee Type Billed 300 210.00 63000 61812011 
City of McCaU 1 Greystone Village ( 4432 I 4 ) 
Continue nevlew of withheld documents requested by Plaintiffs and wor1t on letter to opposing counsel re: same. 
Martin Hendrickson 61912011 No Fee Type Billed 2.20 21000 46200 61912011 
City of McCall/ Greystone Village ( 443214) 
Revise leHer to opposing counsel re: pri'lileged recOrds; conference wiUl M. Groeoevelt ne: additional community hOusing documents: wor1t on supplemental discovery response. 
Christopher H. Meyer 6/1612011 No Fee Type UnbiRed 100 310 00 310.00 612012011 
City of McCan I Greystone Village ( 44321 4 ) 
Review dectsiOn on motiOn for summary judgment coordinate wnh client and co-counsel; begin preparing for attorney fee request. 
Martin Hendrickson 611612011 No Fee Type Unbilled 0.40 210.00 8400 71612011 
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 44321 4 ) 
Review decision granting summary judgment. 
Christopher H. Meyer 611712011 No Fee Type Unbilled 3.40 310.00 1.054 00 612012011 
City of McCall I Greystone Village ( 4432/ 4 ) 
Pre pane memorandum of costs and fees. 
Martin Hendrickson 612312011 No Fee Type Unbined 040 210.00 84.00 71612011 
City of McCall 1 Greystone Village ( 44321 4 ) 
Draft proposed judgment 
Christopher H. Meyer 612912011 No Fee Type Unbilled 300 31000 930.00 6/3012011 
City of McCan I Greystone Village ( 44321 4 ) 
OffiCe conference with Manln Heodrlcltson to diScuss strategy for attorney fee recovery (interaction of 12-117 and contract claim, and its relationship with judgment); edijs to appliCation 
for attorney tees; telephOne conference with Murray Feldman re his af!ldavrt; coordination with accounflng office re costs and fees. 
Christopher H. Meyer 6130/2011 No Fee Type Unbtlled 2.20 310.00 682.00 715/2011 
City of McCaH I Greystone Viftage ( 44321 4) 
Review and respond to motion lor reconsiderallon; coordinatiOn wiUl =unset and client re same. 
Martin Hendrickson 613012011 No Fee Type Unbilled 2.80 210.00 58800 7/612011 
City of McCan 1 Greystone Village ( 44321 4 ) 
Study Plaintiffs' motion tor reconsideration and cited au!hontles; conference willl C. Meyer re: same; review and edU memorandum of costs and lees. 













Exhibit C JUDGMENT IN SCHAEFER V. CITY OF SUN VALLEY 





JAN-24-2011 MON 10:55 AM BL COUNTY JUDICIAL P. 02 
" -·~ . . 
... , . Jo • 
Christopher H. Meyer [ISB No. 4461] 
Martin C. Hendriclcson [ISB No. Sl76] 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Strecrt 
P.O. Box 2720 . 
Boise, Idabo 83701-2720 
Office: (208) 388-1200 
Fax: (208) 388-1300 
www.givenspurslcy.com 
Artonreysfor Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantJ Phil and LyM Schaefer 
• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TilE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICf 
OF THE STATE OF' IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
PHIL AND LYNN SCHAEFER, Case No.: CV-06-882 
Plaintiffs/Countcrdefendants, 
v. JUDGMENT 
CITY OF SUN VALLEY, 
Defendant/Counterclairnant. 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon the Motions for Summary Judgment 
filed by Plaintiffs and the Defendant, and this Court having issued ita Decision on Summary 
Judgment on July 3, 2007. in favor of the Plaintiffs; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Summary Judgment is 
granted in favor of the Plaintiffs and the City of Sun Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED; and the Plaintiffs arc entitled to a refund from the Defendant in the amount of 
$11,989.97. 
The Court, having considered the Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs and Requests for 
Attorneys• Fees. the Defendant's objection thereto. and the arguments of the partie!, it is hereby 
Pllge I of3 475 




7 P. 03 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECRBBD that Plaintiffs are awarded attorneys' fees in tho 
amount of$60,703.00 and costa in the amount of$88.00 for a total amount of$60,791.00, plus 
interest at the statutory rate of 10% annually from and alter the date of Judgment. 
DATED: ~ )Jj ~f 
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COUNTY JUDICIAL FAX NO. 208 
• 
CLERI'S CQIIFJ,AII OF SERVIQ 
1 hereby certifY that on thia :kJ day of February 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicatod below, and addressed to the following: 
Christopher H. Meyer ~u.s. Mail 
Martin C. Hendrickson _ Overnight Mail 
Givens Pura.Iey LLP _ Hand Delivery 
601 W. Bannock Street Fax 
P .0. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
Geoffrey M. W ardlc, Esq. 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
877 W. Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1614 
Rand L. Peebles, Esq. 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
540 North 2nd Avenue 
P.O. Box297 
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Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Jase No. __ _.nst.No_._~-­
Filed A.M . ..: I : I 2 P.M. 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Office: 208-388-1200 
Fax: 208-3 88-1300 
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com 
mch@givenspursley .com 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant City ofAlcCall 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 




CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Counter-defendant. 
Case No: CV 201 0-276C 
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INTRODUCTION 
Defendant and Counterclaimant City of McCall ("City"), by and through its undersigned 
attorneys of record, and, pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. (''Rule") 54 and Idaho Code§§ 12-117 and 
12-121, hereby submits its Jfemorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees with Supporting Statement 
(''Memorandum"). The City is not claiming any costs as a matter of right under Rule 
54( d)(l )(C), nor is it claiming discretionary costs under Rule 54( d)( l )(0). However, it is 
seeking attorney fees in the amount of $82,023 pursuant to Rule 54( e)( 1 ). The City seeks 
recovery of these attorney fees against Plaintiffs Richard Hehr and Grey stone Village, LLC, 
jointly and severally. 
The City tiled a counter-claim seeking attorney fees based on violation of its contract 
with the Plaintiffs. An award of attorney fees under this Memorandum, however, would moot 
the contract claim presented in the counter-claim.' The contract-based claim is not presented 
here but is instead reserved in the event that attorney fees are not awarded as sought under this 
Memorandum. 
This Memorandum consists of two parts. The first is a Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees in accordance with Rule 54(e)(5). The second is a Supporting Statement 
explaining the basis for the request. This Memorandum is further supported by the Affidavit of 
Christopher H ,\4eyer, the Affidavit of.Hartin C. Hendrickson, the Affidavit of William F 
Nichols, and the Affidavit ofAiurray D. Feldman, which are submitted herewith. 
1 Although the attorney fees sought here and in the counterclaim are the same fees, the standards would be 
different: Fees under the contract are awarded to the prevailing party as an entitlement (without a showing that the 
non-prevailing party lacked a ·•reasonable basis"). To recover under the contract, however, the City would need to 
establish the factual premise that the contract was breached. 
CITY'S MBIORA:"lDDf OF COSTS A~D AITOR:"iE\ FEES Wrnt Sl'PPORTI:"lG STATE:\IENT 
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MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Costs as a matter of right under Rule 54(d)(1)(C) ................................................. $0 
Discretionary costs under Rule 54( d)( 1 )(D) .......................................................... $0 
Attorney fees under Rule 54( e)( l) ................................................................ $82,023 
A detailed breakdown and description of the attorney fees sought is set out in the 
Ajfidavit of Christopher H Jfeyer. 
SUPPORTING STATEMENT 
I. THE STANDARDS UNDER SECTIONS 12-117 AND 12-121 ARE FUNCTIONALLY 
IDENTICAL. 
The City seeks attorney fees under both Idaho Code § 12-117 and Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Under section 12-11 7, parties in actions involving a state agency or local government 
may recover their costs and attorney fees if they prevail and can show that the other party acted 
"without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The statute provides: 
( 1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any 
administrative proceeding or civil judicial proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency or political subdivision and a person, 
the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as the case 
may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevai1ing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Code§ 12-117( 1) (emphasis supplied).2 
Idaho Code § 12-121, in contrast, reads like a pure, English-style prevailing-party statute: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this 
section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise 
provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or 
2 This statute was amended in 20 I 0, 20 I 0 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 29, to change the result obtained in 
Rammel/ v. ISDA, 147 Idaho 415,210 P.3d 523 (2009). The amendment restored the prior law, which is that 
attorney fees may be awarded in administrative proceedings, not just court proceedings. Accordingly, prior 
precedent remains valid. Subsequent decisions interpreting the 20 I 0 amendment (e.g., Laughy v. Idaho Dep 't of 
Transportation, 149 Idaho 867,876-77,243 P.Jd 1055, 1064-65 (2010); Smith v. Washington County, 150 Idaho 
388, 392, 247 P.3d 615, 619 (20 I 0) (replacing earlier opinion) have held that the amendment bars recovery in 
judicial review proceedings. However, that has no bearing on this matter, which is a civil action. 
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"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
Section 12-121 is moditied, however, by Rule 54(e)(l), which states: "Provided, attorney 
fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when it finds, from the 
facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation." (Emphasis supplied.) 
While these two standards ("without a reasonable basis in fact or law" and "frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation") read differently, there is little if any difference between 
them in application. Indeed, our appellate courts have equated the two standards. Total Success 
Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist. ("Total Success If'), 148 Idaho 688, 695, 227 
P.3d 942, 949 (Ct. App. 20 I 0); Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC 
("Total Success f'), 145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323, 335 (2008); Jenkins v. Barsalou, 145 
Idaho 202, 207, 177 P.3d 949, 954 (2008); Nation v. State, Dep 't of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 
194, !58 p .3d 953, 970 (2007). 
The only difference between the statutes is that section 12-121 entails an exercise of 
discretion. Consequently, on appeal, the reviewing court reviews section 12-121 claims under an 
abuse of discretion standard. In contrast, appellate courts freely review section 12-117 claims. 
Total Success II, 148 Idaho at 695, 227 P.3d at 949. 
There is a line of authority holding that if section 12-117 is available, it is exclusive and 
section 12-121 is unavailable. Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlatch School Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 
630, 635, 226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010). On other occasions, the Court has applied both sections 
12-117 and 12-121. E.g., Total Success I and Total Success II. We are unable to reconcile these 
two lines of cases. To be on the safe side, the City seeks fees under both provisions. Each of the 
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arguments below showing that the Plaintiffs' actions were "without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law" should be understood to apply equally to the corresponding standard under section 12-121. 
fl. THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO FEES UNDER SECTION 12-117 AND/OR SECTION 
12-121. 
A. Section 12-117 is intended to deter litigation like that brought by 
Plaintiffs. 
This case satisfies the threshold requirements in section 12-117: the case is a civil action 
involving a governmental entity and private entities as adverse parties, and the City prevailed. 
All that remains is to establish that the Plaintiffs pursued the matter "without a reasonable basis 
in fact or Jaw" or, under section 12-121, that Plaintiffs brought or pursued this case "frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." 
The Idaho Supreme Court has often described the purpose of an attorney fee award: 
"First, it serves 'as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] 
a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against 
groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have made.'" 
Reardon v. Alagic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004) 
(brackets original) (quoting Rincover v. State of Idaho, Dep 't of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 
976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999), and Bogner v. State Dep 't of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 
859, 693 P.2d 1056, I 061 ( 1984)). These important goals are often discussed by the Court in 
explaining what actions constitute pursuing an action "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
Indeed, the language on the importance of deterrence and appropriate remedies has been quoted 
20 times by Idaho's appellate courts. 
These words are particularly applicable here. The City and its taxpayers have endured a 
costly and unnecessary legal challenge that should never have been brought in the first instance. 
Deterrence of such unwarranted lawsuits is important when, as here, the law was clear from the 
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outset that Plaintiffs had no viable cause of action, and this was made plain to them by the City 
early in the litigation. 
B. Attorney fee awards under section l2-ll7 are mandatory. 
It is important to underscore that, unlike other attorney fee provisions, section 12-117 
does not entail an exercise of discretion. The Idaho Supreme Court has noted on numerous 
occasions that, where the requirements of the statute are met, an award of attorney fees is 
mandatory. ''This Court has further noted that Idaho Code § 12-117 is not a discretionary 
statute; but it provides that the court shall award attorney fees where the state agency did not act 
with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving a person who prevails in the 
action." Rincover v. State of Idaho, Dep 't of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 
(1999) (emphasis original). "The statute is not discretionary but provides that the court must 
award attorney fees where a state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or in Jaw in a 
proceeding involving a person who prevails in the action." Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 
349, 356, 109 P.3d I 091, 1098 (2005). 
C. Litigation in the face of controlling facts and settled precedent 
justifies an attorney fee award. 
The most common successful defense to an attorney fee request is that the non-prevailing 
party raised issues of first impression. There are dozens of such cases. E.g., Lake CDA 
Investments, LLC v. Idaho Dep 't of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 284-85, 233 P.3d 721, 731-32 (20 I 0). 
The flip side, however, is equally compelling. Where parties ignore settled precedent, as the 
PlaintitTs did here, they are subject to a mandatory award of fees under section 12-117. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that failure to address controlling appellate decisions and failure 
to address factual or legal findings of the district court equates to pursuing litigation without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Waller v. State of Idaho, Dep 't of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 
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234, 240, 192 PJd I 058, I 064 (2008). Other examples of parties paying the price for ignoring 
settled precedent are found in Excel/ Construction, Inc. v. Idaho Dep 't of Commerce and Labor, 
145 Idaho 783, 793, 186 P.3d 639, 649 (2008) (attorney fees awarded against agency that failed 
to apply a case whose relevant facts were "virtually indistinguishable"), and Gallagher v. State, 
141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d 756, 760 (2005) (attorney fees may be awarded when "the Jaw is 
well-settled"). 
The same holds true under section 12-121. "Attorney fees are awardable if an appeal 
does no more than simply invite an appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting 
evidence, or if the Jaw is well settled and appellant has made no substantial showing that the 
district court misapplied the law." Johnson v. Edward, 113 Idaho 660, 662, 747 P.2d 69, 71 
(1987). 
D. Plaintiffs refused to acknowledge controlling precedent. 
Plaintiffs find themselves in a position similar to that of the non-prevailing parties in the 
cases just cited. Like those parties, PlaintifTs here failed to address key facts and controlling 
legal precedent. 
(l) Four-year statute of limitations 
Their treatment of the four-year statute of limitations issue ignored the seemingly 
inescapable fact that they had signed the Development Agreement on May 3, 2006, more than 
four years before initiating the litigation. In addition to ignoring the key facts ofthe case, 
Plaintiffs ignored controlling precedent establishing that the clock begins to run from the day the 
loss becomes apparent-even if the full extent of the Joss is not yet known. JlcCuskey v. 
Canyon County Comm 'rs ("JlcCuskey If'), 218 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d I 00, 104 ( 1996) (citing 
Tibbs v. CityofSandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,671,603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979)). Remarkably, 
PlaintitTs cited JfcCuskey II to the Court, but refused to acknowledge the case's plain holding. 




Plaintiff's Jfemorandum in Opposition to Defendant's J!otionfor Summary Judgment at 6-10. It 
is hard to imagine a more clear-cut case of pursuing litigation without a reasonable basis. 
In State of Idaho v. Estate of Joe Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 439-40, Ill P.3d 121, 124-25 
(2005), the Court quoted the dual purposes of the statute recited above and declared that both 
were violated. "The action was groundless because the Department clearly waited too long to 
present its claim .... It is appropriate to discourage such action. Further, the Department's 
action placed an unjustified financial burden on the Estate." !d. The same can be said here. 
Ironically, the very case that hung the Plaintiffs on the statute of limitations, 
lv!cCuskey II, also compels an attorney fee award. In that case the plaintiff claimed a temporary 
taking from the time Canyon County issued a stop work order to the time the Idaho Supreme 
Court voided the controlling ordinance in McCuskey v. Canyon County ("McCuskey f'), 123 
Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 ( 1993). The McCuskey II Court dismissed the inverse condemnation 
claim as time barred, concluding, based on Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 
1 001 ( 1979), that the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the stop work order not the 
subsequent decision vindicating the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court awarded attorney fees to 
Canyon County. 3 "This Court clearly established the time when a cause of action accrues in an 
inverse condemnation claim in Tibbs . ... McCuskey has provided no 'substantial' showing that 
the district court misapplied the rule elucidated in these cases with his particular claim and has 
given no compelling reason to deviate from the rule we have established." JfcCuskey II, 128 
Idaho at 218,912 P.2d at 105.4 
3 The fee award in JfcCus/cey II was made under Idaho Code§ 12-121, not § 12-117, which, at the time, 
was a one-way street and did not allow counties to obtain fee awards against private parties. As noted in section I at 
page 3, however, the standards under the two statutes are essentially identical. 
4 In Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 782, 53 P.3d 828, 833 (2002), the Court distinguished 
McCus/cey II in denying attorney fees to Jefferson County. The Court declared, "However, we find the Covingtons 
have made some valid arguments relating to their claim for inverse condemnation, which demonstrates that the 




Exactly the same can be said here. There was no novel question of law. There were no 
unusual facts. This was a textbook statute of I imitations case controlled by Tibbs, JfcCuskey II, 
and other settled authority. Accordingly, this is a textbook case for an award of attorney fees. 
(2) Tort Claims Act 
PlaintitTs' position in this case was even weaker that the position of the plaintitTs in 
Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley County, Case No. CV-2009-554C, recently decided by this 
Court. The Buckskin plaintiffs were not subject to the Tort Claims Act, because the defendant 
was not a city. Here, it was a fatal tlaw. Plaintiffs responded that this defense was barred by 
quasi-estoppel. However, they misrepresented the nature of quasi-estoppel and failed to advise 
the Court of the key elements of this legal theory. Plaintiffs never bothered to explain how they 
met those criteria, and, of course, they could not. In short, they had no reasonable basis to 
pursue this case. 
(3) KMST 
The facts of this case also ran headlong into K1HST, LLC v. County oj.Ada, 138 Idaho 
577, 581,67 P.3d 56,60 (2003). Yet the Plaintiffs refused to acknowledge or meaningfully 
address the hard facts: It was the developers themselves who presented the proposal to convey 
the subject lots in their own application for tina! plat, it was the developers who agreed to 
Development Agreement, and it was the developers who never objected to the arrangement or 
disagreed with the express statements in the official record documenting the voluntary nature of 
appeal is not frivolous or unreasonable." This was an apparent reference to a fairly complex debate over whether a 
land use action authorizing a hot mix plant (which in tum emits odors that travel to the plaintitTs' property) is a 
physical or regulatory taking. The complexity of the constitutional issues raised in Covington stands in contrast to 
the cut and dried statute of limitations and other defenses presented by the City. The case at bar is also 
distinguishable from Gibsonv. Ada County, 1421daho 746,756, 133 PJd 1211, 1221 (2006), ct?rt. dt?nit?d, 549 U.S. 
994 (2006), rt?hearing denied, 549 U.S. 1159 (2007), where the Court denied attorney fees despite the plaintiff 
blowing the statute of limitations because it found, "She made a good faith argument based on relevant authority that 
the statute of limitations was tolled." Plaintiffs here have cited no relevant authority that supports their position. 




the arrangement. Even their own affidavits showed that they chose this course in order to speed 
things along. See discussion in City's Response Brief Opposing Jfotionfor Reconsideration 
dated July 5, 2011. PlaintitTs had no reasonable basis to ignore these undisputed facts and 
should have realized that they barred recovery under KMST. 
( 4) Two-year statute of limitations 
Plaintiffs refused to recognize clear federal precedent showing that their federal claims 
are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs' contention that they could escape the 
two-year statute by failing to plead § 1983 ignored controlling Ninth Circuit law to the contrary. 
Their argument on this point can fairly be described as frivolous. 
(5) Williamson County 
Finally, even if the Plaintiffs could escape the two-year statute of limitations, they should 
have known that their federal law claims would founder on the well-established ripeness tests set 
out in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172 (1985). For example, they simply ignored the U.S. Supreme Court's clear rule that 
federal takings claims cannot be presented until they have tirst pursued and lost an inverse 
condemnation claim based on state remedies. Pressing forward with their federal claims in the 
face of such clear obstacles was patently unjustifiable. 
E. Plaintiffs' pursuit of this litigation following the Court's decision in 
Buckskin is untenable. 
As noted above, this Court handed down its Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's 
.\lotion for Summary Judgment in the Buckskin matter on January 7, 2011. This was followed by 
the Court's Jfemorandum Decision (1) Plaintiffs' Jlotionfor Partial Summary Judgment 
(2) Defendant's .\lotion for Entry of Judgment (3) Plaintiffs' .\lotion for Reconsideration! 
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Amendment (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees on April 11, 2011. The 
Court entered its Judgment in this matter on April 19, 20 II. 
The Buckskin case involved legal arguments and defenses that closely track those 
presented in the case at bar. It should have informed Plaintiffs' judgment. They were certainly 
aware of this litigation. Counsel on both sides of that case are the same counsel in the instant 
action. 
While the Court declined to award attorney fees in Buckskin, we urge that the situation is 
different here. IfPlaintiffs' counsel initially was entitled to a learning curve on the statute of 
limitations and other defenses, that cannot be said in the case at bar. The Court's decision in 
Buckskin on January 7, 2011 should have been ample education for the Plaintiffs here. Yet they 
pursued the litigation with undiminished vigor. Indeed, most of the legal expenses in this case 
(which continue to mount) have been incurred after the Court's decision in Buckskin. 
F. The City went out of its way to bring this litigation to an early 
conclusion. 
Plaintiffs' pursuit of this litigation is particularly unjustified in the face ofthe City's 
extraordinary efforts to bring this case to an early conclusion. 
Rather than hold its fire for the courtroom, the City went out of its way to provide a 
particularly detailed Answer to First Amended Complaint and Counterclaim ("Answer"). The 
Answer went beyond the minimal requirements of code pleading, providing the Plaintiffs with a 
careful analysis of the key evidence and the controlling law. Indeed, it included a half an inch of 
exhibits. This should have been sufficient to call the Plaintiffs' attention to any issues they 
might have previously overlooked. It should have ended the litigation before all the discovery 
and motion practice. But it did not have that effect. Plaintiffs proceeded untazed. 
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On April 15, 20 II, ten days after filing its .Hotion for Summary Judgment, undersigned 
counsel for the City sent a letter to counsel for PlaintitTs urging settlement (the "Letter"). A copy 
is attached hereto as Exhibit A. (The Letter provided: "This offer is not subject to Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 408 and may be shared with the Court in the event settlement is not reached." Letter 
at 2.) 
In the Letter the City set out is argument in detail, comparing the facts to those of other 
cases recently decided involving similar challenges to actions of Valley County. The Plaintiffs 
ignored the letter and proceeded with the litigation. 
Not surprisingly, the authorities cited in the Letter closely track those discussed in the 
decision ultimately reached by this Court. After all, these are settled authorities, and the 
outcome of this case should have been foreseen. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES WERE NECESSARY AND REASONABLY INCURRED. 
Attorney fees incurred by the City also were necessary and reasonable. The City took the 
initiative to reduce the cost of litigation by tiling its Alotion for Summary Judgment. In briefing 
the motion, it presented its arguments fully and fairly so as to invite a meaningful response from 
the Plaintitis. 
The City and its counsel sought to keep their attorney fees as low as possible. In so 
doing, however, they did not sacrifice the quality of the lawyering provided, nor are they 
expected to do so under sections 12-117 or 12-121. After all, a great deal is at stake in this 
litigation, particularly considering that these Plaintiffs are not the only ones so situated. The 
reasonableness of the attorney fees charged is supported by the accompanying affidavits. 
Rule 54(e)(3) sets out criteria for the Court to consider in determining the amount of 
attorney fees to award. Those factors are addressed below. 




l. Time and labor required: The actual time spent by the City's attorneys on this 
matter is set forth in detail in the Affidavit of Christopher H. Meyer and the exhibits thereto. It is 
reasonable under the circumstances. See also Affidavit of William F Nichols and Affidavit of 
.Hurray D. Feldman. 
2. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved: The issues presented in this 
case involve the interaction of three constitutional provisions, state and federal statutes, and 
extensive case law. At the end of the day, the rule of law is clear and unmistakable. But tracing 
through the precedents in both state and federal law justified retention of counsel with 
specialized experience. Moreover, the stakes were high. The issues are of significant public 
concern, implicating the ability of local governments to conduct their affairs in the context of 
settled expectations. If local governments may be forced to reimburse developers in connection 
with signed agreements called into question years later after the City has made investments and 
taken other actions in reliance on those agreements, their ability to plan and budget will be 
jeopardized. Moreover, had Plaintiffs prevailed, the precedent established by this case would 
attract multiple other litigations by those seeking to undo past deals. Rather than presenting this 
as a simple inverse condemnation under state law, they raised a broader range of claims and 
alternative forms of relief including, notably, federal damage claims. This, in tum, led to more 
complex legal defenses under section 1983, etc. Although the City provided an extensive and 
thorough explanation in its brief as to why these claims and arguments failed, Plaintiffs 
continued to pursue in them. Even after the Court's decision was rendered, Plaintiffs have 
engaged in further strategic maneuvers requiring the City to incur further legal costs. 
3. The skill requisite to perform the legal services properly and the experience and 
ability of the attorney: As set forth in the discussion of the previous factor, this case presented 




significant and complex issues of administrative Jaw, constitutional law, statutory interpretation, 
and civil procedure. Messrs. Meyer and Hendrickson have extensive experience in the fields of 
Jaw pertinent to this litigation, as detailed in their respective affidavits. Messrs. Meyer and 
Hendrickson were specially retained in this matter. The City is not seeking recovery of attorney 
fees for its city attorney, who provided oversight and review of this litigation. 
4. Prevailing charges for like work: Fees charged by Messrs. Meyer and 
Hendrickson are at or below the prevailing charges for like work by attorneys of their caliber. 
This statement is supported by the Ajjidavit of William F Nichols and the Affidavit oj}vfurray D. 
Feldman. Mr. Meyer's hourly fee of$310 per hour was discounted from his regular rate as an 
accommodation to the City of McCall. Work performed by other attorneys at Givens Pursley 
was limited to brief strategic consultations. To the extent possible, costs were reduced by 
employing paralegals for document management. 
5. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent: Undersigned counsel for the City charged 
a tixed hourly fee for their work. Accordingly, no upward adjustment for a contingent fee is 
appropriate. 
7. Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances: There were no 
particular time limitations that would support either an increase or decrease of the attorney fee. 
8. The amount involved and the results obtained: The results obtained were entirely 
successful for the City. The amount charged was proportionate to the stakes involved and the 
complexity of the litigation. 
10. The undesirability of the case: No adjustment to the attorney fees is necessary 
based on this factor. 
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11. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client: No 
adjustment to the attorney fees is necessary based on this factor. 
12. Awards in similar cases: Undersigned counsel for the City are not aware of 
awards having been made in similar cases, other than the case of Schaefer v. City of Sun Valley, 
Case No. CV-06-882 (Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist. July 3, 2007) (declaring unconstitutional Sun 
Valley's affordable housing fee). A copy of the Judgment entered in at case is attached as 
Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Christopher H .Heyer. In that case, the plaintiff prevailed and was 
awarded attorney fees in the amount of $60,703 in addition to other costs. Counsel for the 
plaintiff in that case were Christopher H. Meyer and Martin C. Hendrickson. That fee award was 
based on Mr. Meyer's hourly fee in 2006 of $230 per hour. This is one of the three cases 
mentioned in the briefing in the case at bar. 5 The City has described the case at bar as a 
"copycat" lawsuit based on these earlier impact fee cases. These three cases are not a direct 
parallel, however, because they were initiated by plaintiffs in a timely fashion before or shortly 
after impact fees were paid. Accordingly, they did not trigger the defenses presented here. But 
they do reflect the typical level of attorney involvement in cases of this nature. See Affidavit of 
William F. Nichols and Affidavit ofJlurray D. Feldman. 
On balance, these factors support an award of the attorney fees charged to the City in this 
matter, as set out in the Memorandum of Costs above. 
~The second was Cove Springs Development, Inc. v. Blaine County, Case No. CV2008-22 (Idaho, Fifth 
Judicial Dist., June 3, 2008) (declaring unlawful and unconstitutional various exaction and comprehensive plan 
ordinance provisions). This case, also litigated by Messrs. Meyer and Hendrickson, was settled following the 
District Court's favorable decision on the merits. The third was litigated by Victor Villegas and was resolved in 
favor of his client. Central Bd of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial 
Dist., Feb. 19, 2008). An award may have been made in that case. Plaintiffs' counsel is in the best position to 
provide that infonnation to the Court. 
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DATED this ll 1h day of July, 2011. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
By: -~-"C•hrc:;.is...;t-'op.:::h .. e _r ;;;::H . -,..:;e=y-e~-fi--=-'{!J4---',.;;...:;-"':':.":.-~-
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of July, 20 II, the foregoing was filed, served, 
and copied as follows: 
DOCUMENT FILED: 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk 
Valley County Courthouse 
219 Main Street 
Cascade, ID 8361 I 
Facsimile: 208-382-7107 
Jed Manwaring, Esq. 
Victor Villegas, Esq. 
Evans Keane LLP 
1405 West Main 
P.O. Box 959 
SERVICE COPIES TO: 













COURTESY COPIES TO: 
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin 
District Judge 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jason Gray 
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
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April IS, 2011 
Re: Hehr v. City of McCall, Case No.CV 201 0-276C 







David A. Lombtltlll 
Emoi\<L. McCIWe 
~A.~ 
Kelly Gr- McConnell 
Cyt>IMI A. l\letilo 
Cl'v!flOPIW H Meyet 
L Edwald Millr 
Pi111idl J. Mohr 
ludlon 8 MonlgcoMiy 
Deborllh E Neiaoft 
K-'..,J.~ 
W Hugn O'ftlonlan. ll M. 
AnvttaM. AMCI 
Mill\ A St.,• 
Conley E. WM1 
ROIM!t8 . ...._ 
RETIRED 
K'""""' L Pun~ 
J-A~Iure 
Raymond 0. O•ventl1~17·20081 
On April 5, 20I 1, the City filed its Motion for Summary Judgment together with 
supporting brief and other materials. The matter is set for argument on May 11, 201 I. I write 
because it seems unnecessary tor us to go through this exercise. 
The defenses we have presented are rock solid. In addition to the defenses presented in 
the Buckskin and White Cloud matters, this case presents the additional defense of the 180-day 
notice requirement (which is applicable to cities but not to counties). I just don't see a way 
around this one. The statute is clear on its face, and Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 571-73, 
798 P .2d 27, 30-3 2 ( 1990) and BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise (" BHA If'), I 4 I Idaho 168, 
174-76, 108 P.3d 315,321-23 (2004) leave no room to maneuver. 
This case is also very strong on the four-year statute of limitations. Unlike the White 
Cloud matter (in which the Road Development Agreement was signed inside the four-year 
period prior to the Complaint), the Development Agreement here was signed more than four 
years before the Complaint. 
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Jed W. Manwaring, Esq. 
VictorS. Villegas, Esq. 
April15,2011 
Page 2 
The facts here are distinguishable from Buckskin only in that in Buckskin there was a 
tina! plat approvaJ on October 25, 2004 (subsequent to the CapitaJ Contribution Agreement) that 
also was outside of the four-year period. That is the day upon which the District Court focused 
in the decision. But the Court made it clear that it focused on October 25, 2004 because 
"October 25, 2004 was the latest point in time that the statute of limitations could have began to 
run as a matter of law." (Decision at 3.) The case law embraced by the District Court in 
Buckskin and the Magistrate Judge in White Cloud makes it clear that the statute began to run at 
least from the time of the Development Agreement, which firmly committed the Plaintiffs to 
convey the property. Thus, this defense also is dispositive. 
Then, of course, there are all the other barriers set out in the brief supporting the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' federal law claims will fare no better than did the rejected 
federaJ claims in Buckskin and White Cloud. The plaintiffs might escape the two-year statute of 
limitations or Williamson County, but not both. Finally, the Hehr Plaintiffs are much more 
vulnerable under KMST given the fact that their project was grandfathered under Ordinance 
No. 819. The record shows that the conveyance of the property was not required by the City and 
that it was the result of an agreement between the parties. 
This is a daunting set of obstacles. In Buckskin, the Plaintiffs avoided having to pay 
attorney fees only because the Court found: "Both parties spent a significant amount of time 
briefing the statute of limitations issue and it was not clear from the outset of the litigation 
exactly when the statute of limitations began to run." With Buckskin as precedent, the Hehr 
Plaintiffs will not have that shield. Indeed, the Court need not even reach the statute of 
limitations and other issues given the 180-day rule. 
Given all this, there does not seem to be a reason to keep the legal meter running. The 
outcome is clear. If your clients continue to pursue this litigation, they will not only lose but will 
be responsible for the City's attorney fees, which are not insubstantiaL 
The City wants to get this matter behind us. Accordingly, if your clients will agree to 
dismiss this case with prejudice, the City will not seek attorney fees. If this offer is not accepted, 
however, the City will seek recovery of all attorney fees incurred. This offer is not subject to 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 and may be shared with the Court in the event settlement is not 
reached. 
This offer expires on April 29, 201 1. At that point, we will need to gear up for oral 
argument. I look forward to hearing from you after you have had an opportunity to share this 
letter and the relevant pleadings with your clients. 
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cc: Mayor and City Council 
William F. Nichols, Counsel 
Sincerely. 
~~ 
Christopher H. Meyer 




Christopher H. Meyer, ISB # 4461 
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
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State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
MURRAY D. FELDMAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I make this 
Affidavit based upon personal knowledge and to the best of my information and belief. 
2. I am a partner in the Jaw finn of Holland & Hart LLP. From 2001 to 2003 I headed 
Holland & Hart's finn-wide environmental practice group. I currently serve, and have since 
January 2009, as the administrative (managing) partner for the Boise office of my finn, 
overseeing the activities of 3 7 attorneys, 9 legal assistants, and 28 support staff. 
3. I have been admitted to practice in Idaho, Colorado, and California (inactive 
status), as well as before numerous federal district courts and the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 
4. I hold a J.D. degree from the University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) 
School of Law ( 1988), an M.S. degree in Wildland Recreation Management from the University 
of Idaho College of Natural Resources (1985), and a B.S. degree with high honors from the 
University of California, Berkeley (I 982). 
5. I have been listed in the Best Lawyers in America® since 2000, in Chambers 
USA's listing of America's leading lawyers for business since 2006, in Mountain States Super 
Lawyers® since 2007, and in Who's Who Legal, the International Who's Who for Environmental 
Lawyers since 20 I 0 (one of only seven lawyers named in Idaho). I have authored numerous law 
review articles and other publications, and I am a regular speaker at legal forums throughout the 
nation. 




6. [ have practiced law in Idaho since 1990. During that time, I have handled 
numerous cases in state and federal courts throughout Idaho and elsewhere. I have also 
represented a variety of clients at the administrative level before the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Interior Board of Land Appeals, the United States Forest Service, the 
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, the Idaho Department of Agriculture, the Idaho 
Outfitters and Guides Licensing Board, the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, and the Idaho 
Department of Water Resources. I have litigated a number oflocal-land use and planning and 
zoning related matters in the Idaho state courts, or analogous administrative agency permitting 
matters, including Laughy v. Idaho Dep 't of Transportation, 149 Idaho 867, 243 P .3d 1055 
(2010); Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 950 P.2d 1262, 130 Idaho 923 (1998); Dirk Dunham v. 
Ada County Highway District, No. CV -OC-00-05122 (Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. May 17, 2002) 
(impact fee case); Ben Gnesa and Barry Wood v. State of Idaho, DEQ, Case Nos. CV-02-00716 
(Idaho 5th Jud. Dist. Feb. 3, 2003); Neighborhood Preservation Ass 'n, Inc. v. Ada County 
Highway District, No. CV OC 05-00938D (Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Sept. 2005); Ada County 
Highway District v. City of Boise City, Case No. CV OC 0614386 (Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Dec. 22, 
2006); Sandpoint Independent Highway District v. Board of County Commissioners of Bonner 
County, 71 P.3d 1034, 138 Idaho 8837 (2003); and SavethePlateau.org. v. Ada County, Case No. 
OC-0702034 (Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. Jan. 7, 2008). I have also handled planning and zoning 
matters before various local boards, including those in Ada and Canyon counties and before the 
City of Boise and City of Eagle. Many of these state-levellocalland-use and planning and 
zoning cases have involved claims of and defenses to attorney fee recoveries. I have also been 
involved in numerous cases involving attorney fee claims at the federal judicial and 
administrative level, including Greater Owyhee Legal Defense v. U.S. Department of Defense, 




889 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Idaho 1995)~ Idaho Sporting Congress v. Computrol. Inc., 952 F. Supp. 
690 (D. Idaho 1996); Davis Afountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass 'n v. Federal Aviation 
Administration, 116 Fed. Appx. 3 (5th Cir. 2004); St. John's Organic Farm v. Gem County 
''-fosquito Abatement District, 574 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2009); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 
20 I 0 WL 1651994 (D. Idaho Apr. 21 , 20 1 0) (order awarding attorney fees and costs in Hague 
Convention action under International Child Abduction Remedies Act); and James G. 
Katsilometes v. Bureau of Land Afanagement, IBLA 2003-160 (Order Nov. 3, 2004). 
7. Further information about my professional background, including litigation 
experience and publications, is included in my resume, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
8. I have reviewed the Court's Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated June 16, 2011. I also have reviewed a draft of the City's 
N!emorandum ofCosts and Attorney Fees with Supporting Statement, together with drafts of the 
referenced supporting affidavits and exhibits. Finally, I have discussed with Christopher H. 
Meyer the course of proceedings and actions taken by the Plaintiffs and Defendant in this 
litigation. 
9. Although the state statute of limitations and tort claims issues were relatively 
straightforward, the litigation also presented a variety of other issues, particularly those involving 
federal and state constitutional claims and associated procedural and jurisdictional issues, as well 
as discovery. These issues demanded experienced litigation counsel familiar with this 
specialized area. Likewise, the merits ofthe case called for assistance of counsel familiar with 
the specialized area of impact fees and their constitutionality under state and federal law. Mr. 
Meyer has substantial experience and expertise in these areas. From my review of the court's 
decision, the time sheets of the Defendant's outside counsel submitted in support of the attorneys 
AFFIDAVIT OF ~ft RRA Y 0. FEtDMAN 
5159576_1DOC /4432-4 
Page4 505 
fee motion, the work performed by Mr. Meyer and his co-counsel and legal assistant was 
reasonable and necessary. In my experience there are only a small number of law firms in the 
state and few in Valley County (especially ones that would not be conflicted out of representing 
the City) that are available to handle this range of issues. 
l 0. I am familiar with the current hourly rates generally charged by attorneys 
litigating matters such as this one in Idaho. For these types of proceedings, lawyers in the Boise, 
Idaho market generally charge hourly rates ranges between $180 and $450. During the time 
period in 2010 and 20 II when this case was litigated, my billing rates for this t}';'e of litigation 
were in the range of$350 to $425 per hour. 
11. I am familiar with the qualifications, experience, and abilities of Christopher H. 
Meyer and his law firm, Givens Pursley LLP. I know of Mr. Meyer's work and reputation from 
his presentations at Continuing Legal Education conferences, his written materials for those 
presentations, his publication of articles, his work on the Idaho Environmental Forum Steering 
Committee, his past position at the University of Colorado School of Law where I observed one 
of his seminars in 1987, and my involvement in matters where his firm was also representing 
clients. I believe that the hourly rate charged by Mr. Meyer in this matter ($31 0/hour) is 
reasonable, in light of the nature of this litigation, the stakes involved, and his abilities, skills, 
and experience in these matters, and his total years of practice and experience. 
12. I have reviewed the rates charged by other counsel at Givens Pursley LLP who 
performed work in this matter. I believe, based on my experience and knowledge and what I 
personally charge and what other attorneys in my firm charge similarly situated clients in similar 
matters, that those rates are reasonable and are at or below current hourly rates charged in the 




market for litigated matters involving land use exactions with associated administrative and 
constitutional law dimensions. 
13. I have reviewed the total amounts of the attorney fees requested to be awarded in 
this matter. In my opinion, the total requested attorney fees represent a reasonable charge for the 
work performed given the nature of the matter, the effort required, the stakes involved, and the 
issues required to be addressed. 
I dec tare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this /.Z~ay of July, 2011. yj/J !} ;57 
j/ ~~~M , a/4--
Subscribed and sworn to before me this l~ day of July, 2011. 
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Mr. Feldman's practice includes endangered species, environmental impact 
assessment, environmental permitting, public lands, and environmental 
insurance. He has represented regulated community interests and others in 
Endangered Species Act and National Environmental Policy Act litigation 
and administrative proceedings in the Pacific Northwest, New Mexico, 
Nevada, Colorado, Texas, Michigan, and Alabama. He also represents 
clients on land-use, contaminated site cleanup, and air and water quality 
issues. 
Mr. Feldman was lead counsel in a significant federal court case concerning 
the adequacy of environmental analyses for competing military and public 
uses of over 3.2 million acres of public land in southwestern Idaho. He was 
also lead counsel for interests challenging the Department of Defense's and 
Department of Transportation's NEPA compliance for military training 
activities in west Texas, which resulted in the first U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruling in over 20 years to set aside an agency's environmental 
impact statement decision. He has represented clients in several 
groundwater contamination and remediation cases. At the administrative 
level, Mr. Feldman has represented clients before the Environmental 
Protection Agency, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, the 
Interior Board of Land Appeals, and the United States Forest Service. 
He has significant experience with the major federal laws affecting natural 
resources and environmental matters, including the Endangered Species 
Act; NEPA; Federal Land Policy and Management Act; National Forest 
Management Act; and National Park Service Organic Act. He also advises 
clients on permitting issues under the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and 
other federal and state environmental programs. 
Mr. Feldman has been admitted to practice in California, Colorado, and 
Idaho, and before the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits and the federal district courts for the District of Idaho and the 
Western District of Texas. Prior to joining Holland & Hart, he served as a 
law clerk to Justice George Lohr of the Colorado Supreme Court. He has 
been listed in the Best Lawyers in America® since 2000, in Chambers USA 's 
listing of America's leading lawyers for business since 2006, and in 
Mountain States Super Lawyers since 2007. From 2001-2003, he headed 
Holland & Hart's firmwide environmental practice group. He is currently 
the administrative partner for the firm's Boise Office. 
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Honors 
Volunteer Lawyer of the Year, Land and Water Fund of the Rockies, 
1992 
Celebrating Natural Resources Award (for contributions to inter-
disciplinary natural resource management), University of Idaho 
College of Natural Resources, 2004 
Professional and Civic Activities 
Board Member and Past President (2007-2008), East Boise Little 
League 
Past Chair (2008), Idaho State Bar, Environment and Natural 
Resources Law Section 
Member, Steering Committee, Idaho Environmental Forum 
Former President (2004-2006), University of Idaho College of Natural 
Resources Alumni Board of Trustees 
Publications and Speaking Engagements 
"Taking A Harder Look At Direct, Indirect, And Cumulative Impacts," 
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation NEPA Special Institute 
(Oct. 2010). 
"Give PECE a Chance: Evaluating Conservation Programs to Avoid 
Endangered Species Act Listings," 53 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Institute 21-1 (2010) (co-author). 
"Endangered Species Act Law, Policy, and Perspectives (2d edition)," ABA 
Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources (2010) (peer 
reviewer). 
"Consideration of Climate Change in NEPA and ESA Processes," 45 Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Journal 325 (2008) (lead author). 
"Of Hard Looks, Reason, and Agency Expertise: Shifting Standards for 
Implementing NEPA's Scientific Analysis Requirements," 53 Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Institute 8-1 (2007) (lead author). 
"Suggestions On How To Improve The Endangered Species Act," The 
INGAA Foundation, Inc., Report No. F-2007-06 (November 2007) (co-
author). 
EXHIBIT A J/0 
"Photography and the Environment," The Advocate (Idaho State Bar 
publication), June/July 2007, at 42. 
"Storm Water Enforcement Response and Settlement Strategies," 21 Natural 
Resources & Environment 17 (Spring 2007) (lead author). 
"Our National Wild and Scenic Rivers System," 20 Natural Resources & 
Environment 10 (Fall 2005) (lead author). 
"Application of the 'Best Scientific Data Available' Standard in the 
Endangered Species Act," 16 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 387 
(2003) (co-author). 
"The Growing Importance of Critical Habitat for Species Conservation," 16 
Natural Resources & Environment 88 (Fall2001) (lead author). 
"Growing Recreational Conflicts on the Public Lands," The Advocate (Idaho 
State Bar publication), March 2001, at 14-16. 
"Redefining Critical Habitat for Anadromous Fish in Central Idaho," in 
Proceedings of High Altitude Revegetation Workshop No. 14, 
Colorado State University (Info. Series No. 91 August 2000) (lead 
author). 
Education 
University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law O.D. 1988) 
Associate Editor, Ecology Law Quarterly 
University of Idaho (M.S. 1985) 
Wildland Recreation Management (College of Natural Resources) 
University of California, Berkeley (B.S. 1982) 
Conservation of Natural Resources 
with High Honors 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJ' VALLEY 




CITY OP McCALL, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV l010-276C 
AFFIDA V1T OF VICfOR VILLEGAS 
VICTOR VILLEGAS, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am a partner in the law fim1 of EVANS KEANE u.P, and represent Plaintiffs Richard 
Hehr and Grey:~tonc Village, LLC (''Piaintitts'•) in the abovc-cntided matter. and have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth in this affidavit. 
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2. Attached as Exhibit A to this affidavit is a true and conect copy of rbc Coun•s 
Memorandum 0e(:ision in Buclr.skin Properties. inc. el aL v. Valley County, Case No. CV-2009-.554-
C, tiled January 7~ 2011. 
3. Attached as Exhibit B to this affidavit are true and correct copies of the Decision on 
Summary Judgment entered July 3. 2007, in rhe mattet of Phil and Lynn Schaefer. 
Plaintiffi/Counterdeftndanrs, v. City of Sun Valley. Idaho, a PoliticaJ subdivision o/tlre Stare of 
Idaho. Defendanii'Counrerc/aimant, Ca~ No. CV -06-882; and tbe Order on Summary Judgment on 
Counts 2 and 3 entered June 3, 2008 in the matter of Cove Springs Developmem. Inc .. a Nevada 
corporation, and Redstone Partners. L.P .. a Nevada limited partnership. Petilioners/Plaintijft v. 
Blaine County, a political subdivision of the Slate of Idalro, and John Does J Through 10, Wlro.o;e 
True Names Are Unknown. Respondents/Defendams, Case No. CV 2008-22. 
4. Attached as Exhibir C to this affidavit is a h'IJe and corrc~:t copy of Valley County's 
Opening Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (minus Exhibits A, B and C) in 
Buclcslcin Properti~s. Inc. uta/. v. Valley County, Case No. CV -2009·554-C, filed October l4, 20 I 0. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 25th day of July, 20 I I. 
AFFIDAVIT OF VICTOR VILLEGAS • 2 
No PUblic for Idaho 
Residing in Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 03/0812012 
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charge of the office as indicated below: 
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P.O. Box. 2720 
Boise, ID 8370 t ·2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attomey~·fo,. Defenda.nt 
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[X] u.s. Mail 
[ ] Fax 
[ J Overnight Delivery 
[ ) Hand Delivery 
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3 IN TH5 DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
4 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
5 
BUCKSKIN PROPERTIES, INC •. an Idaho 
1 corporation. an<l TIMBERLINE 
Case No. CV-2009-554-C 
8 
DEVELOPMENT. LLC, an Idaho limited 













DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VALLEY COUNTY, a political subdivision, 
Defendant 
APPeARANCES 
For Plaintiff: Victor Villegas of evans Keane LLP 
For Defendants: Christopher Meyer and Martin Hendrickson of Givens 
Pu~ey 
PROCEEDINGS 
Thi$ matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary 





The Plaintiffs Buckskin Properties, Inc. ("BucJ(skin") and Tlmberlitle 
Development LLC ("Timberline") undertook a multi-phase Planned Unit Development in 
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County imposed the payment of impact fees as a condition to approve the Plaintiffs' 
final plat for the various phases of the Meadows. The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit seeking 
a dedaration that the contracts under which Valley County required the payment of 
impact fees are invalid and seeking a judgment that Valley County violated the 
Plaintiffs' rights in conditioning approval of their project based on the payment of the 
impact fees. Valley County has filed the current Motion for Summary Judgment 
seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit on the grounds that the statute of limitations 
has run and that the Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into the agreements and paid the fees. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment will be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
12 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
13 
14 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." !.R.C.P. 56(c}. When considering a summary judgment motion, the trial 
15 court must construe the record liberally in favor of the non-moving party and draw all 
16 reasonable factual inferences in favor of such party. Bear Lake West Homeowner's 







motion will be denied if conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. Parker v. Kokot, 117 Idaho 963, 
793 P.2d 195 (1990}. 
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
rests with the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency. Inc .• 126 Idaho 527, 531, 
2• 887 P.2d 1034. 1038 (1994). If the moving party meets that burden, the party who 
25 resists summary judgment has the responsibility to p4ace in the record before the court 
26 
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the existence of controverted material facts that require resolution at trial. Sparks v. St. 
Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 508, 768 P.2d 768, 771 (1988). 
The resisting party may not rely on his pleadings nor merely assert the existence of 
facts which might support his legal theory. /d. He must establish the existence of those 
facts by deposition, affidavit, or otherwise. ld.; I.R.C.P 56(e). 
A mere scintilla of evidence or a slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to 
withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 
730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986). In other words, there must be evidence on which a jury 
might rely. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362, 
368 (1969). Moreover, the existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary 
judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 
of an element essential to his case. and on which he will bear the burden of proof at 
trial. Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425. 426, 816 P.2d 982. 983 (1991). 
DISCUSSION 
Valley County argues that the Plaintiffs' alegations of violations of the federal 
constitution must be dismissed because the Plaintiffs' failed to bring this action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs respond that they have not sought relief under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, nor were they required to do so. The Plaintiffs argue that an action for 
inverse condemnation for violations of the Fifth Amendment can be brought 
independent of a § 1983 action. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
Const11ution of the United States, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), provides: "[N}or shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Artide 1, § 14, of the 
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Constitution of the State of Idaho provides: "Private property may be taken for public 
use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by 
law, shall be paid therefore.• 
A property owner who believes that his or her property, or some interest therein, 
has been invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of 
law and the payment of just compensation, may bring an action for inverse 
condemnation. McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987). The 
property owner cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless there has 
actually been a taking of his or her property. Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 
777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002). Here, the Plaintiffs have not made a claim pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. However, they were not required to do so because they have a valid 
daim pursuant to the State constitution. 
Valley County argues that the Pfaintiffs failed to timely file this action within: (1) 
the four-year statute of limitations under I. C. § 5-224 for an inverse condemnation 
claim; (2) the two-year statute of limitations for a§ 1983 daim; (3) the three-year statue 
of limitations for the taking of personal property; and (d) the six-month statute of 
limitations for claims against a county. The Plaintiffs respond that their inverse 
condemnation claim was timely filed because the statute of limitations began to run on 
20 







$232,160.00 in order to pay the impact fees for Phases 2 and 3 of the Meadows. 
Idaho Code § 5-224 contains the statute of limitations for an inverse 
condemnation claim, and states: ~[a]n action for [inverse condemnation} must be 
commenced within four {4} years after the cause of action shall have accrued." See C & 
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G. Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dlst. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 143, 75 P.3d 194, 197 (2003). 
The date when a cause of action accrues is a question of law to be detennined by this 
Court where no disputed issues of material fact exist. /d. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. "The 
actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact detenninatlon, is to be 
fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a degree and kind as to 
constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest. became apparent.· 
Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979}. 
8 



















case are essentially undisputed. The Plaintiffs are making a legal argument that the 
Valley County's HtakingH did not occur until the cashier's check was drawn in order to 
pay the impact fees on December 15, 2005. However, as Valley County points out, the 
"Plaintiffs certainly knew the essential facts on July 14, 2004, the day they received the 
Conditional Use Pennit and they signed the final Capital Contribution Agreement setting 
out the contribution requirements in full detail. • At the very latest, drawing all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, October 25, 2004 was the date when the 
statute of limitations began to run. This was the date when the dedication of right of 
way was accepted and It was at this point in time at which the impairment of such a 
degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with the Plaintiffs' property 
interest became apparent. Therefore, the Court grants the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment because Plaintiffs are barred from recovering under their inverse 
condemnation claim by I.C. § 5-224 because their Complaint was not filed within the 
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four-year statute of limitations.' 
Although the Court is granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on the statute of limitations. the Court will address the remaining arguments 
submitted by the parties in order to provide a more complete record. As a general rule, 
a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts to challenge 
the validity of administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 906, 854 P.2d 242, 
249 (1993). However, there is an exception to that rule when the interests of justice so 
require and the agency acted outside of its authority. Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 
Idaho 721, 725, 100 P.3d 615, 619 (2004). Valley County argues that summary 
judgment should be granted because the Plaintiffs could have objected or otherwise 
filed an appeal to the conditions of approval, but did not do so. The Plaintiffs respond 
that they had no duty to exhaust any administrative remedies because the Plaintiffs' 
claims meet both exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion. It appears from the 
record that Valley County did not follow the provisions set forth in the Idaho 











speciflcaUy, Valley County failed to follow the procedure for the imposition of 
development impact fees set forth in I. C. § 67-8206. As such, the Plaintiffs were not 
required to exhaust their administrative remedies because the proper administrative 
procedures were not in place. 
Valley County also argues that the Plaintiffs should have raised their objections 
to the impact fees with the local government in a timely manner in order to set up their 
1 The Plaintiffs also argued that lhls action is subJect to a frve-year statute of limitations based on I.C. § 5-
216 However, this is not an action for breach of contract. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record 
before the Court that the contract between lhe Plaintiffs and the Defendant was ever breached. 
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claim that their payment was involuntary. In essence, Valley County is arguing that the 
Plaintiffs should be precluded from maintaining this action because they did not object 
during the public hearing on their previous approvals for Phases 1 through 3. The 
Plaintiffs respond that they were not required to object because there is no Idaho law 
requiring a party to object or otherwise pay under protest in order to later recover an 
illegal fee and the Plaintiffs had no reason to question Valley County's LUOO at the 
time of the public hearings on its CUP/PUD application. The Plajntiffs are correct. As 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated in BHA lnvestl116nts, Inc. v. City of Boise, •[w]e have 
not held, however. that when a city imposes a fee that it has no authority to impose at 
all, such fee must be paid under protest before it can be recovered." 141 Idaho 168, 
176, 108 P.3d 315, 323 {2004). Here, the Plaintiffs had no obligation to pay the impact 
fees under protest in order to recover them later because Valley County did not have 
the authority to impose the Impact fees as Valley County had not complied with the 
procedures setforth in I.C. § 67-8206. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this _L day of January 2011. 
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521 
y /Y 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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I hereby certify that on the ~~y of January 2011, I mailed (served) a true 
3 
and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
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Victor S. Villegas 
EVANS KEANE. LLP 
1405 W Main St 
PO Box 959 
Boise, 10 83701-0959 
Fax: (208) 345-3514 
Christopher H. Meyer 
GIVENS PURSLEY lLP 
601 W Bannock St 
PO Box 2720 
Boise,IO 83701-2720 
Fax: {208) 388-1300 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY 
Clerk of the District Court 
By:D~~ 
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Givens Pursley. U.P 
1N THE DIS'l'lUCT CO'lJl1' OF 110! PIFJ1I JUDICIAL DISnUC:r OF 
'11m STATE OF Ir>ABO. IN ANn FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
v. 
CJTY OF SUN V.AU...:BY, .D:>ABO, a 
Polifie.lsubdfvit:ion ofelle SC&fl: ofJdabo 











C. No. CV-06-882 
DICISJO!f ON 
S\IMM.UY .JUDC1\aNT 
P~ PhiliDd L)'Qil Schaefer I.-e R.adl Pllrf:netshlp 
filed 1bia 1awlllit oa 0cto1Mw' J8,11X/1, olaallca1iqtbc City otSm Vahy'J imposition of 
u iD-Iieu tee on tbl Sc:hac:fc.l1. purJU11t to OrdDace 364, rhe Workferc:c Linbp 
OtctiuDce. T.hil maucr canac ~ rfle Court by Onl Arpmeat oa M&y 3, 2001. 
Chri&toplwr M.,.,. appearccl tor and ora bcbalt o! plaintif!Wc~td~nts Phil and 
I.)ml Scbdr, .., Nr.ltiDd PecbJa and Gc:oftrey"' WICdlc lppCinld b-OD 
td~M'of~dd~ tbe CityofS. Valley •. Tke Court ,_dilcuaed 
UU.liUbar It oral J~F~cat. mi&wed 1he brid'i. n caMiacted i:DIIepcodaat n::narcb em 
the matter, and rendcn tbc: fbUowin& deciliGD. 




, · .. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Th.e fullowing facta are undisp\tt:M. On Apri121, 200S the City of Sun Valley 
adopted Ordinance No . .363 and Ordinanco No. 364. Botb orctinanees SOllgbt to addrCSII 
the growing need fur affordable workJOrce housing in Sun Valley. Otdiname 363 appJie.t 
to residential aud multi-family development,. md Ordinmee 364, k:nown as WorlcjoTCII 
Htnl$illg LinJcap Ordirlmlt:4, applies to sinsle-fami.ly coDStrlletian. Ordinance 363 is not 
at issue in lhe preaeot lawsuit. 
Ordinance 364 provides that allappli.catiOill for Design Review in the City of Sllll 
Valley •shaU rcqujre m approved WOl'fd.broe Housi.n& Unlcagc Plan such that a 
perccntap of the employee boucing demand generated by the applicat:io.o will be 
provided as Workforce Housing U:nita.,. Son Valley, Idabo On:linmce No. 364, § 9-9F·2. 
Petmit approval for residential dove.lopmcmt requires the applicant to either "deveiop or 
ensure development of twenty peccent (20%) of the employee housing unit demand 
genented by the application eitber oosite or on oo Eligible Site prior lo or concw:rent 
with the issuance of any building permits tor proposed new constructi.OD." ld. at 9-9F-
4(B). The ordinance tbcm sets fodb a formu.Ja to comp11ta tbe rotal on-site worlc.force 
bouaing tmits a home-builder must provide. The fomrula is based upon the size of the 
residential development, bow many employees wiU be requirod, and bow many 
employees wiU rea.ide in a unit. 
Ordmance 364 also providoa 1w )here alternatives to the on-site pzovision of such 
housing iJ determined to be more practical, effidcnt, and equitable, this Article vrill set 
fotlh standards for Eligible Site J:tousing. the conveyance ofland, or a payment in-lieu 
DECISION ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 
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fee. .. Itl. at § 9-9F-i. For instance, iftbt fol'DUila yfcld.t a friction of a unit a homo-
builder has the option to either build a full unit or pay a tee in-lit~~. An in-lieu fee may 
alto be l)lOvided wbelo the City Council finda on-site howint to be inappropriate or 
impractical. Once coUected, the fcc& muat bo deposited iDto a WoxXfotce HO\lling Fuad 
and used "solely to illcreuo and improve the supply of rental ~or for sale wori:tb:rw. 
housing •.. " 
PlaintiffSICounterdcfcndants Phil and Lynn Schaetec owned a lot in Sun Valley 
and sougbt to ob1ain deaip. review approval a:nd a building permit fur a new home. The 
City assessed an "fn..lieu .. foe of$11,.989.97 against the Schaci::rs pursllant to the 
LinbBe Ordinance. The Schaefers filed this lawsuit and moved fur SlllilitUl1)' judgrueot 
challeaging the constitutionality of Ord:i.nance 364. Sun Valley filed t countercJain1 
reokin& a dec:laratillll that Ordinatlce 364 ia a permissible constitutional &action pursuant 
to the ponce power of Article XII, § 2 of the Idaho Constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Stlmmary Judgment is proper if tho "pleadings. deposiliOilS, and admis.'lions on 
fi.Je, together with the a.ffidiiVils, if any, show that there is no genuine issue u to any 
material fact and that the moving party i& entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 
S6(c). I.R.C.P. Ordinarily, the Court liberally construes all disputed facta in favor of the 
noo.-moving party, and draws all reasonable i'nf'emlccs and conclusion~ supported by the 
record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Boru: v. Swlwah, 119 Idaho 539. 541, 
808 P .2d 876, 878 ( 1991) . If the evidence rovoals no disputed iasuca of material fact, tbe 
lrial court should grant tbe motion for swnmary judgment Farm CrcdU Bank v. 
S~o11, 125 Idaho 270,272, 869 P .2d 1365, 1367 (199-J). The fact that both parties 
DBCISION ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 3 
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mon for SllilUIWY judgment does Mt in and of itself establish chat there is no genuine 
isauo of material &ct. Kromr.i v. AJD ln.s. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321 
(1986). 
The parties appear to agree tflat no facta are at issue. 
ISSlJES 
In tbe prestmt case the primary iuue is whether, as the City of Sun Valley argues, 
tbll in-lieu fees provided by Ordinance 364 are a proper ext:tcise of awthori.ty under th5 
police powers granted to ntunicipatities by the Idaho Constitution. T:n the alternative, the 
City of Sun Valley argus that the Local Land Use Ptannin& Act (ILUP A) provides the 
City wilh tbe authority to assoas in-lieu fees for tho purpose of affordable housing. In 
rcaponae, tbe Schacfen fim argue that C>rdinmt;e 364 is an uncoostitutional tax. 
Seeoodly, the Schacfenl contend tha:c is no legislation that psmita the City to aness the 
in-lieu fee. Further, the Schaefers claim the ouly arsuable legislation that would permit 
in-lieu mea would be the Idaho Development Jmpaot Pee Aot (lDIFA). IDIFA add1·csses 
the city's authority to II8SOSI charges on new growth and development, and ilnportaru1y, 
does not allow the imposition of in·Iieu fees for affordable housing. Therefore, tbe 
Scbaems claim, the IDIF A pre-empts the area of impact fee assessment 
The Court willmaly.m Doth iasuea in tum. 
ANALYSIS 
AI t}H, outset. a brief review of the law regarding a mWlicipality's authority to 
asse:as ch8rges on tho public is nececsary. "ldabo baa long :recognized the propO&idon 
that a municipal corporation, as a cmture of the 8la'IB. poasess and ac:teiasa only those 
powers eithecexpressly or impliedly granted toil This position, also known as "Dillon's 
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Rubs," has been geonlly recognized as tbo ptw.uina view in Idaho." Caaw v. Stat.. 
101 Idaho 158.610 P.2d 517, '20 (1980). (cit.UO. omitted). 
Consequently, there ara three limited methoda by which a lDllTlicipalily may 
iclpose charges on the public or plrt:i.colar peraons. ldabo Bldg. Commctors AMoc. Y. 
CllyofCoolrd'Al4ne, 126 Idaho 540 (1995). Under Art. 12, § 2 ofthcidabo 
CODif.i.tution, a municipality may enact regull'tions pursuant to Its police power, for the 
fultbcrance of the public hea.ltb., safety or morals or welfare of its residents. .Brewtr.r v. 
City of Pocats/lo, 114 Idaho 502. 503-504, 768 P .2d 765, 766-67 (1988). Ot1de.r its 
police powers, a municipality may "provide for the collection of revenue incidental to the 
eofumment of that regulation." ldo.lto Bldg. C011/FtlC/f.11'T A.uoc., 126 Idaho at 743, P.2d 
at329. 
A1&o pursuiiDt to a n:nmicipallty's police power,. Art. 8 § 3 of the Idaho 
Constitution pennits the imposition of rates and charges to provide ~venue for pub he 
works projects. Loumi8 ,, City ofHttiley, H91daho 434, 438, 807 P.ld 1272. 1276 
(1991 ). Under this co.nstittttional grant of authority, the Idaho Legislature enacted the 
ldtbo Revenue Bond Act, which allows cities to vote to approve the i.ssuaoce ofrcventJe 
bonds to fmance tM cost or maiotenancc of public works. Id. In the present action it is 
undisputed that Sun Valley did not atl!tmpt to hold an ~:lcction to provide a bobd to 
fi.naDce affordable housing. 
Finally, a Il1Uilicipelity may assess char&a on the public pursuant to specific 
legjsiation permitting a mllnicipality to fuud a particular project through tbe assessment 
G!taxet or fees. /d. This municipal autbority arises from Art 7, § 6 of the Idaho 
Caostitution, which •aucws the legislature to invest in tht: corporate authorities ... the 
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powec !o asaeaa and collect taxce fur all purposes of the <Xll'pOJ'Ition." Sim fl'altq Co. v. 
City of Sa Valley, I~ Idaho 424,-427,708 P .2d 147. 150 (198S). Thia grant of 
aWboJ:ity bowe\ler, is oot self-executma. A municipality may Ol1ly OJtCil'Cila this lu.in& 
power pllrsuant to, and limilcd by tile authority IJ'8Il(ed by !he legislature. 
The first issue of contention is tho scope of authority posscascd by muniapaliliea. 
The City of Sun Valley claims a municipality a authority ia much broader than Dillon's 
rule, whereby a city's exercise of authority is only improper if it con:fl.icts with the 
general laws of the mte. TherefOre. 1he City may enact Ordinance 364 so long aa it does 
not oonftiet with the state's general laws. The City citea the recect Supnmc Court 
dec:i&i011 of Plaurmuu v. City of PruiJJiuul, 139 Idaho 810, 87 P.3d. 297 (2004), as support 
for this proposition. When considering a municipality' a police pawer, the Court in 
Plu~r~mustatad that. "the burden falls upon the party challenging the oxcroiae ofthla 
power to show that such an exercise is either in conflict with the genenl.la.ws of the stato 
or that it is unreasonable or arbitrary." Id. at 813. 
While the City is correc.t that Pbmtmsr does set forth the law for a llNl'licipality's 
police power, a municipality's aufhorityto tax requires separate authority. A City's 
police power does not authorize a city to tax the public, but rather regulate tbe public and 
in some instances as8CS8 a fee incidental to the regulation. As tbe Court recently 1nada 
clear in Potts Co,.ltruclioll. QJmptury v. Nortlr Kootetai Wm.r District, ... municipal 
corporation's taxa on the general public reqn:i:re B(*ific legislative authorization." 141 
.klabo 678, 681, P.3d 1. 11 (2005). There1bte.lbedisti.nctian lies in whether a city has 
imposed. a gene.ral tax, in which specific authorizing legislation is required, or acted 
pursuaat to their police power, when a broader grmt of authority I'Jltists. 




The second issu that must be remlved prior to the asaeainl the COilltitutiODility 
o!Orclinancc 364 reprda the diffinnee betwoe.n a tax and an exaction. The City spends 
a conaidenblo amount of time argujng that tho in-lieu fee is an exat:tion rather than an 
impact fee. The import of this atgUliiiSit il two-fold; first, that 111 exaction ia 
ca:~stitntionally diltinct ftom a Ceo, and second. because the in-lieu. fee is an exaction 
rather than an impact fee, LUJP A doesn't apply. The City, bowiM:r, cite. oo Idaho law 
supporting tbeac propositions and this Court can find none. The analy&i.s i!l' the same 
wlledw it ia labeled fee or ao e.xaction. A municipality may regulate wilhin itt police 
collect revenue if it ia iDCidentalln the cn.futt:ement ofthatregulatioo. 87'1/fWSJer, llS 
Idaho 504. The first requirement is wbdher the municipality may lawfully regulatD 
p111'.swmt to their pollee power. If tbe regulation fails to s:atisfy this requirement. lhea the 
Court need not addtesa whether the revenue ia incideatallo the regulatioo. Here. the 
regulation is an ordinance requiring developmeut to mitigate its effect on the houstng 
l'l'llfket. The revenue at i.salo is an in-lieu fee. Whether the revenue is labeled an 
exaction or an in-lieu fue does not remove it from the requirements of a valid exercise of 
po.tice power. 
Wilh regard to the lllgODlml. tbat an in-lieu fee is 1111 exactioo and not an impact 
fcc, a%ld therefore ILUP A is inapplicable, the Cowt's holding ia the same. The label is 
not the distinguishing factor. The question is wheth« the Idaho Legisl.ature baa 
specifically authorized the collection of revenue. Thua, for purposes of this analysia, 
whatber the charge is labeled an in-lieu fee or an exaction is inconsequential. 
L Ordlauu:e 364 llaot a lawful exercise of ~e City of Sua ValleJ'a Pollee 
Power. 









." . ' 
The City of S\a Valley argues that Ordiamce 364 ia merely a "resulatim of 
development to ensure that new development adequately mi.tiptat Ita effect on the supply 
of affordable workforce bouai.n& .. !U1d as such, fallt within a city's eatabliahad ponce 
power authority to regulate for tbe fbrtbennco of tbe pub He hoaltb. safety ox mm:ala or 
ml!lre of ita residmta. Furtl:lflr, since a municipality may impose fees incident.l1o 
police power regulation. charging an in-lieu fee is permissible. Tile Schaeftlrs argue that 
Oatinllll.Ce 364 ia nothing roon than a genetal tax, and thus requiteS specific legislative 
allthorization. 
A municipality's police power ariael from the Idaho Constitution, Art xa. § 2, 
which provides: 
Any~ or i.D.r.:otparated aity or town may mab aDd enforce, 
within ita limits. all auclJ local police, 4llllitlry atld other 
regn.lations as are not in ca:atllct witb its clmter or with the genenl 
laws. 
As stated above. punruanl to a municipality's police power, a city may provide for 
a fee i.nc:idental co the enforcement of that regulation. Brew.rtsr, 115 Jdabo at 504, P. 2d at 
767. The funds generated must .. bear some n:asooablc relationship to the cost of 
enforcing the regulation." Idtzlro Bldg Canrracton Assoc, 126 Idaho at 743, P 2d t11329. 
However, if the regulation's purpose is to raiso revenue rather than regulate, it is a LaX, 
and may only be upheld under tbe power of taxation. !d. The Idaho Supreme Court 
cautiously reviews whether the collection of revenue is incidental to the enforcement of 
that regulation, to enaure that the police power is not "resorted to as a shield or 
subterlugc. under which to coact IIDd enforce a rev~mue-caisiq ordinance or statute." Jd, 
FO$W's Inc. 11. Bot# Ct:y, 63 klabo 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941). 
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In BrrNJttr v. City of Pocaullo, the Idaho Suprema Court analyzed the difference 
betweea a fee and a tax. Oeoerally, tbc Court oonaidered a fee u revenue inc:identtl to 
police power regula1iOilS. and a. tax to include ordinances enacted for tbe purpoae of 
t.aimgreveouo. See pe.rally ~. SM Idaho Ill 502. 768 P.2d at 676. In tbat cua. 
the Court held in'llalid 110 ardirla:nce that imposed a charge for the rcstoratio.11 and 
mainteunce ofstteets on all owners oroccupantJ of property in the city, as an 
unconstitutional tax. The cb.ar&c wu calculated porsuaut to a tbmtula raflectins the 
trafiie estimated by that particul• property. ld at 502. Initially, the Court noted that the 
ordinance had no tenna of regulation. The Court compared the alleged •'fee'' to 1 fee 
upheld in Fostru 3 Inc. v. Boise City u 111 example of 1 revenue incidental to a valid 
police power regulation. In Fosw '.r, tbc operation of parking meters was found to be 
inc.id.erOl to tbe city's police power to regulate traffic and perking. However, the Court 
foWid the revenue ftom the Pocatello ordi:n.Jnce had "no necCISIIY relationship to the 
~ of travel o'fV its streets, but rather [ wu] to generau: f\lnds for the non-
regulatoiy function ofrepairitll and mai.ntajning streets." ld. at 504. 
In other eases dlstinguishing a fee from a t.ax. the Idabo Supreme Co11rt has placed 
em.phuis on the tenns of the ordinance regarding who will benefit from the revenue 
co11cctcd, whether it bo the particular cons001.er or the public at large. In ldolto Bui/dittg 
Ct>Titl'tJCIIin Assoc. v. City o{Comsr D'AlB1J8, 126ldaho ?40, 890 P.2d 326 (1995). the 
Court reviewed a case with fir.cll similar to the present case, where contractors chal1eoged 
an ordinliDCc tha.t required payment of impact fees from new buildBrs to pay for the cost 
of development as a ~n to the receipt of a building permit Tho Coob:actors 
claimed that the City Jacked autbmity to collect lhe fees without autborizina legislation, 
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and the City defended its oroinanoe by argn.in& the the wu a valid exercise: ot police 
power. In diffilreotiating a fee ftotn a tax, the Court defined a fee u "a charge b- direct 
ptlblic service rendered to the particular eonaumer, while a tu ia a forced contribution. by 
tht 'j)Uhlic: at large to meet public :needa." 126 Idaho at 7.44, B90 P .2d at 330. The CoUlt 
held the charge to be a tax because it benofited aU those wbo live in Coeur d • Aleoe 
equally, yet only newcomers were ~Je fur the cost. ld. As tht Coi.Wt stated "(I ]he 
ftd that additklnal services are made necessary by growth and dcveJ<Jpment does DOt 
chanF the essmtial nature of tho services provided: tltey are for the public at large. .. I d. 
S imi!arly, in .Brtlwsw, tbe Court viewed the atreet fee to be a cbarge on the occupaniB or 
owners of pt'Operty for tho privilege having a public street abut their property, which is no 
diffetellt ftom a privilege shared by the geoer:al public in tlus usage of public streets. 
Brewstttr, 115 Idaho at 504,768 P.ld at 767. 
The Court in IBCA. also expressed concern that the revenues coUccted pUISuant to 
the ordinance wore paid into a general fund to be used ''for capital improvements 
throughout the City by aU residents, aod not solely fur the benefit of those seeking the 
building permit." ldoho Bldg Contractor! As3oc., 126 Idaho at 330, 890 P.2d at 330. 
Because those fUod.s were not eann&Ited for use based on tho demand created by 
development, they could not possibly relate. to any speci..fie regul.atiotl, but rather raise 
revenue for alJ public facility infrastructure. 
The Idaho Supreme Court hu found ordixlanoes requiring payment for water 
services fD be a val.id oxerciao of a municipality's pol:ic:e power. In Loomis Y. City of 
Hailq. the Court foUDd feca valid uoder the city's police power that were sqreptcd and 
used tn repair and replace wllttlr system ~used by the city. 119 Idaho 434, 807 
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P .2d 1272 (1991). Again in Potll Cmutnldlon Company"· NfJ1111 Koottmtd. Wa_. 
DLttrld., the Court found the pmpoae ofwmr md sewer diatricts are to *'sei"V8 a public 
usa and promote betltll. safety, prosperity. securily aod general welfilro of tho inhabitan18 
of said district.• 141 IdUo 678.682. ll6P.3d 8 12 (2005). Tho Court fbuod !he fee to 
be UIIICd toward the wate:r district 'a system and reasonably and rationally rela1ed to tbe 
pUI'JlOSI' ofllie city's regulatory function of "insuring clean and safe water for tbo8e usera 
of the district's system." ld. Thus the ordinance was upbeld the by the Court. 
I'D the present cue, this Court finds that the puxpose ofOrdina:nce 364 is more 
similar to a general lax than a fee because its clear purpose i.s In raise RM::nue rattw than 
regulate. In order fur an ordinance to regalale, it must cxcrc:iac some control by a rule or 
a restriction. Blacb Law Dictionary (7~ 2000. For oxample, inFo.rtu'1 tb.a Court 
found that operating the parking rnetem was an essential part of the city's authority to 
corrtrol traffic and ptrtcinJ. In coxtrast, in BrtiWslilr !he Coorttound. the street fee was not 
tailored to conlro.l an)IChing regarding str!lets. but raise revenue for maintenance aad 
repair of the stn:eta. Similarly, Ordinance 364 is not designed to exercise control or 
regulate the building of community housing, but merely ~ revenue. · 
Sun Valley also argue£ that it would be inconsistent to prohibit in-tiea fees while 
allowing restrictions on development with regud to off-street pe;ddn.g. setback md height 
regulaticms, and provide for on-site and aff-sito improvements neceaitated by new 
growth. The Court .finds nothing inoonsiatenl wilh tbe above scenario. It is we1J settled 
that municipalities arc able to rep/au development. Setbacks and height regulations ans 
valid £eiU}stioJJS of l city's police power. Spren.gfr. Grwbb 01111 A.slodtlla Y. City of 
Hau-,. 127 Idaho 576,903 P.2d 741 (19\lS). Fnrtbennore. municipalitiea bave been 
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legislatively authori?AM! to enact 7mling regulations pum1ant to the Local Land Use 
P1aming Ad. Pa:rldna reatrictiooa ~proper regulations under tbo oity'a rocognizod 
police power to regula traffic ml part.ina. The in-lieu fees ISitl8l8d in OrdinluK:e 364, 
as diacussed above, do not assear feel incidental to police power replatioJU, btlt insteed 
generate revenue. 
As stated above, 111:1other factor in establishing whether Ordinance 364's in-lieu 
fee ia a tax, is determining who wiD bcnotit. h Bnwstcr stated. generally a tax benefits 
1M pub& at large and a fee ia payment by a particular consumer for a public service. 
A.ccording to Sun V a.llay, Ordinance 364 seeks to addreaa the lack of workforco housing 
in tho Wood Ri'll'ee Valley, and its olfeot on local employer"s ability to attract and retain 
employees. UIJ1'/t0 i11 Sllj)JKN1 of Sui& Yalltty't Motion for Sturtmary JudgrnMt a1ld 
Mtmwmncbun in Oppmtton to &h~t~' Motion for 5\mtmary JudgmfmC. p.-4. It is 
clear that the btme:fit of the ordinance serves new homo-builders aud the general public 
equally. This Court eanuot distinguisb this situation from the orne that em ted in 
Brtlwstv or ItiaAo Bviltlbfg Con.traatort Association, wbc=-e !be Court !ltated "'the 
assessment bcre is no different than a charge for the privilogo ofUving in the City._" 
Similal to Brewtlft', where Che City utilized a fonnula to dcteanine tlu:l omount of the 
charge based on the tnffie estimated by that particular property, the City of Sun Valley 
altempts to distinguish Otdinanoe 364 from a general tax by including a fb1mula to 
ca.ltGlate the amount of the ft:e for each home-build« to Cll81II'C tbe builder does not bear 
an inordinate amount of the cost. Despite tho city's effort, the problem remaina. The 
ld: of workforce houing. like tho improwment of city streets. has an effect on the 
p~~blic, and thus the public should bear the cost. As tho Supreme Court stated in ldtlho 




Jhtildbfr Cottlracto'n Auoc., "the fact that addiliona11C:l"Yieea are made necesnry by 
growth and development doca not chaD,te the essential nllUre of thb servicea provided: 
thay are fi:Jt the public at large." 126 Idaho at 744, 890 P.2d 330. 
Aamlltematmt arg11men1, the City tll.eP ISIIIIIts tbat tha-a ia a particnlar benefit 
received by the Schaefi'Jrs. which i& the reticffrom consttuctiug and. dedicaf:in& a. 
complete worldOroe housing unit as required by tile Ordinance. By paying the in-lieu fee, 
the City claima. the Schaefers are saving money by payinl SUD Valley to assume th& 
oosts aasoei.ncd with worldbrce housing. The City is likely com!Cl However, the City's 
optiona Rally only provide one feasibJe selection to the avenge person. Tbt; alte:mative 
optiot11, such u on-site hous:iog. eli.gib]e site houli:Dg or a conveyance of land to 
Workfbrce Housing. are all unrealistic to the avenge applicant. Por example, if the 
formula calculating the number of units the applicant shall provide prodtiCeS a ftuctioaal 
mnnber, either the applicant must build an entire unit, or pay an in-lieu lee. Fnrther, if 
tbe P&Z finds on-1rite housing to be impractical oc inappropriaee, ()('that it would be !l'lOt'e 
practical for the required units to be pooled with housing units ftom other projects in the 
aty, or a more viable project may be coostructed el&ewhere, tbc::n an applicant tnay eid1er 
pay min-lieu fee or convey another piece of property. Ord.. 364, § 9-9F-4.D. However, 
the conveyance ofland option ia only pOS51ble if ( 1) the app,licant owns another piece of 
property in Sun Valley, and (2) the property is propcdy zoned, (3) the value of the 
property is enongh to offset the City's development costs, and fulally (4) the proposal is 
accepted by the Sun Valley Clty Counc:it. In addition. the developer must appraise the 
property. and the City may require, prior to approval, tbat the property contain roads, 
water supply, sewage disposal, an environmental report and other basic services. Ord. 
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364, 9-9P-4.D.2. Due to the rrumerous obetlclea an applicant would conftont by 
cb:Joaing any othor alternative options, the City hu effectively required m applies 110 
pay an in-lieu fee. Consequently, it is umeaonable 110 claim !hat Schtefen have received 
the beoetit ofuol bein& required to chooee the otbec tbree optiQIJS. 
Sun Valley's claims that OrdiDince 364 does DOt sutler tiam. the same fllWs as 
kiUo B'llildlng C01fti"'I,C.UJn A.nociati.on because Ordinance 364 specificaUy segregates 
m:l allocatca the in-lim feea, and limits their usc to fimd tbe wortfbrce housing created 
by the n.ew development. '!be Court agrees that the ordinance does not fail in tbis regard. 
& slaecd above, the Court in Idaho Building ConJroc1or11 ~ pll1ially based its 
invalidation of the Coeur d'Alene ordinance oa the tilc:t tbalt the 1leea wen~ aQCI.Imulated 
inlo a general fund. The Court was conoemed tlult an impact fee could be usessed IIIIi 
the banefit would go toward a.o lli1It'll.atrxl public need. Here, Ordinance 364 serves only 
to mitigale the portion of the demand for affordable worldbrce houJillg direatly caused by 
the new dcveiopmeot. Revenue provided fi:om in-lieu fees 1M to be deposited into an 
interest bearing Worlc.rorce Housina F\tnd, aad solely 11.1ed to .. increase and improve the 
supply of l1lntal and! or for sale woddbrcc housing affordable to nlOdcrate and I ow 
i.ooomt households and whose i.noome is derived ti:om omploym.ent within Sun Valley or 
when fcm.nd appropriate by the City, employed in Blaine County commonly known as tho 
North Valley, includi11g the City of Ketchum and River Run." Ordinance., 364, § 9-9F· 
4llD.l. Although Ordinance 364 san&fiea lbis one camponeat of a valid police powsr 
reguJation. it faila OD the grounds discussed above. 
Th.ia Court finds, tberef'Ote, that the Ordinaoce 364 in--lieu. is in reality an 
iJDPOSition of a tax, and not a valid ex«cise of a municipality's police power. 
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l. The CltJ,• ell-. of an Ill-Ilea fee pamaaat te Ordfu.Dc8 364 Js aot 
spedfteal.ty aathoriud by dae Idabo Lepdature. 
AJ diiCI.liiOd above, a municipality may also impoae taxes or .thea on the public by 
JPfldflc autborizatiou from the Idaho legialatute. Idlzllt> Bl• ~1'$ .Maoc,126 
Id.1ho at 742, &90 P.2d 328. Tbc:rc1bro. the oltly proper question fur th:ia Court ia wbethar 
any specific autllorizatio:a ian the Jegialatnre exists. The City of Sun VaHey identities 
the Local Land Use Planu.ing Act ("LLUPA j I$ the IOUrCe of the City's authority. The 
Schacfecs argue thal Ordinance 364 Ia without 1egiaJative authorizatioD. Tho Schaefers 
1\utber contend that Ordinance 364 is pxeempted by Idaho law, particularly tM Impact 
PeeArJ.. 
The Schaefera' arpmcnt is two fuld. Firat, the Idaho Legislatu:re did not 
specifically authority tbe City to asaea in-lieu :tees. Second, the IDJF A preempted the 
area ofimpect fees, and therefore the City could not assess :in-lieu fees. Here, the Court 
need not proceed to Schaefer·s steond araument on preemption at this time. The 
question to addreiS ia whether the Idaho Legi.sJature specifically authorized a 
municipality to assess fees or taxes for affotd.a.b)e hOU&ing. [f so, the ordlnance would be 
upheld oo tbal. bam. If no legislative aJJthority exists, thea no preemption argument is 
necessary bcc::aae the .state did not grant specific authornation to tho city. 
Fur!hmnore, preemption generally serves aa a limitation of authority &ranted to 
mwricipaJiti.cs by tho Idaho Constitution. Caesar. 101 Idaho at 161. "The city carmot act 
in an area which is so comp.letel:y covered by general law aa to indicate that it is a. rmtter-
of state coocem. Nor may it act in an mea w~ to do so, would conflict with tbe state's 
geaera.llawa. • !d. For ins111Dce, a city's police poliMI ia limited in areu where the State 




to concede that tbe pteemption arpment would apply oaJy if the Court n:nmd Ord.inau.c:-.6 
364 to be a. proper axercite of 1 municipality's police power. Only tbeo oould it be 
argued that tha State hu preempted tho II"ell ol impact fees, and the city is prohibited 
from acting in thlt :field. Since this Court found Ordin111oc 364 to be outside the 
authodty of a mumcipality's police pewee, the Court nccci 110t decide whether IDIPA 
preempted the ordinauce. Thoref01'8, siDce it is undisputed that ID1FA does not provide 
the ncccssary au1hority ftom the legislature, tho Court will focus on the LLUP A. 
The City deftnda Ordinance 364 by arguing that U.UPA provides the authority 
neceasary far a municipality to a.aeu in-lieu fees foe affordable hou8ing. This Court 
etnnOt fmd that LLUP A provides the City with any sucb authority. 
'l'he Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed othe.r challenges to County ordinances 
wbere the Couaty defended by identifying a specific grant of authority by tb.e J.egisla1ure. 
One such lawsuit, Kootl!llfai Cowtty Prop~~.rty A.r.r ·,. v. KootflnQi Count) involved a 
muoieipality's anempt to charge the public fees to estabJiab, maintaio and operate a solid 
waste disposal system. ln that cue the Court upheld tho 8SSeSIIIIllC1lt of feu on the basis 
that lhe Idaho legislature permitted the municipality tc fund a particular project ttuougb 
the asscssmem of taXes or fees. 115 Idaho 676, 769 P .2d 553 (1989). The legislation at 
iSI118 wu entitled Solid Wae Disposal Sit-es. Title 31, Chapter 44, which granted COUl1t.}l 
commissioners tbe authority "to acquire, establish, :maintai.n and operate such solid waste 
disposalaystems as are ntCCSS8l'Y and to provide reasomble and conveoient access to 
m:h disposal s:ystema by all the citi%ens... I. C. § 31-4402.. Further. the statute provides 
the board of county commisaioners the rollowing options to Llmd the waste disposal 
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S}'ltcm: levy a tax. eolleet fees, use e.xistina revem1111, or collccC. money from any other 
source, or anycombiDition ther~K>l. LC § 31-4404(1). 
I'n contrut. the eityofSuu Val.ley faill to point to any languaae in the Looal Land 
Uae Pluming Act that spceifi.caJly gnniB autbority to aaseca feci or taXes. lt ia evident 
ftom the Solid Waste Disposal Sites Act that the 1qislatlm: providca xeveoue collection 
a:utllcxity with specific language. In contrut. the City of Sun Valley cites the Court to 
several sectiona ofllUP Au support fur the IegislaiUre's broad grant of authority. 
Theac soetiODa provide d. ties with the authority to promote the general welfan~ of the 
peopleolldaho byida:ltifYUag and assessing the need for atfordablc.housio& and 
relf'liring cities to adcbss socll issues by implementing regu1ati.ons and standards. LC. § 
67-6508, LC § 67-6511. Indeed, LLUPA provides a city with broad authority to regulate 
in tho context of land use. However, notably absent from LLUP A is language pennitting 
a city to aaesa taxes or fees. 
Fur1hec, it is net at aU clear that Ordinance 364 is of the type that LLu1' A applies 
to. "UUP A establiahes explicit and express procedures to be followed by the govc:n:ring 
boards or commissioas when considering. emcting and amending toning plans and 
ordinances." Rllardon v. Magic FlaJlq Sand fJifd Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 11 s. 119, 90 
P.3d 340, 344 (2004). Furthar. zoning regulati001 "llrll divided in10 two classes; first, 
tlose which rogulata the height and bulk oibuildinga within certain desiptcd <tistrict.s, 
and second, those whi.cb prescribe the usc tD wbich buildinp within certain designated 
district may be put... 0 'Connor v. Oty of Mokcow, 69 Idaho 37. 202 P .2d 401 (1949). 
'!he standards listed in the ILUP A 8t'8 consist.cot with the above definition of zoning 
repJatioas, liltin& "sucla thinp u bullding de&ip; blocb, !ott. mel tracts ofland; yaMs. 









courU, grec.obelra. planting stripa, pcd:l, md other open SIJa&Mi trees; signs; parkm& 
sp~Cet~ road~ 1treet1, lanes. b~lewaya, pedesmm walkway~. rigtu.af..way, 
iflde•, alignments, and intencctions; lighting; em:mCD.ta f« public utilities; access tc 
streets numbers and Jllllla; bouse numbers; schools, hospitals. and other public and 
private development." I. C. § 67-6518. The common tbeme of the above standards is the 
rtlpiati011 of lwf usc. Ordinance 364 does not impate standards related to the 
regulation of land use, but rather seeks to impose fees upon landowners seeking a 
building permit. 
In sum. tile Court cannot find that the llUP A specifically grmts the City of Sun 
Valley lhe authority to 1111t1a fees or taxes on the public. 'Ibere1bte, Ordinance 364 
cannot be ~eld on the. basis that the City of Sun Valley may a&Bell8 an in-li110 fee 
pursuant to specifit legislative authorization. 
IDAHO TORT CLAIM ACf 
The Sebaefers seek a refimd of the $11 ,989. 91 in-lieu fee pursuant to the Idaho 
Tort Claim Act, l.C. § 6-901 to 6-92.9. The City claims no refund is due because the city 
acted 'Withoot n:cklea, will.t\tl mi wanton oonduct. as defined in 6-904C, Idaho Code." 
LC. § 6-904A This Cowtcannot find that the City of Sun Valley enacted Ordinance 364 
wiJJfully or rec.ldesaJy, and tberefu.re denies any rcfmJ:i pursuant to this act. 
The Schaefen also seek a refbnd OD the buis that tbc state wu unjuatJy enriched 
by receipt of m un0011£titutional tax. The Court in BHA.lmctmm~.r, inc., v. State. 13 8 
Idaho 348, 355, 63 P .3d .474, 481 (2003), acknowledged such a claim may be appropriate 
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(1) t be.netit ia confarnld upon dcleadant by plaintift;. (2) appreciltioD by the dcftm.danl of 
the benetlt. rod (3) acc:eptaDce of the~ ander eircUIDJbncea thtt would be 
inequitable 1br the defendant 1o J"11taiD the benefit without payrncU of the value thereof 
Gib.tote 11. Ada Couaty. 142 Idaho 746, l33 P .3d llll (2006). In the pte8CIIt action, the 
City collected and appn:ciatcd receipt of S11,989 .n .from the Sabaofcrl. Further. aa a 
result of Ibis Courts niling reflll'din& the constitutionality of the ordinance, acceptance of 
the char~ by lhe City would be inequittble. Thus, this Court finds tbe City til have been 
ulijustly enricbed in the amount of$11,989.97 uu:1 tho Scbaefors are HEREBY entitled to 
a refund in that amowat. 
rn conclusioa. because Ordi.uanca 364 ia not a valid exercise of a m.unicipality"s 
police powe£, IlCI' specifically antborizcd punuant to a specific legislative enactment, tile 
Sc.haew's S'Uilllllai}' JudgJneOt Is H.Em.HBY GRANTED, and thus the City of Sun 
Valley's SurrutiJirY Judgment is DBNIBD. 
It is so orden:cl. 
Distrlct Judge 
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This matter came on for hearing before the Court on May 29, 2008. Appearing at that 
hearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs Cove Springs Development, Inc. and Redstone Partners, L.P. 
were Chris Meyer, Boise, Idaho, Martin Hendrickson, Boise, Idaho, and Martin Flannes, Hailey, 
Idaho. Appearing on behalf of the Defendant Blaine County was Tim Graves, Hailey, Idaho. 
Also appearing at the hearing but not participating was Ned Williamson, Hailey, Idaho on behalf 
of Intervenors Tom O'Gara, John Stevenson, and Gerry Bashaw. The Court, having reviewed 
and considered the Petitioners/Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 2 and 3, the 
supporting pleadings, and the briefing with respect to the motion, and having heard and 
considered the oral argument of respective counsel, finds and rules as follows: 
CoH!!I .2- T~asheld. PUD, tllld CD Standtuds (or Contornrance with Comprehensm 
Pl(!n fZO(J.i Ordinance1 
1. In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 211, 212, 213, 214, and 215 of 
Cove Springs' Complaint, which state as follows: 
211. County Subdivision Threshold Standard § 1 0-5-2B 
states that no application shall be approved unless the Board 
determines that: "The proposed subdivision ofland conforms to 
and is in accordance with the comprehensive plan text and map." 
212. County Subdivision Planned Unit Development 
Standard§ l0-6-8A.10 states that a planned unit development is 
contingent upon the Board's determination: "That the PUDwill 
conform to the comprehensive plan." 
2 I 3. County Subdivision Cluster Development Standard 
§ 1 0-9-8E states that a clu::>ter development is contingent upon the 
Board's determination: "That the A.-20 CD conforms to the goals, 
recommendations and conclusions in the Blaine County 
comprehensive plan." 
214. Under Idaho law, the purpose of a comprehensive 
plan is to serve as a general guide in instances involving 1.0ning 
decisions such a(sJ revising or adoptin& a zoning ordinance. 
215. Under Idaho law, the County may not elevate its 
comprehensive plan to the level of controlling zoning law. 
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2. The County admitted Paragraphs 211,212,213,214, and 2IS of Cove Springs' 
Complaint. These are accurate statements of the law. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 
358, 2 PJd 738, 743 (2000). 
3. Subdivision Ordinance §§ I 0·5·2.8, I 0-6-8.A.1 0, and 1 0..9-8.E, as written in 
2004, apply to the Cove Springs applications. These ordinances remain in effect throughout 
Blaine County today with minor changes under the 2025 Ordinances which do not affect the 
analysis or conclusions reached in this order. 
4. The Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code§§ 67-6501 to 67-6537 
("LLUPA") contemplates that the comprehensive plan shall serve as a pl8.1ming document to 
guide the adoption of zoning and other ordinances. Comprehensive plans are forward-looking, 
visionary documents. Although LLUPA requires that land use ordinances adopted by the County 
should generafly reflect the broad goals and aspirations of the comprehensive plan, not all of the 
specific provisions in a comprehensive plan are necessarily reflected in cunent zoning 
ordinances. Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome CounJ.y, 2008 WL 803001 (Mar. 27, 2008). Thus, the 
standards and conditions spelled out in its adopted land use ordinances constitute the County's 
articulation as to how the comprehensive plan is to be applied to subdivision applications, 
including the Cove Springs Applications. Cove Springs and all citizens of Blaine County are 
entitled to rely on that articulation. Thus, individual zoning and subdiv1sion permit applications 
are to be measured against the specific criteria set out in the applicable ordinances. 
5. The following statement by the Idaho Supreme Court is controlling here: 
It is to be expected that the land to be subdivided may not agree 
with all provisions in the comprehensive plan, but a more specific 
analysis, resulting in denial of a subdivision applicatiot1 based 
solely on non-compliance with the comprehensive plan elevates 
the plan to the level of legally contro111ng zoning Jaw. Such a 
result affords the Board unbounded discretion in examining a 
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subdivision application and allows the Board to effectively re-zone 
land based on the general language in the comprehensive plan. As 
indicated above, the comprehensive plan is intended merely as a 
guideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning decisions. Those 
zoning decisions have already been made in this instance .... 
Thus, . . . the Board [may not rely} completely on the 
comprehensive plan in denying these applications, and should 
instead have crafted its findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
demonstrate that the goals of the comprehensive plan were 
considered, but were simply used in conjunction with the zoning 
ordinances, tbe subdivision ordinance and any other applicable 
ordinances in evaluating the proposed development<:. 
Urrulia, 134ldaho at 358-59, 2 P 3d 743-44. 
6. There is no issue before the Court on these present motions as to whether and 
what extent the County may consider its comprehensive plan in passing upon a subdivision 
application. More particularly, what weight Blaine County chooses to give to its comprehensive 
plan in considering or passing upon a subdivision application, or the question of whether the 
CoWlty can give its comprehensive plan !!!i: weight in passing upon a PUD or a Cluster 
Development or a Subdivision Application, (as opposed to adopting a new ordinance, or 
considering a conditional use permit, etc.) are not before the Court. 
7. County ordinances are law. By including in its ordinance 10-5-2.3 a requirement 
that "No application shall be approved" unless the Board "detetmines the proposed subdivision 
ccnfonns to and is in accordance with the comprehensive plan," Blaine County has elevated its 
comprehensive plan "to the level of legally controlling zoning law." Therefore, this particular 
provisiQD ofthis ordinance violates Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 358, 2 P 3rd 738, 
743 (2000), and is contrary to law on its face. 
8. By including in its ordinance I 0-6-8.A.( I 0) a requirement that a planned unit 
development is "contingent upon the Boards detem1ination" that "the PVD will conform to the 
comprehensive plan," Blaine County has elevated its comprehensive plan "to the status oflegally 
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controUing zoning law." Therefore. this particular provision of this ordinance violates Urrutia, 
and is contrary to law on its face. 
9. By including in its ordinance 10-9-8.8 a rrJquirement that a Cluster Development 
is "contingent upon the Boards determination" that the "A-20 CD conforms to the goals, 
recommendations. and conclusions in the Blaine County comprehensive plan," Blaine County 
has elevated its comprehensive plan "to the status of legally controlling zoning law." Therefore, 
this particular provision of this ordinance violates Urrutia and is contrary to law on its face. 
The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Blaine County Code 
Sections l 0-5-2.B, l 0-6-S.A.l 0, and 1 0-9-8.E are contrary to law and are therefore null, void, 
and without further force and effect. 
Count 2 - Unauthori:r.ed Exactions in Threshold. PUD, and CD Standards (20(}4 
Ordinance) 
10. In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 219,221,223,225,226,227,228, 
229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 240, 241, 243, 244, and 249 of Cove Springs' Complaint, 
which state as follows: 
219. County Subdivision Threshold Standard§ 10-5-2.C 
states that no application shall be approved unless the Board 
determines that: "The proposed subdivision shall not adversely 
affect the quality of essential public services and facilities lo 
current residents, including but not limited to school facilities, 
school bus transp01tation, police and frre protection, emergency 
services, and roads, and shall not require substantial additional 
public funding in order to meet the needs created by the proposed 
subdivision. The applicant shall be required by the Board to 
mitigate the adverse effects of the proposed subdivision, which 
may include., without limitation, contributions for additional capital 
improvements, on-going maintenance, and tabor costs. The plan 
for, timing of. and proposed phasing of the mitigation shall be in a 
fonn acceptable to the Board." 
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221. County Subdivision Planned Unit Development 
Standard § 1 0-6-8.A.9 states that a planned unit development is 
contingent upon the Board's determination: "TI1at the developer 
will finance the improvement of the road network outside of the 
PUD where traffic generated by the PUDs increased densities 
make such improvements necessary ... 
223. County Subdivision Cluster Development Standard 
§ 1 0-9-S.D makes approval of a Cluster Development contingent 
upon a determination· "TI1at where off-site impacts are found to 
result from the proposed development of the A-20 CD, the 
developer has proposed improvements to mitigate said impacts. 
Such improvements may include but not be limited to the road 
network (road improvements not limited to surfacing, school bus 
turnarounds, widening, intersections, bridges, culvet1s, and 
drainage facilities), fire protection facilities, and trails/recreation." 
225. Idaho is a Dillon's Rule state. 
226. Under Dillon's Rule, counties have no inherent 
authority to regulate or to tax. 
227. Under Dillon's Rule, the autholity of Idaho counties 
to tax detives from grants found in or necessarily impJied by the 
Idaho Constitution and state statutes. 
228. The Idaho Constitution contains a grant of police 
power to Idaho counties. 
229. The grant of police power to counties contained in 
the Idaho Constitution does not include a general authority to tax. 
230. The police power includes the authority to impose 
regulatory fees that are incidental to proper regulatory programs 
for the purpose of funding such programs. 
231. The police power includes the authority to charge 
user fees for services provided by the County to a user of those 
services. 
233. Development impact fees and other measures whose 
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital 
improvements benefiting the public in general are not incidental 
regulatory fees. 
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234. Development impact fees and other measures whose 
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital 
improvements benefiting the public in general are not user fees for 
services. 
23 5. Development impact fees and other measures whose 
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital 
improvements benefiting the public in general are not the sott of 
traditional exactions authorized under the police power in 
association with dedications within and primarily benefiting the 
development. 
236. Development impact fees and other measures whose 
primary purpose is to generate revenue for services and capital 
improvements benefiting the public in gece1'al are taxes. 
240. Atticle VII,§ 6 of the fdaho Constitution is not self-
executing. Any power of taxation authorized under this section 
must be implemented by legislation. 
24 I . The only statute authorizing counties to assess 
developme11t impact fees is the Idaho Development Fee Act, Idaho 
Code§§ 67-8201 to 67-8216 ("IDIFA"). 
243. County Ordinances§§ J0-5-2.C, I0-6-8.A.9 and 10-
9-8.0 do not comply with the procedural and substantive 
requirements of IDIF A. 
244. The County did not enact County Ordinances§§ 10-
5-2.C, 1 0-6-8.A.9 and 10-9-8 .D pursuant to or in reliance on 
IDIFA. 
249. The County has no authority to enforce a void 
ordinance or to apply a void ordinance to the Development 
Applications. 
II. The County admitted Paragraphs 219,221, 223,225,226, 227,228,229,230, 
231,233,234,235, 236,240, 24), 243,244, and 249 of Cove Springs' Complaint These are 
accurate statements of the law. Idaho Building Con.t.ractors Ass 'n v. City ofCoeur d'Alene 
C'!BCA"), 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Brewster v. City of Pocatello, liS Idaho 502, 
768 p 2d 765 ( J 988). 
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12. Subdivision Ordinance§§ 10-5-2.C, 10-6-8.A.9, and 10-9-8.0, as written in 2004, 
apply to the Cove Springs applications. These ordinances remain in effect throughout Blaine 
County today with minor changes under the 2025 Ordinances which do not affect the analysis or 
conclusions reached in this order. 
13. Subdivision Ordinance§§ I 0-5-2.C, 10-6-8.A.9, and 10-9-8.0 establish 
development impact fees that the County seeks to impose without compliar.ce with IDlFA. 
14. The County has no inherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The 
County must impose development impact fees pursuant to IDfF A or not at all. 
15. The County could have imposed development impact fees to recover certain costs 
associated with new developments pursuant to IDIF A, but apparently elected not to do so. 
16. The fees imposed under these ordinances are not incidental regulatory fees or user 
fees, but are intended to raise revenues for public purposes benefiting the County as a whole. 
AccordingJy, the fees imposed under these ordinances constitute illegal taxes in violation of the 
Idaho Constitution and are, therefore, null and void. 
17. "Approval of a plat may ill!! be conditioned upon payment by the 
subdivider of a specified portion of the cost of improvements if no power to exact 
such a payment is delegated by the statutes. The county has a duty to keep all 
roads in reasonable repair and may not discharge that duty by imposing the costs 
on local developers, absent statutory authority; thus, requiring a developer to~~ 
a county road as a condition for approving a site olan js ultra vire~."' 
83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning a11d PlaMing § 485. at 420 (2003) (emphasis added). 
1 8. In addition. even if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it 
does not), Subdivision Ordinance §§ I 0-5-2.C, I 0-6-8.A.9, and l 0-9-8.0 are void because they 
have been preempted by IDIFA. IDIFA is a broad regulatory program that comprehensively 
addresses development impact fees in Idaho and wa..'l intended "to occupy the entire field of 
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regulation.'' Envirosafe Services of Idaho v. County ofOwyhet~, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 
998, 1000 (1987). 
19. Specifically, with regard to designated paragraph 223, the County argues that 
compliance with Standard § 10-9-8.0 is voluntary. While part of that may be true, the County 
has made approval "contingent" on whether the proposed development has voluntarily agreed to 
contribute tQ mitigate off site impacts. When viewed in context, the County has conditioned 
approval upon an agreement by the developer to contribute to offsite improvements for clearl5-
designated public purposes. In other words, the County has conditioned approval upon the 
developer's ag.""eement to voluntarily pay a tax. In that regard, the County seeks to do indirectly, 
(by coercing payment of a fee for mitigation of offsite public impacts) what it may not do 
directly (levy an "exaction" or tax for precisely the same purpose). 
Idaho Code 67-6513 requires that: "Fees established for purposes of mitigating the 
financial impacts of development must comply with the provisions of chapter 82, title 67, Idaho 
Code." Additionally, the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIFA") provides, at section 67-
8204( I 7): "A development impact fee ordiruu1ce shall include a schedule of deveJoprnent impact 
fees for various land uses per unit of development.'' Blaine County's ordinance includes no such 
fee schedule, an omission the County seeks to get around by arguing their fees are ''voluntary", 
that the County does not need to enact or set a fee, (because they have placed the burden on the 
developer to set a fee 1), and that d1e County may or may not actually set a fee requiring any 
payment in any particular instance. The issue is not whether the County will or mighf set a fee; 
the statute demands that they set a fee. TI1is attempt by the County (to avoid setting fees as 
1 Blaine Counry Ordinance 10-9·8.0 provides thai approval is contingent upon a determination that " .. the 
developer hns proposed improvements to mitigate such impacts " 
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called for by IDIFA} runs afoul of lDlF A. Another subsection of the same statute sets forth the 
re1ult. 67-8204(25) provides: 
"Any provision of a development impact fee ordinance that is inconsistent 
with the requirements ofthi.s chapter shall be mdl rmd void and tltal provi.rion 
shallltave rro legal effect. A partial invalidity of a development impact fee 
ordinance shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of the ordinance 
that are inconsistent With the requirements of this chapter." 
The CoUJt therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Sections J 0-5-2.C, 
1 0-6-8.A.9, and I 0-9-8.0 are contrary to law and are therefore null, void, and without further 
force and effect 
Count 3 -Road Milifatkln Fee (2025 Ordinance) 
J 9. In its Answer, tbe County admitted paragraphs 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 
233,234,235,236,240, and 241 of Cove Springs' Complaint, which are quoted above. 
20. In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 256,257, and 258 of Cove 
Springs' Complaint, which state as folloW'S: 
256. The Road Mitigation Fee [defined in paragraph 254 
ofthe Complaint as Public Ways and Property Ordinance§ 6-1-4 
as amended in 2007) does not fall within the scope of IDIFA. 
257. The Road Mitigation Fee does not comply with the 
procedural and substantive requirements of IDIFA. 
258. The County did not enact the Road Mitigation Fee 
pursuant to or in reliance on IDlFA. 
21. The County admitted Paragraphs 225,226,227,228,229,230,231,233,234, 
235, 236, 240,241, 256, 257, and 258 of Cove Splings' Complaint. These are accurate 
statements of the law. 
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22. The Road Mitigation Fee required under Public Ways and Property Ordinance 
§ 6~ 1.-6, (sometimes referred to as 6~ 1-4 in Cove Springs documents) as amended in 2007, 
establishes a development impact fee th81 the County seeks to impose without compliance with 
IDIFA. 
23. The County has no inherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The 
County must impose development impact fees pursuant to IDIF A or not at all. 
24. The County could have im?3sed development impact fees to recover costs 
associated with roads pursuant to IDIF A, but elected not to do so. 
25. The Road Impact Fee is not an incidental regulatory fee or user fee, but is 
intended to raise revenues for public purposes benefiting the County as a whole. Accordingly, 
the fees imposed under this ordinance constitute illegal taxes in violation of the Idaho 
Constitution and are, therefore, null and void. The County may not use an appliCWlt's failure to 
pay an illegal fee as a basis for denial of a permit application. 
26. In addition, e\len if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it 
does not), the Road Impact Fee is void because it has been preempted by IDIFA. IDIFA is a 
broad regulatory program that comprehensively addresses development impact fees in Idaho and 
was intended ... to occupy the entire field of regulation." Envirosafo Services of Idaho v. County 
of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, lOOO (1987). 
The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Section 6-1-6 of the 
Blaine County Code is contrary to law and is therefore null and void, and without further force 
and effect. 
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Cq_unt J -lnclHfif.ngrv Hogsin« Fee (2025 Ordinanu) 
27. In its Ansvver, the County admitted paragraphs 225, 226,227, 228,229,230, 231, 
233,234, 235,236,240, and 241 ofCove Springs' Complaint, which are quoted above. 
28. In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 265, 266, 267, 268, and 269 of 
Cove Springs' CompJaint. which state as follows: 
265. Subdivision Ordinance§ 10..5-4 adopted in 2006, 
provides, in relevant part: "JNCLUSIONAR Y HOUSING: 
Twenty percent (200/o) of the lots and houses in all subdivisions, 
including condominium subdivisions. approved and platted after 
the adoption date hereof shall be permanently restricted as 
community housing .... " 
266. Pursuant to Subdivision Ordinance § 1 0-5-4, an 
applicant for subdivision approval may propose and the Board may 
approve, any of four ( 4) options, or a combination thereof, for 
providing community housing that is required by the ordinance, as 
follows: (1) the applicant build community housing on the site of 
the subdivision; (2) the applicant build community housing off the 
site of the subdivision; (3) the applicant convey land, either within 
the subdivision or off the site ofthe subdivision, for community 
housing; or (4) the applicant pay a fee in lieu for community 
housing. 
267. Subdivision Ordinance§ 10~5-4 does not fall within 
the scope ofiD IF A. 
268. Subdivision Ordinance § I 0-5-4 does not comply 
with the procedural and substantive requirements of IDIF A. 
269. The County did not enact Subdivision Ordinance 
§ 10-5-4 pursuant to or in reliance on IDJFA. 
29. The Cow1ty admitted Paragraphs 22:5, 226,227, 228,229, 230,231,233,234, 
235, 236, 240, 24!, 265, 266, 267, 268, and 269 of Cove Springs' Complaint These are accurate 
statements of the law. 
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30. The Inclusionary Housing Fee imposed under Subdivision Ordinance § 1 Q..S-4 
establishes a development impact fee that the County seeks to impose without compliance with 
lDIFA. 
31. The County has no inherent authority to impose taxes under its police power. The 
County must impose development impact fees pursuant to lD[FA or not at all. 
32. IDIF A authorizes certain categories of development impact fees, to wit 
1. water supply, 
2. wastewater facilities, 
3. roads, 
4. storm water collection facilities, 
5. parks and ope11 space, and 
6. public safety facilities. 
Idaho Code§ 67-8203(24). Affordable workforce housing is not among them. 
33. Accordingly, the County has no authority to impose a development impact fee tor 
affordable workforce housing, even if it complied with the procedural requirements of IDIF A. ff 
the County wishes to provide affordable workforce housing, it must do so through the 
expenditure of property tax revenues or other authorized means. lbe Legislature has not 
authorized the CoW1ty to shift the cost of building affordable housing from the community as a 
whole to individual developers and property owners. 
34. TI1e County has no inherent authority to impose taxes. The Inclusionary Housing 
Fee is not an incidental regulatory fee or user fee, but is intended to raise revenues for public 
purposes benefiting the County as a whole. Accordingly, the fees imposed under this ordinance 
constitute illegal taxes in violation of the Idaho Constitution and are, therefore, null and void. 
3 5. In addition, even if the County had inherent authority to impose taxes (which it 
does not), the Inclusionary Housing Fee is void because it has been preempted by IDIF A IDIF A 
is a broad regulatory program that comprehensively addresses development impact fees in ldaho 
ORUElt ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTS 2 AND 3 Page 13 of20 
555 
and was intended "to occupy the entire field of regulation.,. &virosafe Services of Idaho v. 
County of Owyhee, 112 [daho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, WOO (1987). 
The Court therefore ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Section 10-5-4 of the 
Blaine County Code is contrary to law, is therefore null and void, and without further force a11d 
effect. 
Coll!pl3 - Wildlife Overlq District ( 2025 Ordinance) 
36. In its Answer, the County admitted paragraphs 262 and 263 of Cove Springs' 
Complaint, which state as follows: 
262. The Wildlife Overlay District includes all 
"Classified Lands" as defined in Zoning Ordinance§ 9-20-4. 
263. "Classified Lands" are defined in Zoning Ordinance 
§ 9-20-4 solely by reference to determinations made by the lDFG 
[Idaho Department of Fish and Game]. 
37. The County admitted Paragraphs 262 and 263 of Cove Springs' Complaint 
TilCSe are accurate statements of the law as enacted by Blaine County. 
38. Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 defines "Classified Lands" in terms of elk winter 
habitat, mule deer winter habitat, elk migration conidors. mule deer migration corridors, and 
other areas identified by IDFG. The ordinance provides: 
• "Elk migration corridors in Blaine County are designated by IDF&G." 
• "Elk winter habitat in Blaine County is designated by IDF&G." 
• "Mule deer migration corridors are designated by IDF&G." 
• "Mule deer winter habitat in Blaine County is designated by IDF&G." 
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39. Zoning Ordinance§ 9-20·5 provides: "Prior to the planning or designating of any 
subdivision, the applicant shall contact IDF&G and any other applicable agency or professional 
as detetmined by the administrator to identify any classified lands on the subject property." 
40. LLUPA authorizes and mandates the establishment of zoning districts. Idaho 
Code § 67-6511. 
41. LLOPA does not require creation of a zoning map in so many words, but it does 
require the designation ofL.oning districts which, as a practical matter, may be displayed on a 
zoning map. 
42. A zoning map describes current zoning. It is not to be confuse<! with the land use 
map that is part of the comprehensive p!an.2 
43. LLUPA does not expressly authorize overlay districts, which are special zones 
imposed on top of an underlying zoning district However, zoning districts and overlay dist:licts 
are permissible fonns of zoning, so long as they comply with statutory, common law, and 
constitutional requirements for land use zoning. One of the requirements inherent in all zoning is 
that landowners and other affected parties be infonned of the boundruies of the zones. This may 
be accomplishe<l either by mapping or by the establishment of objective, textual standards that 
allow persons to detennine with rea.•10nable certainty which zones apply to a given property. 
44. Accordingly, the County's adoption of a Wildlife Overlay District without 
mapping its boundaries does not, in itself, violate LLUPA. 
45. However, the Wildlife Overlay District fails to provide any objective cliteria (or 
any criteria at all) to define its boundaries, other than "references used by lDF &G" 
Accordingly, there is no way for a person to determine whether a property is within or outside of 
1 The operative provision simply refers to this as a "map." Idaho Code§ 67-6508{c). lt is referred to as a 
"lend use map" in Idaho Code§ 67~509(d). 
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the Wildlife Overlay District other than to ask for a determination by a third party (an IDFO 
employee} who answers to no one within the County and who can issue a conclusory 
determination on a case-by-case basis unbounded by any fixed, articulated standards or criteria. 
Furthermore, the ordinance allows IDFG to modify such "references" from time to time without 
any notice to and/or input from affected landowners. 
The County argues that ''wildlife move" which makes the adoption of a map difficult. 
Petitioners argue that the County had a map that was used prior to the adoption of this ordinance. 
At different times, in different years. vittually everyone in Hailey, Bellevue, or Ketchum has 
seen moose in the streets, elk in their yards or subdivisions, elk or deer wintering on surrounding 
hillsides, bears along the river, etc. Yes, wildlife move, and they move in different quantities to 
different locations in different years; however, the county ha.'l sought in this instance to avoid 
responsibility for fixing or studying or ascertaining the general movement of various animals, 
and/or zoning in accordance with general movements of particular populations, by delegating 
this entire responsibility to the Idaho Department ofFish and Game. 
Fish and Game undoubtedly has more expertise than the County Commissioners in this 
area, but Fish and Game has no authority to set and/or designate zoning boundaries. The setting 
of zoning boundaries is a function that rests entirely with tl)e designated agents of Blaine County. 
In making this delegation, the County has unlawfully delegated all of its authority to 
officially designate the boundaries of a zoning district, the Wildlife Overlay District, to a non 
elected non county agent that needs to hold no hearings, accepts no public input, can change Jt'l 
designations of"cla.ssified lands" (and therefore the zoning boundary line) daily, weekly, or 
monthly, without notice, be subject to differing opinions and criteria within Fish and Game itself, 
and are oot required to set forth their designations in a published map or guide for the benefit of 
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landowners, buyers, sellers, developers, or the generaJ public. The botmdaries of the zoning 
district don't even shift with the wildlife; they shift with the opinions of unknown persons in an 
amorphous state agency. 
Blaine County has wholly abandoned its exclusive stalutory obligation to establish a 
zoning boundary in this instance. The fact that the public can find out where these botmdaries 
exist by contacting Idaho Fish and Game, or possibly obtain a waiver from the County 
administrator, or address grievances or complaints about the process or how Fish and Game 
exercises its discretion, before the Board of Commissioners does not save the ordinance. 
Contrary to the County's arguments, the Board of Commissioners, in this circumstance, is not 
able to control the ability of Fish and Game to exercise discretion. lt is too late for there to be 
any discussion regarding an exercise of discretion once Fish and Game has made a designation. 
That comes about because Blaine County has delegated to Fish and Game the ability to set and 
establish law - the boundary of a zoning district, which may not be delegated. Any challenge 
after that is not a challenge to someone's exercise of discretion, it becomes a challenge to 
legislative authority, something quite different. 
46. The delegation of land use planning and zoning authority contained in LLUPA is 
a complete, comprehensive, and exclusive delegation to local city and county governments. 
"The LLUPA provides both mandatory and exclusive procedures for the implementation of 
planning and zoning." Sprenger. Grubb & Associates v. Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 321, 986 P.2d 
343, 344 (1999) ("Sprenger Grubb If'). "[LLUPAJ directs cities and counties to plan and zone . 
. . . Exercise of the authority to zone and plan, whether by governing board or by the established 
[planning and zoningj commissions, is made llUllldatory by I. C. § 67-6503." Gumprecht v. City 
ofCoeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615,617,661 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1983), overruled on other grounds, 
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City of Boist City v. Keep the CommandmenJs Coalition, 143 Idaho 254, 257, 141 P.Jd 1123, 
1126 (2006). ''Tile legislature clearly intended that the authority to enact comprehensive plans, 
establish zoning districts and adopt amendatOlJ' ordinances be exercised exclusively by city and 
county legislative or governing bodies and pursuant to specific prescribed procedures." 
Gumprechl, J 04 Idaho at 618, 66 I P.2d at 1217 (1983). "We conclude that the power to approve 
a subdivision application in the impact area resides exclusively with the County." Blaha v. Bd. 
of Ada Courtly Commr's, 134 Idaho 770, 777, 9 P.Jd 1236, 1234 (2000) (only the county has the 
authority to approve applications in the area of impact, even if the county wished to cede or 
delegate that authority to a city). 
47. IDFG is charged by the Legislature with the regulation of fishing and hunting and 
with wildlife research. Idaho Code§§ 36-101 to 36-124. It has no regulatory authority over 
habitat on private lands. 
48. Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 constitutes an unlawful delegation of regulatory 
authority by the County to another agency. Gumprecht, 104 Idaho at 617,661 P.2d at 1216 
(holding that the City of Coeur d'Alene may not, in effect, delegate its planning and zoning 
responsibilities under LLUPA to the people by holding an initiative election on zoning issues). 
49. LLUPA preempts Zoning Ordinance§ 9-20-4, because the ordinance violates 
LLUP A's assignment of decision-making authority to local officials and authorizes non-elected 
officials outside of county government to make binding determinations that affect the land use 
entitlement process. 
50. If the County desires to make use of the expertise ofrDFG, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, the University of Idaho, the USDA Extension Service, or any other expert, it 
should invite their views in the context of a hearing process that accommodates rebuttal of 
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evidence and wbidl reserves the final decision to the Connty, as mandated by llUPA. The 
result of that process sbouJd be the adoption ofa map or objective criteria that clearly define the 
boundaries of the zone. 
Sl. AccordinaJy, Zoning Ordinance § 9-20-4 is inconsistent with fundamental 
principles of main& law. Zoning Ordinance § 9-20~ on its face violates both U..UP A and tbe 
due procea:a clauses of the Idaho and federal constitutions. The Court hereby declares. adjudges. 
and decrees it is void and of no fUrther force and effect. 
'fb.elefore., the Court ORDERS, ADJUDOES, AND DECREES that Blaine County Code 
section 9-204 is contrary to law and is 1hecefore null and void. and without further force aod 
II IS SO ORDIRIQ1 
DATED this J~ day of ~ .2008. 
ROB~ 
District Judge 
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This is Defendant Valley County's ("County") opening brief in support of Valley 
County's Motion/or Summary Judgment filed on this day. This brief in supported by VaJ/ey 
County's Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and the 
Affidavit ofCynda Herrick filed herewith. 
Plaintiffs seek the return of money paid years ago by the developers of a project pursuant 
to a development agreement, claiming that the money paid was an illegal tax under Idaho law 
and, therefore, was a per se taking under state and federallaw. 1 Plaintiffs seek this relief despite 
the fact that they voluntarily executed the agreement and have received the benefit of their 
bargain through road improvements funded thereby and constructed by the County. The County 
seeks dismissal of the action for a variety of jurisdictional and procedural reasons. Plaintiffs' 
lawsuit also fails on the merits. 
Plaintiff Buckskin Properties, Inc. ("Buckskin") was the initial developer of a residential 
subdivision in Valley County known as The Meadows at West Mountain ( .. The Meadows"). 
Plaintiff Timberline Development, LLC ("Timberline") is the assignee/successor in interest of 
Buckskin. Buckskin and Timberline are referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs" or "Developers." 
The Developers contemplated that The Meadows would consist of 221 residential lots, 12 
(later changed to 17) multi-family lots for condominiums containing 96 (later changed to 160) 
1 U.S. Const amend. V (applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. 
Canst. amend. XIV). In paragraph 19 of their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs also allege 
the County failed to comply with state law and thereby violated due process. Although the 
Second Amended Complaint is not clear on this point, it appears that Plaintiffs have in mind 
procedl.D1ll due process. In any event, their due process claim is indistinguishable from their 
taking claim, both of which are prenrlsed solely on the same alleged state law violation. 
Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief to the same effect 
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units, two commercial lots, and open space. The Meadows was envisioned to be built in six 
phases.2 
All land within the County's jurisdiction is zoned multiple use, pursuant to the County's 
Land Use Development Ordinance ("LUDO"). Within this single district, various uses are listed 
as "allowed" while others are listed as "conditional" necessitating a conditional use pennit 
("CUP"). On or about Aprill, 2004, Buckskin filed an application with the Valley County 
Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z") for a Planned Unit Development, Conditional Use 
Permit, and Preliminary Plat (collectively "Application") for The Meadows. 
On or about May 21, 2004, the Applicant submitted an updated version of the 
Application ("Updated Application"). The Updated Application was filed after the 
recommendation for approval by the P&Z on May 17, 2004 but before the final approval by the 
Board ofCounty Commissioners on July 12,2004. The Application and the Updated 
Application are referred to collectively hereinafter as the "Applications." The P&Z refers to the 
Applications by the nwnber "PUD 04-01." 
The proposed development was located within a rural area served by unpaved roads not 
intended for urban-type residential development The County could have denied the 
Applications outright on the basis of inadequate transportation infrastructure. Idaho Code § 67-
6512(a). Alternatively, P&Z could have approved the Applications with the expectation that 
roads serving The Meadows eventually would be improved as funds became available to the 
County. The County developed a capital improvement program to give developers in fast-
1 The undisputed facts upon which Valley County's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
based are set forth in detail in Valley County's Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, which is filed contemporaneously herewith. 
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growing. rural portions of the County the option of contributing their fair share to fund 
accelerated construction of road improvements serving their developments. 
At page 22 of the Application and page 23 of the Updated Application, under the heading 
"I. Development Agreement," the Applications recite a provision from LUDO and then 
reference a Preliminary Development Agreement, which was included as Appendix C to the 
Applications. 
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant) 
states at 1J 2.11 at page 3: "Also as a condition of designating the Property as a Planned Unit 
Development and approving its development consistent with this Development Agreement the 
County has required Developer to execute a separate Capital Contribution Agreement specifying 
the funding mechanism and processes to provide the payment of monies to certain providers of 
public services .... " 
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant) 
states at 112.15 at page 4: "The County acknowledges that Developer is relying upon the 
execution and continuing validity of this Development Agreement ... " 
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant) 
states at 112.18 at page 4: "Development of the Property pursuant to this Development 
Agreement will also result in significant benefits to Developer .... " 
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant) 
states at 1J 2.19 at page 4: "Developer and the County have cooperated in the preparation of this 
Development Agreement ...... 
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant) 
states at 1J 8.8 at page 15: "In the event of the default by any party to this Development 
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Agreement. the non-defaulting party shaH be entitled to collect from the defaulting party its 
provable damages, including, but not limited to, its reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses. 
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant) 
states at~ 2.20 at page 4: •·The parties desire to enter into this Development Agreement .... " 
The Preliminary Development Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant) 
references and incorporates a Proposed Capital Contribution Agreement, which is set out as 
Exhibit A to the Development Agreement. 
The Proposed Capital Contribution Agreement (as drafted and proposed by the 
Applicant) states a ~ II(A) at page 1: "Developer agrees to pay a road impact fee as established 
by Valley County. Currently this fee has been set by the Valley County Engineer at $1,870.00 
per equivalent single-family residential unit. ... " 
At page 22 of the Application, under the heading "J. Impact Fees," the Application 
recited a provision from LUDO and then stated:3 
The impact fees for the various improvements to The Meadows is 
as folJows: 
• Road Improvements - $1870/unit 
• Sewer Service Connections - $2500/unit 
• Water Service Connections- TBD 
The Application contains an "Impact Report" set out as Appendix D to the Application. 
The Impact Report (as drafted and proposed by the Applicant) states on page l: 
A professional traffic study was prepared by Dobie Engineering, Inc. as part of the Tamarack 
Resort project .... The original estimated cost to complete this [sic] roadway improvements 
was $6,000,000.00. The development is proposing in the Development Agreement to [sic] a road 
1 This provision is restated at page 23 of the Updated Application. 
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impact fee as established by Valley County. Currently this fee has been set by the Valley County 
Engineer at $1,870.00 per equivalent single-family residential unit. ... " 
A public hearing on the Application was held May 17, 2004. Joe Pachner, Project 
Manager for Toothman-Orton Engineering Company, represented the Applicant at the May 17, 
2004 hearing. The minutes of the May 17, 2004 hearing (at page 8) recite that Mr. Pachner 
stated as follows: "The traffic report completed by the Tamarack Resort has been incorporated 
into the design of this project. The impact of this project using this roadway is incorporated and 
they will pay their proportional impact fees." At the conclusion of the May 17, 2004 hearing, the 
P&Z voted three to two to recommend approval of the Application, subject to conditions set out 
in the Staff Report for the hearing. 
The Staff Report for the May 17, 2004 hearing contains the following proposed condition 
number 12: "The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement must receive 
approval from the Board of County Commissioners." On or about June 10, 2004, the P&Z 
issued its Findings and Conclusions with respect to the Application. The Findings and 
Conclusions contain the following condition number 12: "The Development Agreement and 
Capital Contribution Agreement must receive approval from the Board of County 
Commissioners." 
On June 28, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners held a hearing on the Updated 
Application. The Staff Report for the June 28, 2004 hearing contains the following proposed 
condition number 12: "The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement must 
receive approval from the Board of County Commissioners." The minutes of the June 28, 2004 
hearing recite that the Applicant's representative, Joe Pachner, stated: ••Have been talking to 
County Engineer to co-ordinate road requirements." This was the Applicants onJy statement 
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with respect to obligations under its proposed Development Agreement and Capital Contribution 
Agreement. There was no suggestion that Buckskin had any concern or objection to the 
contributions they had offered by way of their Preliminary Development Agreement or Proposed 
Capital Contribution Agreement. 
On July 12, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners held a second hearing on the 
Updated Application. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board voted to approve the Updated 
Application and to enter into the Development Agreement and the Capital Contribution 
Agreement as corrected and amended. 
Nothing in the minutes of either the June 28, 2004 hearing or the July 12, 2004 hearing 
suggests that the Applicant had any concerns or objections with the respect to the contribution 
that the Applicant itself proposed in it Applications. 
On July 14, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners issued a Conditional Use Pennit 
for Planned Unit Development No. 04-01 ("CUP"). The CUP contains the following condition 
number 12: "The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement must receive 
approval from the Board of County Commissioners.,. 
On the same day that the CUP was issued, July 14,2004, Jack. A. Charters of Buckskin 
Properties, Inc. signed the Capital Contribution Agreement. The Capital Contribution 
Agreement was signed by the Board of County Commissioners on July 26, 2004, and it was 
recorded on August 4, 2004. The Capital Contribution Agreement recites that the date of the 
agreement is July 12, 2004. 
The Capital Contribution Agreement differed in some details from the earlier Proposed 
Capital Contribution Agreement contained in the Applications. Notably, the new Capital 
Contribution Agreement contemplated conveyance of property in lieu of payment of some of the 
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fees. The basic ooncept of payment of proportionate costs associated with the development, 
however, was unchanged from the original proposal of the Applicant 
On August 26, 2004, Joe Pachner, acting on behalf of Buckskin, wrote a letter to the P&Z 
Administrator addressing each of the conditions in the CUP for PUD 04-01. With respect to 
condition number 12, he simply stated, "Please see attached approvals, dated August 16, 2004" 
(referring to the date of that the Board signed the Capital Contribution Agreement). A similar 
letter dated May 22, 2008 simply states "Noted" with respect to the same point. Neither letter 
contains any suggestion that Buckskin had any concern or objection to the contributions required 
under the CUP or any agreement with the County. 
On September 9, 2004, the P&Z voted three to two to recommend approval of the final 
plat for Phase 1 of the Meadows. The minutes of the hearing reflect Jack Charters was present. 
The minutes reflect no expression of any concern with or objection to the obligations imposed 
under the CUP, the Development Agreement, or the Capital Contribution Agreement. 
On October 25, 2004, the Board of County Commissioners met and voted to approve the 
final plat for Phase 1 of the Meadows. The minutes of the October 25, 2004 meeting specifically 
reflect the County's acknowledgement that the conditions of the Capital Contribution Agreement 
had been met with respect to Phase l. Nothing in the minutes of the October 25, 2004 meeting 
reflects any expression of concern or objection by Buckskin with respect to the obligations 
imposed under the CUP, the Development Agreement, or the Capital Contribution Agreement. 
On December 6, 2004, a representative of Buckskin appeared at a public meeting of the 
Board of County Commissioners to discuss concerns respecting certain Idaho Department of 
Environmental Quality requirements applicable to The Meadows. Nothing in the minutes of the 
December 6, 2004 meeting reflects any expression of concern or objection by Buckskin with 
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respect to the obligations imposed under the CUP, the Development Agreement. or the Capital 
Contribution Agreement. 
On September 5, 2005, the P&Z met and voted to recommend approval of the final plats 
for Phases 2 and 3 ofThe Meadows. Nothing in the minutes of the September 5, 2005 meeting 
reflects any expression of concern or objection by Buckskin with respect to the obligations 
imposed under the CUP, the Development Agreement. or the Capital Contribution Agreement. 
On September 26, 2005, the Board of County Commissioners met and voted to approve 
the final plats for Phases 2 and 3 of The Meadows. The minutes of the September 5, 2005 
meeting reflect the Board's agreement to enter into a new Road Development Agreement with 
Buckskin which included a payment of $232,160.00 for these phases. Nothing in the minutes of 
the September 5, 2005 meeting reflects any expression of concern or objection by Buckskin with 
respect to the obligations imposed under the CUP, the Development Agreement, the Capital 
Contribution Agreement. or the Road Development Agreement 
On the same day, September 26, 2005, the Board of County Commissioners and 
Buckskin entered into the Road Development Agreement described in the preceding paragraph. 
The Road Development Agreement states: "Developer has agreed to participate in the cost of 
mitigating these impacts by contributing its proportionate share of the cost of the needed 
improvements identified in the Agreement and listed in the attached Exhibit A." 
On December 15, 2005, Timberline Development issued a check to the County in the 
amount of$232,160 (reflecting a prior credit) in fulfillment of Buckskin's obligations under the 
Road Development Agreement. The payment was not made under protest. 
On June 3, 2009, Joe Pachner, on behalf of The Meadows, requested an extension of the 
deadline for final plat on phases 4-6. In his letter, Mr. Pachner identified items that the 
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developer was working on, including "Finalize the Road Development Agreement." The letter 
stated, "The reorganized partnership is committed to diligently work towards submitting the 
plans for review and completing the project." The letter contained no indication of any objection 
or concern with respect to obligations lUlder the CUP, the Development Agreement, or with 
respect to any Road Development Agreement 
On July 9, 2009, the P&Z met and granted the requested extension of the deadline for 
final plat on phases 4-6. The minutes of the meeting recited: "Staff explained that the applicant 
was requesting an extension in order to finalize the road development aga=ement .... " The 
minutes reflect no expression of concern by the Developers with respect to obligations under the 
CUP, the Development Agreement, or any Road Development Agreement. 
Plaintiffs have in their possession or have had access to each of the staff reports, letters, 
and minutes quoted above. On no occasion have the Plaintiffs or anyone acting on their behalf 
questioned the accuracy or completeness of any statement from any of those documents. 
On or about December 1, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this action. The 
Complaint states in paragraph II and 14 that the Capital Contribution Agreement and Road 
Development Agreement entered into by Buckskin and/or Timberline were entered into "under 
protest." The record documented above demonstrates that they were not entered into under 
protest. 
The Developers did not appeal, contest, or seek judicial review of the CUP (at either the 
recommendation or final action stage). A judicial review of the CUP pursuant to the Local Land 
Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") would have been the appropriate and timely means of initiating an 
inverse condemnation action. Prior to this litigation, the Developers took no other action to 
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protest or otherwise object to the CUP, the Mitigation Agreements, or payments made pursuant 
to any of them. 
The County accepted the money from the Developers in good faith and relied on those 
payments and the tenns of the Mitigation Agreements. At no time did the Developers advise the 
County that any of them might seek a refund of the money paid pursuant to the Mitigation 
Agreements or that the County could not safely rely on that money being available to the County 
for purposes of the Mitigation Agreements. Using money received from the Developers pursuant 
to the Mitigation Agreements, the County undertook capital investments for roads in the vicinity 
of The Meadows development All such monies spent by the County were spent in a<:cordance 
with and in fulfiiJment of obligations on the County spelled out in the Mitigation Agreements. 
But for the Mitigation Agreements and other similar voluntary development agreements, the 
County would not have undertaken the road improvements and expenditures described above. 
Those capital improvements are now in place. Those capital investments have improved 
transportation access to The Meadows and have thereby benefited the Developers of The 
Meadows and the current residents of The Meadows. 
Having paid the money per their own Agreement, and having received the benefit of their 
bargain, the Developers now want their money back. They brought this lawsuit claiming that the 
County could not accept money under the Agreement because such money would be an illegal 
tax under Idaho Jaw. This, they allege in tum, results in a per se taking under idaho and federal 
law. Plaintiffs failed to plead this as a§ 1983 action.4 The County, however, has treated it as a 
§ 1983 action, because that is the only cause of action available to Plaintiffs. 
4 Section 1983 refers to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan 
Act, 17 Stat 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). It provides in relevant part: "Every 
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or 
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Plaintiffs' claim fails on the merits. Whatever money the Developers have paid or will 
pay under the Agreement is paid voluntarily. Therefore. as a matter of Idaho law, it is not an 
actionable taking. Moreover, the Developers should have raised their objection at the time. It is 
too late to raise the issue now. [n any event, for a variety of reasons discussed below, the Court 
lacks jurisdiction over this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PLEAD A RIGHT OF ACflON FOR THI ALLEGED 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS. 
Plaintiffs have identified no private right of action for their federal constitutional claims 
against the County. 
Where the Congress has created an explicit cause of action for federal constitutional 
deprivation, that remedy is exclusive and a so-called "Bivens" s action is not available. The 
Ninth Circuit has so held: 
Plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the United 
States Constitution. We have previously held that a litigant 
complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 was available to Azul, but plaintiff 
failed to file its complaint within the applicable limitations period. 
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any 
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial 
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory reliefwas unavailable." 
s An implied cause of action was necessary in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Fed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), because that case involved a constitutional 
violation by~ agents making § 1983 unavailable. 
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Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 108 t ( 1993). [f Plaintiffs have any cause of action for their federal claims, it must be under 
§ 1983. 
Plaintiffs' failure to plead a cause of action is a sufficient basis to dismiss their federal 
claims. In the event the Court overlooks this pleadin& failure or allows the Plaintiffs to amend 
their complaint, this brief assumes that Plaintiffs' case is premised on § 1983. 
As will be shown below, Plaintiffs' § 1983 action is unavailing. 
II. THIS LAWSUIT IS BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by their failure to brio& their action within two years as 
required by Idaho's statute of limitations for personal injury torts, Idaho Code § 5-219(4). This 
lawsuit was flled on December l, 2009. All of the actions described in the Complaints occurred 
more than two years before that. 
It is, admittedly, counter-intuitive that Idaho's statute of limitations for personal torts 
would apply. But the law is well settled. AU § 1983 actions, regardless of their nature, are 
subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury (torts). Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 
261,266-67 (1985); Owens v. 0/cure, 488 U.S. 235,249-50 (1985)~ Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 
384, 387 (2007). 
Finally, in 1985 the Supreme Court seized the opportunity 
to put an end to the "uncertainty and time-consuming litigation that 
is foreign to the central purposes of section 1983." In Wilson v. 
Garcia, the Court, affirming a decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, decided that henceforth all section 1983 claims 
are to be characterized as personal injury actions for statute of 
limitations purposes, regardless of the underlying cause of action. 
Robert M. Jarvis, The Continuing Problem of Statutes of Limitations in Section 1983 Cases: Is 
the Answer Out at Sea?, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 285,287 (1988). 
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Wilson held that this one-size-fits-all approach applies even where the State's highest 
court has ruled that some other statute of limitations should apply to the particular type of§ 1983 
action. 
Idaho courts have followed Wilson, applying Idaho's two-year statute of limitations 
(Idaho Code§ 5-219(4)), regardless ofthe nature ofthe § 1983 action. McCabe v. Craven, 145 
Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.Jd 896, 899 (2008); Osborn v. Salinas, 131 Idaho 456, 458, 958 P.2d 
1142,1144(1998);/dahoStateBarv. Tway, 128Idaho794, 798,919P.2d323,327(1996); 
Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., 125 Idaho 429, 436, 871 P.2d 846, 853 (1994); Herrera v. Conner, 
Ill Idaho 1012, 1016,729 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Henderson v. State, I 10 
Idaho 308,310-11, 715 P.2d 978,980-81 (1986).6 The Ninth Circuit also has followed this rule 
with respect to inverse condemnation actions under§ 1983. Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. 
City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651,655 (91h Cir. 2003). 
Plaintiffs may contend that this is not a § 1983 case. Indeed, as previously noted, they 
have not pled it as a § 1983 case. That is their error. If it is not a § 1983 case, the federal law 
claims must be thrown out because, as discussed above, there is no other cause of action 
available to them. If the Court forgives their pleading error, then the case must be thrown out 
under the statute of limitations. 
As for the state constitutional claims, other statutes of limitations may apply. (These 
would also apply to both state and federal claims should the Court determine, for some reason, 
that the ruJe in Wilson is not applicable here.) To the extent the Developers' Complaint (or any 
6 On only one occasion has the Idaho Supreme Court has strayed from this clear line of 
precedent. Tn 2006, the Idaho Supreme Court applied the four-year "residual" statute of 
limitations in an inverse condemnation case raised by way of§ 1983. City of Coeur d'Alene v. 
Simpson, 142 [daho 839, 846-47, 136 P.3d 310, 317-18 (2006). This decision cannot be 
reconciled with prior precedent, which was not discussed, much less overruled, in the Simpson 
case. Most likely, the Wilson rule was not briefed. 
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further amendment thereof) sounds in tort, it is barred by the Developers' failure to meet 
procedural requirements and deadlines established in Idaho's Tort Claim Act, Idaho Code§§ 6-
906 and 6-911. This, too, is a two-year rule. 
Plaintiffs' inverse condemnation under the Idaho Constitution are subject to Idaho's 
residual four-year statute of limitations. Idaho Code§ 5-224; Wadsworth v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 128 Idaho 439,442, 915 P.2d I, 4 (1996). Plaintiffs have blown that statute too. 
It first proposed the mitigation fees in its own application filed on April l, 2004, over six years 
ago. The P&Z recommended approval of a CUP including those mitigation provisions on May 
17, 2004. The CUP was finally approved on July 12, 2004 and was issued on July 14, 2004. 
The Capital Contribution Agreement was signed by Buckskin on July 26, 2004. The Road 
Development Agreement was executed on September 26,2005. Each of these occurred more 
than four years before the suit was fi1ed on December I, 2009. The fact that some actions 
occurred in less than four years (such as the issuance of a check for phase 2 of the development), 
does not cure the violation of the four-year statute of limitations. The actions of the County 
giving rise to this lawsuit all occurred earlier. 
In addition, the Complaint violates the three-year statute of limitations set out in Idaho 
Code§ 5-218(3) for a taking of personal property. The money paid to the County by Developers 
pursuant to the Road Development Agreement is personal property. (In contrast, payment made 
pursuant to the earlier Capital Contribution Agreement was a donation of real property and 
would not be subject to this statute of limitations.) 
The Complaint also violates the six-month statute of limitations set out in Idaho Code 
§ 5-221 for claims rejected by a board of county commissioners. Exhaustion and ripeness 
principles discussed below require Developers to have sought relief from the County before 
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bringing this lawsuit. Had they done so in a timely fashion, this would have occurred wetl over 
six months ago. Developers should not be able to avoid this statute of limitations by failing to 
take mandatory procedural actions. 
Ill. THIS LAWSUIT DOES NOT SATISFY THE TWO RIPENESS REQUIREMENTS OF 
WIUIAMSON COIJNTY. 
A. Overview 
In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Supreme Court established two tests for plaintiffs alleging an 
uncompensated taking in federal court.' First, the claim must be ripe in the sense that the would-
be plaintiff has availed itself of all opportunities to obtain relief at the administrative level. 
Second, before seeking federal court jurisdiction, the plaintiff must utilize state judicial 
procedures for inverse condemnation and be denied such compensation. The Plaintiffs fail both 
tests. 
In Williamson County, a developer sought zoning approval for a residential subdivision. 
The developer obtained preliminary plat approval. Before the final plat was submitted, however, 
the County amended and toughened the zoning ordinance resulting in a substantial reduction in 
the number of lots allowed. The County then disapproved the final plat based on noncompliance 
with the revised ordinance. 
Plaintiff brought a § 1983 action in federal court alleging, among other things, a taking of 
its property. The focus of the argwnent at trial and on appeal was on whether temporary takings 
7 Williamson County has been recognized and followed by the Idaho Supreme Court, as 
well. KMST. LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581-82, 67 P .3d 56, 60-61 (2003 ); City of 
Coeur d'Alene 11. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 845-46, 136 P.3d 310, 316-17 (2006). 




an: compensable.' The U.S. Supreme Court, however, changed course and threw the case out on 
two procedural grounds. Both were described as ripeness tests. This is not ripeness in the 
ordinary sense, however. This is a special variety of ripeness applicable only to federal takings 
claims. As noted in footnote 7, however, this law is equally applicable to federal constitutional 
claims raised in state court. 
B. Test 1: The "final decision" requirement 
First, the Williamson County Court held that in order to be ripe for judicial review, the 
decision appealed from must have been a "final decision": 
As this Court has made clear in several recent decisions. a 
claim that the application of governmental regulations effects a 
taking of property is not ripe until the government entity charged 
with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision 
regarding application of the regulations to the property at issue.'' 
Williamson County at 186. Although the local planning commission had squarely and repeatedly 
rejected the preliminary plat, that was not final enough, said the Court, because the developer 
had failed to seek a variance. 
As in Hodel, Agins, and Penn Central, then, respondent has 
not yet obtained a final decision regarding how it will be allowed 
to develop its property. Our reluctance to examine taking claims 
until such a final decision has been made is compelied by the very 
nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause . 
. . . Those factors [which determine whether there has been a 
takingj simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency 
has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will 
8 The trial court rejected the jury's award of$350,000 for a temporary taking, but issued 
an injunction ordering the Commission to apply the 1973 ordinance. 'lbe Commission did not 
appeal the ruling that it must apply the 1973 ordinance. Instead, the plaintiff appealed the 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the temporary taking. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
reinstated the award for a temporary taking. On certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Commission contended that even if it should have applied the 1973 ordinance, its failure to do so 
constituted at most a temporary regulatory interference that, even if it is a taking, does not give 
rise to a claim for money damages. The Supreme Court did not reach the Commission's 
argwnent, instead finding that the plaintiff's claim was not ripe. 
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apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question. 
Williamson County at 190-91 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 
Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City ofTibwon, 441 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Central Tramp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)). The message of these four Supreme Court cases is 
that developers must take full advantage of opportunities for securing relief from the local 
governing body. Until that happens, the finality requirement is not met and the case is not ripe. 
While Williamson County dealt with the failure to seek a variance, the holding is equally 
applicable to Plaintiffs' failure to oppose the recommendation made by the P&Z.9 The .. factors" 
at issue in Williamson County were the traditional federal regulatory takings tests, e.g., "the 
effect [of the decision] on the value of respondent's property and investment-backed profit 
expectations." Williamson County at 200. The factors at issue here are state law considerations 
involving, notably, whether the payment is voluntary. In either case. the federal court is not in a 
position to evaluate the factors when the plaintiff has not even bothered to ask the local 
government for relief. In other words, Plaintiffs must raise and press their objections with the 
local government in a timely and meaningful way in order to set up their claim that the exaction 
is involuntary. The Developers here did just the opposite. Not only did the Developers fail to 
oppose the mitigation requirements included by the P&Z, they actually proposed these 
9 In discussing the difference between ripeness and exhaustion. the Court noted: 
"Similarly, respondent would not be required to appeal the Commission's rejection of the 
preliminary plat to the Board of Zoning Appeals, because the Board was empowered, at most, to 
review that rejection, not to participate in the Commission's decisionmaking." Williamson 
County at 193. This example, however, is limited to Tennessee's peculiar appeal mechanism in 
which the Board sits in the nature of an appellate body. In Idaho, where cities and counties have 
the authority to not only reverse the planning and zoning commission but to modify that 
decision, such an appeal presumably would be necessary in order to satisfy Williamson County's 
''fmal decision" requirement. 
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conditions in their own Applications. Accordingly, there is no "final decision" in the sense of 
Williamson County. 
c. Test l: The requirement to employ state invene condemnation 
procedures. 
The second holding in the case, also framed in terms of ripeness, is even more restrictive. 
As a practical matter, it bars federal court litigation involving regulatory takings claims aimed at 
state or local governments (at least in jurisdictions, like Idaho, that allow inverse condemnation 
actions). The Williamson County Court held that when a regulatory taking is alleged against a 
state or local government agency, the property owner must first "seek compensation through the 
procedures the State has provided for doing so" before litigating in federal court. Williamson 
County at 194. 
Thus, we have held that taking claims against the Federal 
Government are premature until the property owner has availed 
itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. 
Similarly, if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking 
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of 
the Just Compensation Clause until it bas used the procedure and 
been denied just compensation. 
Williamson County at 195 (citing Ruclcelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016-20 (1984)). 
In other words, where state courts will entertain inverse compensation actions. the 
landowner must avail itself of that remedy (and be denied) before initiating federal litigation. 
This is necessary, the Court explained, because the Just Compensation Clause does not prohibit 
takings. It simply prohibits takings without just compensation. Thus, it is n~ssary to tum first 
to the state to see if compensation will be granted. Williamson County at 194-95. 
In Idaho, an allegation of inverse condemnation based on a denial or restrictive approval 
ofa land use application may be pursued by seekingjudicial reviewofthe decision or. in some 
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circumstances, by way of complaint 10 Under Williamson County, this is a prerequisite to a 
federal claim alleging a taking. Having failed to employ this procedure. Developers are barred 
from pursuing the matter by way of a takings claim under the Constitution. 
D. Tbe same rules apply to due proeeaa claima. 
Reframing the question as a due process violation does not change the outcome. In 
Williamson County, the Commission urged that the developer's takings claim should be analyzed 
instead as a due process claim. (The Commission hoped that by reframing it as a due process 
question, it would not give rise to damages for the temporary taking.) The Court said it does not 
matter whether you call it a taking or a due process violation; these specialized ripeness tests are 
a requirement in any event "In sum, respondent [ developer]'s claim is premature, whether it is 
analyzed as a deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or 
as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Williamson County at 
200; 13B Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1238 (3rd 
ed. 2004). 
E. Exceptions are inapplicable 
Subsequent federal cases have carved out a few exceptions to the strict ripeness rules set 
out in Williamson County (e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618-26 (2001) (futility 
exception); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725,730 (1997) (exception for 
10 ldaho first recognized a cause of action for inverse condemnation in Boise Valley 
Const. Co. v. Kroeger, 11 Idaho 384, J 05 P. 1070 ( 1909). It continues to r~ognize the action . 
.. A property owner who believes that his or her property, or some interest therein, has been 
invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of Jaw and the payment 
of compensation, may bring an action for inverse condemnation." KMST. LLC v. County of Ada, 
1381daho 577,581,67 P.Jd 56,60 (2003). To support a claim for inverse condemnation, "the 
action must be: (I) instituted by a property owner who (2) asserts that his property, or some 
interest therein, has been invaded or appropriated (3) to the extent of a taking, ( 4) but without 
due process of law, and (5) without payment ofjust compensation." Covington v. Jefferson 
Cormty, 137 Idaho 777,780,53 P.Jd 828, 831 (2002). 
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artificially created finality requirements)). 11 None are applicable here. 12 Accordingly, the black 
letter rule in Williamson County applies, and Developers have not met it. 
IV. THE DEVILOPERS, CLAIMS ALSO FAIL TWO TESTS EST A BLISH ED UNDER KMST 
AND WHITE. 
A. Overview 
If the Developers' constitutional claims survive the hurdles described above, they 
nonetheless fail as a matter of state procedural and substantive law. 
Developers' lawsuit follows on the heels of three recent "illegal tax" cases which struck 
down impact fees imposed by local governments. 13 Plaintiffs' suit is a copycat. But it is a 
flawed copycat Plaintiffs fail to recognize that their situation is fundamentally different in two 
ways. First. they failed to exhaust. The Developers paid the money without objection and 
without administrative or judicial appeal, accepted the benefits of roads constructed on their 
behalf, and then, years later, brought a lawsuit. Second, their payment was voluntary. In the 
case at bar, fees were not imposed by the governing body pursuant to ordinance (as they were in 
Sun Valley, McCall, and Blaine Cowuy). Instead. they were proposed by the Developers and 
11 These exceptions have been recognized in Idaho as well. City of Coeur d'Alene v. 
Simpson, 142 Idaho 839,845-46, 136 P.Jd 310,316-17 (2006). 
12 The first of the Williamson County ripeness requirements (final decision) does not 
apply to physical takings, while the second one (utilization of inverse condemnation) does. 
Plaintiffs contend at page 7 of Plaintifft' Reply to County's Response to Application for 
Preliminary Injunction (Document 25) that the County's action constitutes a physical taking. As 
the County explained at pages 3-5 of County's Surreply to Application for Preliminary 
Injunction (Document 30), Plaintiffs' allegation is of a regulatory taking. There is no foundation 
for even an allegation of a physical taking. 
13 Cove Springs Development, Inc. v. Blaine County, Case No. CV2008-22 (Idaho, Fifth 
Judicial Dist, June 3, 2008) (declaring unlawful and unconstitutional various exaction and 
comprehensive plan ordinance provisions); Schaefer v. City of Sun Valley, Case No. CV -06-882 
(Idaho, Fifth Judicial Dist. July 3, 2007) (declaring unconstitutional Sun Valley's impact fee for 
affordable housing); Mountain Central Bd of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 
2006-490-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist, Feb. 19, 2008) (invalidated two ordinances imposing 
impact fees for affordable housing). 
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reflected in written agreements entered into in good faith by the parties. In other words, they 
were contract payments, not impact fees. 
Both of these flaws were present also in KMST, UC v. County of A.da, 138 Idaho 577, 
583, 67 P.3d 56, 62 (2003), a case that is controlling here. In KMST. a developer brought two 
claims against the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"), one in connection with ACHD's 
road dedication requirement and another in connection with ACHD's impact fees. (Despite the 
case name, the claims against Ada County were not pursued on appeal.) The Idaho Supreme 
Court dismissed both ACHD claims on technical grounds--Williamson County ripeness (as to 
the dedication) and exhaustion (as to the impact fees). We have already addressed Williamson 
County. The exhaustion requirement, however, is an additional state law requirement. The 
KAIST Court went on to opine as to the merits of the takings claim on the road dedication saying 
that this was not a taking because it was voluntarily offered. In essence, it was a not a "taking" 
but a "giving" (our words, not the Court's). This holding, too, is on point and is a fatal flaw 
going to the merits of Plaintiffs' claim. 
B. The Developers failed to exhaust 
In KMST, the plaintiff failed to exhaust because it paid the fees rather than appealing 
them. 
[KMST] simply paid the impact fees in the amount initially 
calculated. Having done so, it cannot now claim that the amount 
of the impact fees constituted an unconstitutional taking of its 
property. 
As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative 
remedies before resorting to court to challenge the validity of 
administrative acts. . . . KMST had the opportunity to challenge 
the calculation of the impact fees administratively. and it chose not 
to do so. 
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KMST, 137 Idaho at 583, 67 P.3d at 62. 14 
The Developers are in the same position. They could have withdrawn the offer they 
made in their own Applications to provide mitigation. They could have raised their concerns in 
any of the hearings before the P&Z. Likewise, they could have objected to the P&Z's 
recommendation when the matter was taken up by the Board of County Commissioners. They 
did none of these. Accordingly, they have failed to exhaust, as required by KMST. 
KMST recognizes limited exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, notably "when the 
agency acted outside its authority." KMST, 138 Idaho at 582, 67 P.Jd at 61. Those exceptions 
were not applicable in KMST, nor are they applicable here. 15 And for good reason. The policy 
14 ACHD's impact fees were imposed pursuant to the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act 
(''IDIFA"), Idaho Code§§ 67-8201 to 67-8216. Valley County has not yet adopted an IDIFA-
compliant impact fee ordinance (although it is in the process of doing so). But K.MST remains on 
point The exhaustion requirement is not a function ofiDIFA. It is based on general principles 
of administrative law. "As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before 
resorting to the courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts. KMSI, 137 Idaho at 583, 
67 P.3d at 62. 
IS A review of the cases Shows that this exception applies only to facial challenges to 
ordinances and statutes. The clearest statement that exhaustion is required in as awlied 
constitutional challenges is found in Whitt! v. Bannock County Comm 'rs, 139ldaho 396, 80 P.3d 
332 (2003). In White, the Court rejected an end run around the judicial review requirements in 
the Local Land Use Planning Act by a neighbor challenging zoning approval for an asphalt plant. 
Rather than pursuing an administrative appeal. Mr. White filed suit raising various .. as applied" 
due process challenges to the zoning approval. The County sought dismissal for failure to 
exhaust. The Court recognized that there are exceptions to the exhaustion requirement but said 
they did not apply. "We also conclude that the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine 
do not apply to the present case where the question of a conditional use permit 'is one within the 
zoning authority's specialization and when the administrative remedy is as likely as the judicial 
remedy to provide the wanted relief."' White, 139 Idaho at 402, 80 PJd at 338 (citing Fairway 
Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 124, 804 P.2d 294, 297 (1990)). The 
obvious conclusion is that when parties to a zoning matter wish to challenge the constitutional 
adequacy of administrative proceedings (as opposed to the ordinance itself), they must first 
present their objections to the local governmental officials and give them an opportunity to 
consider and, if necessary, address the alleged violations ... As we have previously recognized, 
important policy considerations underlie the requirement for exhausting administrative remedies, 
such as providing the opportunity for mitigating or curing errors without judicial intervention, 
deferring to the administrative processes established by the Legislature and the administrative 
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considerations articulated by the Court in White are poignantly applicable here. Had the 
Developers timely opposed the mitigation proposal, objected to the Mitigation Agreements, or 
stated that they were acting under protest. the County would have been on notice as to the 
situation. Because the Developers did not take such action, there is no way of knowing how 
events might have unfolded. The Developers might have proceeded with their Applications 
without any mitigation proposal, but it would have been much harder to sell the lots if the project 
was accessed by unimproved roads. 16 Instead, the Developers pursued their offer of mitigation 
and entered into the Mitigation Agreements. The County also complied with the tenns of the 
Mitigation Agreements, spending road development money on road improvements that directly 
benefited the Developers. The message from KMST and White is that developers cannot play it 
both ways. There is a reason the Legislature created an administrative appeal process. It is to 
avoid lawsuits like this one. 
C. Developen' actions were voluntary. 
The KMST case also applied Williamson CounJy in ruling that KMST' s action could not 
be challenged under § 1983 because its decision was not a "final decision." The Court then went 
on to say that even if ACHD's recommendation had been a final decision, it would not have 
constituted a taking because the dedication was voluntary. 17 In a pre-application meeting with 
body, and the sense of comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the administrative body." 
White, 139 Idaho at 337-38, 80 P.3d at 401-02. Thus, although the Court did not say so in so 
many words, it is inescapable from White that the exhaustion exception does not apply to "as 
applied" constitutional challenges. 
16 Had the Developers withdrawn their offer to provide road mitigation set out in their 
own Applications, the County would have been entitled to withhold approval of the project or to 
condition timing of the development upon finding other funding for the necessary road 
construction. The County certainly has that authority. Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a). 
17 Technically one might argue that this was dictum, but Justice Eismann's language 
made it clear that the Court intended it as a ruling. 
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ACHD staff, KMST was advised that staff would recommend a requirement of a road dedication. 
In order to move things along, KMST agreed to tbe dedication and included it in its application. 
This proved fatal to KMST' s taking claim. 
KMST representatives included the construction and dedication of 
Bird Street in the application because they were concerned that 
failing to do so would delay closing on the property and 
development of the property. KMST'~ groperty was not taken. It 
voluntarily decided to dedicate the road to the public in order to 
soeed approval of its development Having done so. it cannot now 
claim that its property was "taken." 
KMST, 138 Idaho at 582,67 P.3d at 61 (emphasis supplied) (internal quotations identifying 
district court's language omitted). This language is significant because it shows that it makes no 
difference that the developer was motivated by a desire to speed the processing of its application~ 
the developer's action is stiU voluntary. 
The Developers' situation here is indistinguishable. Perhaps they were not pleased with 
the idea of paying their fair share of transportation costs, but they did not say so and they 
certainly did not challenge the County's authority to accept such mitigation. One way or 
another, the Developers needed to assure the County that adequate infrastructure would be in 
place to support the new development. The Developers could have simply waited until the 
County was able to raise the funds to build that infrastructure. Instead, in order to speed their 
project forward, the Developers elected to make payments to the County reflecting the project's 
proportionate share of transportation impact costs. 
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Having so elected, the Developers cannot now be heard to complain that the payments 
they agreed to make were illegal taxes. This was the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court in 
KMST.' 8 
V. IF PLAINTIFFS' INVIRSE CONDEMNATION ACTION JS DISMISSED, ITS REQUEST 
FOR DECLARATORY RELII:F IS MOOT. 
The core of Plaintiffs' claim, of course, is its desire to get its money back-i.e., their 
inverse condemnation claim. As shown above, that claim is procedurally and substantively 
flawed. If the County is under no obligation to return the money, Plaintiffs' ancillary request for 
declaratory relief is meaningless and moot. It would be of academic interest only and is not a 
proper subject for judicial action. 
VI. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR RELIEF WITH RESPECT TO FlJTURE ACTIONS IS NOT 
RIPE. 
This lawsuit is focused primarily on past actions-notably the Mitigation Agreements. 
Plaintiffs, however, have also included requests for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect 
to actions that might be taken by the County in the future. 
Obviously, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit respecting things the 
Plaintiffs think the County might do in the future. What actions the Plaintiffs and the County 
might take in the future regarding yet-to-be negotiated future road development agreements is 
plainly speculative. Indeed, the County is now undergoing a complete review of its policies 
regarding permitting of new developments and is exploring the enactment of a new IDIF A-
compliant ordinance that would moot any claims with respect to future development agreements. 
11 Developers may contend that their action was not voluntary, but no evidence supports 
this. Valley County's Staterrumt of Material Facts Not in Dispute fully documents the voluntary 
nature of the Developers' actions. 
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The Court cannot entertain lawsuits over such patently unripe allegations. Equitable principles 
prevent the Developers from obtaining the remedies they seek here. 
VII. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES PREVENT THE DEVELOPERS FROM OBTAINING THE 
REMEDIES THEY SEIK HERL 
The Developers benefited substantially from their arrangement with the County. As a 
result of the Agreement, the Developers did not have to wait for the County to find the money to 
build roads, and the approved portions of their project were completed before the economic 
crash. Those roads are now in place, and the property continues to benefit from an improved 
regional road network. Despite those benefits. Plaintiffs want their money back. 
The law of common law of equity, however, prevents the Developers from having their 
cake and eating it, too. Settled equitable principles demand that the Developers not prevail in 
their attempt to profit from what amounts to nothing more than reneging on an explicit 
agreement regarding the most appropriate way to finance necessary road improvements. 
First, the law abhors the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another, and it 
is a general principle oflaw that one should be required to make restitution of benefits received, 
retained, or appropriated from another. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts§ 8 
(200 I). Allowing the Developers to recover the negotiated transportation payments from the 
County would result in an unjust enrichment for the Developers at the expense of the County. 
Equity does not permit the Developers to profit from the County's expenditure of public funds 
without providing anything in return. See Barry v. Pacific West Construction, Inc., 140 Idaho 
827, 103 P.3d 440 (2004) (general contractor was unjustly enriched by uncompensated work of 
subcontractor). 
Second. someone who performs substantial services for another without an express 
agreement for compensation ordinarily becomes entitled to the reasonable value of those 
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services. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts§ 37 (2001). Again., even if there 
were no valid agreement between the parties, the fact remains that the County performed the 
substantial service of designing, financing, and building the road network to serve the 
Developers' property. Under this theory of quantum meruit, the County is entitled to the 
reasonable value of the work and material provided to the Developers. The negotiated 
transportation-related cost in the Agreement represents the reasonable value and should not be 
returned to Developers. 
Third, courts in equity can use "promissory estoppel" to enforce a promise made without 
consideration when the following elements are present: (i) the detriment suffered in reliance on 
the promise was substantial in an economic sense; (ii) the substantial loss to the promisee acting 
in reliance was, or should have been, foreseen by the promisor; and (iii) the promisee must have 
acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise made. Rule Sales and Service, Inc. v. U.S. 
Bank National Association, 133 Idaho 669, 674, 991 P.2d 857, 862 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000). Put 
another way, "the doctrine requires only that it be foreseeable to the promisor that the promisee 
would take some action or forbearance in reliance upon the promise and would thereby suffer . 
substantial loss if the promise were to be dishonored." ld at 675, 991 P.2d at 863. In this action. 
by trying to get its money back, the Developers are essentially claiming a right to take back their 
promise to pay. But the County already relied on that promise and, reasonably and justifiably, 
suffered a substantial economic detriment in response. To allow the Developers to dishonor their 
promise now would be a great injustice. 
Fourth, the equitable principle of laches provides that a plaintiff is estopped from 
asserting the alleged invasion of his rights when: (i) the plaintiff delayed in asserting these rights; 
(ii) the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (iii) the defendant did not know 
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that the plaintiff would assert such rights; and (iv) the delayed suit would injure or prejudice the 
defendant. Finucane v. Village of Hayden, 86 Idaho 199, 205, 384 P.2d 236, 240 (1963). All 
those tests are met here. Allowing the Developers to recover the negotiated transportation-
related costs now will require the County to burden its citizens to raise money to pay the 
Developers for expenditures already made on behalf of the Developers. This financial burden 
would result in a windfall to the Developers and severely injure and prejudice the County. 
Equity should prevent such a result. The undisputed facts in the record show that Plaintiffs did 
not raise any objection to any action of the County. Plaintiffs may claim that they did not object 
because they assumed the County's actions were lawful. That is, in effect, an admission that 
they did not question the County's actions, and, in any event, it is insufficient to overcome the 
equities favoring the County. 
Finally, the equitable concept of"waiver" applies in an action for breach of contract and 
states that "a party who accepts the other's performance without objection is assumed to have 
received the pcrfonnance contemplated by the agreement." 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts§ 640 
(2001). "A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage [and 
the] party asserting the waiver must show that he has acted in reliance upon such a waiver and 
reasonably altered his position to his detriment." Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 26, 936 P.2d 
219, 224 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). Here, the Developers are not claiming breach of contract 
against the County, but the principles behind the concept of waiver instruct that the Developers 
cannot now complain that the road construction under the terms of the Mitigation Agreements 
was anything but acceptable. Until this suit was flled, Developers did not characterize the 
negotiated transportation-related payment as an illegal impact fee or assert its purported rights to 
be free from illegal impact fees. Had the Developers done so, the County could have responded 
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a<."Cordin~,tly then. J (owever, nothing of the sort toolc place and the County acted in reliance on 
lhc Dcvel~(l':n' a.c\:cplaru.."t: of the Cuunty • s J:k:Tfunnam:c: uf its duties under the A~mt:m. 
Waiver principles soould prevent the Developers from asserting that the County did anything 
'Wrung now. 
CONC.:LliSION 
In short, payments made by Plaintiffs were not illegal taxes but were voluntarily 
negotiated payments that benetited them by funding road construction oo an expedited basis. 
Even if those paymeol3 had been illegal taxes. however, it is too late to challenge them now. 
Plaintiffs were obligated to challenge them at the time. Doing so now violates the statute of 
limitations a.'l well as weU-seuled exhaustion and ripeness principles. For these and all of the 
other legal and equitable rea.'lons discu.'l~d above. judgment should be entered dismissing 
Plaintiffs' lawsuit. 
'. t 
DATED this · day of October, 2010. 
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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Exhibit A -Conditional Use Permit (May 24, 2005) 
Exhibit B-Road Development Agreement (June 26,2006 -effective date) 
Exhibit C -Plaintiffs' discovery responses (July 26, 20 l 0) 
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